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fire under the ash 
and written on the wall 
the shadow of a friend 
 
- Matsuo Bashō (1644-1694) - 
 
 
dead my old fine hopes 
and dry my dreaming but still 
iris, blue each spring 
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In this thesis I clarify understanding of the role values play in Japanese views of 
contemporary Japan-China relations. I seek to answer the question: how consistently 
do values play a role in Japanese elite thought, both academic and political, thought 
in explaining contemporary Japan-China relations? 
I first uncover the dynamics of Japan’s relations with China from the end of the 
Pacific War until the mid-2010s. It then explores Japanese academic perceptions of 
current Japan-China relations, and follows this with an analysis of various foreign 
policy strategies that the Japanese government has formulated over the past nearly 
two decades, with a particular focus on the inconsistencies of the so-called values-
oriented diplomacy, with which Japan aimed to forge new alliances in the Asia-
Pacific and attempted to compete with the growing influence of China. The case 
study reveals further significant inconsistencies between certain values with which 
Japan has been attempting to appeal to an international audience and values the 
Japanese political elite considers important for its domestic population. 
This research draws from Japanese scholarly articles, documents and statements 
issued by the Japanese government, various news sources, publications of 
organizations, speeches made by Japanese government officials, and related 
secondary literature. 
I show that that not only are Japan-China relations problematic, but so are some of 
the contexts and value perceptions with which a number of leading Japanese scholars 
and members of the political elite view and explain these relations. It ultimately 
argues that adherence to values is indeed important and that, in order to make 
significant progress in its relations with China, Japan also needs to have a deeper 
understanding of the very values it considers important. 
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Introduction to question, methodology, main concepts and key terms 
Overview 
Japan shares a long and rich history of predominantly amicable cultural interactions 
with China that goes back nearly 2000 years. Before the start of Western 
colonization, Japan was a part of the so-called Sinosphere, a China-centered cultural 
sphere, that characterized traditional international relations in East Asia, and which 
had a significant influence on the early development of the Japanese state.1 While 
Japan had successfully attempted to break away from China’s influence and was able 
to create its own unique culture by the end of the Heian period (794-1185), it still 
continued to regard China as its “significant other” and Chinese culture as a source 
of inspiration. China, therefore, had continued to play a central role in Japan’s 
worldview, with the latter harboring mostly positive sentiments towards its largest 
neighbor. Japan’s relations with China were generally peaceful with only a few 
historical exceptions,2 and the two countries coexisted in an inward-looking and 
hierarchic regional order with China at its center of gravity.3 However, as a result of 
its enormous national modernization efforts driven by the influence of the West’s4 
                                               
1 The Sinosphere, or East Asian cultural sphere, included China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and areas 
between Mongolia and the Himalayas. Japanese historian Sadao Nishijima explains that this cultural 
sphere developed in a relative isolation from other cultures. According to Nishijima, Sinosphere was 
based on the sharing of Confucian thought, Buddhism, and similar political and social structures. See 
Hui Wang, "'Modernity and 'Asia' in the Study of Chinese History," in Across cultural borders: 
historiography in global perspective, ed. Eckhardt Fuchs and Benedikt Stuchtey (New York: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 322. See also Edwin O. Reischauer, "The Sinic World in 
Perspective," Foreign Affairs  52, no. 2 ( January 1974): 341-348. 
2 The only exceptions were the Mongol invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281, and Japan’s invasion of 
the Korean Peninsula between 1592-1598, with the aim of expanding its power further into China. 
Chinese troops were instrumental in stopping Japan’s expansion. For the Mongol invasions, see 
Wendy Smith, “The Mongol Invasions of Japan,” Agora 47. No. 1 (2012): 47. Accessed May 21, 2018, 
https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=054751911761602;res=IELHSS. 
For Japan’s expansion into mainland Asia, see David C. Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five 
Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 1-2. 
3 See David C. Kang, “Hierarchy in Asian International Relations: 1300-1900,” Asian Security 1, no. 1 
(2005): 55. 
4 The concept of “West,” also referred to as “Occident,” has its roots in the Greco-Roman civilization 
in Europe, and the advent of Christianity. The term has little geographic relevance today and is 
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expansion into Asia, Japan had emerged as a newly industrialized and militarized 
regional power by the end of the 19th century, while China remained largely 
undeveloped and rather shaken by Western colonization. The new struggle for power 
in the region resulted in Japan’s successful modernization and China’s relative 
stagnation and prolonged internal struggles, demolishing the millennium-old 
regional order in East Asia. As a new contender for regional leadership, Japan 
quickly moved to challenge China’s weakened positions, which effort culminated in 
the two Sino-Japanese wars.5 These wars have profoundly changed Japan-China 
relations, and their acute memories – along with their very different interpretations 
on each side – continue to have a significant impact on bilateral relations even today. 
Recent history has opened yet another chapter in Japan-China relations. As a 
result of various substantial global and regional transformations, the world has 
witnessed China’s breathtaking rise over the past few decades, the pace and scale of 
which was perhaps as unexpected as that of Japan’s some 100 years earlier. China’s 
spectacular re-emergence as the economic powerhouse of the world has also put the 
country in the centre of global attention.6 It was also during the past few decades that 
East Asia, after having experienced a period of “cold peace” during the Cold War 
that was framed by the power struggle between extra-regional forces, has started 
developing a renewed sense of regional identity. This new awareness of region was 
based on economic growth that was supported by a rapidly developing network of 
                                                                                                                                    
widely used to refer to Europe, North America, and countries of European colonial origin with 
substantial European ancestral populations elsewhere, such Australia and New Zealand. See also 
discussion of the term on pages 232-233. 
5 The First Sino-Japanese War was fought between 1894-1895. See Sarah C. Paine, The Sino-
Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press (2005). The Second Sino-Japanese Warwas fought between 1937-1945. Officially regarded by 
the Imperial Japanese government as an “incident”, it was in fact the largest war fought in Asia in 
the 20th century. See Herbert P. Bix, "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War 
Responsibility", Journal of Japanese Studies 18, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 345. 
6 Tilak Abeysinghe and Ding Lu, “China as an economic powerhouse: Implications on its neighbors,” 
China Economic Review 14 (2003): 164-85. 
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trade links and region-wide organizations in East Asia.7 However, and particularly in 
contrast with China’s recent success story, the world has observed a very different 
Japan: a nation that has been struggling to cope with both new external and internal 
challenges in the post-Cold War era. For these reasons, therefore, it is no wonder that 
China again has a central importance in Japan’s international relations. This is the 
first time in history when both countries are competing head to head for regional 
leadership while being two of the strongest economic powers in the world. Sino-
Japanese relations therefore not only have a significant impact on both countries, but 
are also generally considered to be the single most important bilateral relation in East 
Asia.8 This is also the region in which the interests of the three largest economic 
powers of the world, the United States, China, and Japan, meet, overlap, as well as 
collide at times.9 However, relations between Japan and China not only shape the 
development of the region, but can also have a significant impact beyond East Asia. 
In the process of globalization, it was East Asia, with China back again at its centre 
of gravity, that emerged as a region to pose arguably the greatest challenge to 
Western global dominance.10 Nevertheless, the development trajectory of East Asia 
has been in a sharp contrast with some other regions, perhaps most notably with that 
of the European Union, since it has so far been unsuccessful in creating an 
                                               
7 Paul De Grauwe and Zhaoyong Zhang, “The Rise of China and Regional Integration in East Asia,” 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 63, no. 1 (February 2016): 1-6. 
8 For instance, Men Honghua, Deputy Director of the Center of International Strategic Studies at the 
Party School of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, maintains that the most 
important relationship for the future of the East Asian order is the one between China and Japan. 
Men Honghua, “East Asian Order Formation and Sino-Japanese Relations,” Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 17, issue 1 (Winter 2010): 47 
9 The United States has the largest economy in the world, followed by China and Japan. See current 
economic figures of the World Bank database at 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.CD&country=. 
10 Giovanni Arrighi, Iftikhar Ahmad, and Miin-wen Shih, “Western Hegemonies in World-Historical 
Perspective,” in Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System, ed.  Giovanni Arrighi, Beverly J. 
Silver et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 219. 
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overarching regional security framework or a broader political cooperation.11 At the 
heart of this problem lie Japan-China relations. 
 
Research question 
Significant interest in contemporary Japan-China relations means that there is 
already a substantial body of literature available on various aspects of this subject. 
Recent scholarship, be it Chinese, Japanese, or international, generally represents 
contemporary Sino-Japanese relations in the context of a growing competition for 
regional leadership in East Asia,12 as an issue of national security,13 as a conflict 
stemming from different interpretations of history,14 as a rivalry between different 
national identities,15 or in the light of territorial disputes and a clashing over the 
development of the resources in the East China Sea.16 As Japanese historian and 
international relations expert Akira Iriye argues, “it is customary to stress power, 
(…) the ways in which [countries] respect, defend, or infringe upon each other’s 
                                               
11 Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki, “Prospects for Regional Security Cooperation in East Asia,” Journal of 
Asia-Pacific Studies 16 (May 2011): 45-58. 
12 Joel Rathus, Japan, China, and Networked Regionalism in East Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011).  
13 Yasuhiro Takeda, “Sino-Japanese Strategic Relations in Multilateral Regional Frameworks,” in Sino-
Japanese Relations: Rivals or Partners in Regional Cooperation?, ed. Niklas Swanström and Ryōsei 
Kokubun (Singapore:  World Scientific, 2013), 85-104; Akio Takahara, “Issues and Future Prospects 
for Japan-China Relations”, The Tokyo Foundation, April 7, 2011, 
http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2011/Japan-China-Relations. 
14 See Masanori Nakamura, “The History Textbook Controversy and Nationalism,” Bulletin of 
Concerned Asian Scholars 30, no. 2, (1998): 16-23; Takashi Yoshida, “History Textbooks: For Whom 
and for What Purposes,” Asian Studies Newsletter 45, no. 4 (Winter 2000), 13-14. For an overview 
on the issue of history, see Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the 
Future? (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 1-9. 
15 Haruko Satoh, “The Odd Couple: Japan and China, The Politics of History and Identity,” YaleGlobal 
Online, 7 August, 2006, https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/odd-couple-japan-and-china-politics-
history-and-identity. 
16 Unryū Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism 
and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (University of Hawai’I Press, 2000); Niklas Swanström and Ryōsei 
Kokubun, eds., Sino-Japanese Relations: Rivals or Partners in Regional Cooperation? (Singapore:  
World Scientific, 2013),.188-9. For an overview of Japan-China relations, see Lam Peng Er, ed., 
Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power (London: Routledge, 2006). For a Chinese 
perspective, see Ming Wan. Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006). 
 5 
sovereignty and independence” when discussing relations between two or more 
countries.17 In other words, notions of power, rivalry and competition consist the 
central focus of contemporary literature. While it is important to pay close attention 
to the economic, security and political issues between these two countries, of similar, 
if not more, importance are the visions, ideas, and values that influence the dynamics 
of Japan-China relations and that can also play a significant role in the development 
of the region. Nevertheless, existing scholarship appears to pay little attention to the 
ideas and values that shape contemporary Japan-China relations. As someone with a 
background in Japanese studies, what interests me in this context is how Japan 
perceives and explains its relations with China. In particular, I am interested in the 
approach and value perceptions that frame contemporary Japanese thought regarding 
Japan-China relations. More specifically – and this finally leads to my research 
question – how consistent a role do values play in Japanese elite thought in 
explaining contemporary Japan-China relations? 
Even though there is a growing interest, both academic and general, in various 
aspects of Japan-China relations, little attention has been given to the approaches and 
value perceptions that frame contemporary Japanese academic and political thought 
in regards to Japan-China relations. My research, therefore, aims to contribute 






                                               
17 Akira Iriye. China and Japan in the Global Setting, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 




This section introduces and clarifies the meaning of “value,” and its dependent 
variables, political values and universal values, concepts that are of central 
importance in my thesis. 
 
Values 
It is interesting to see how little scholarship is available on the concept of values and 
how little theoretical framework has developed on this basis. On the one hand, there 
appears to be a general agreement among scholars writing on the subject regarding 
five features of the conceptual definition of values: a value is a (1) belief (2) 
pertaining to desirable end states or modes of conduct, that (3) transcends specific 
situations, (4) guides selection or evaluation of behaviour, people, and events, and 
(5) is ordered by importance relative to other values to form a system of value 
priorities.18 On the other hand, however, there also appears to be a consensus among 
scholars in regards to the general lack of a theoretical framework for the analysis of 
values.19 Hechter et. al. point out that, while in the 1960s values “explicitly occupied 
a central place in all of the social science disciplines,” there is now a “striking 
absence of discussion” when it comes to what values are and what values-related 
theoretical frameworks might consist of, and that, more generally, there has been 
“too little appreciation of how difficult it is to incorporate values” in the field of 
contemporary social scientific research.20 Loek Halman explains that the sociological 
                                               
18 Shalom H. Schwartz. “Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human 
Values?,” Journal of Social Issues 50, no. 4 (1999): 20. 
19 Thomas Dietz and Paul C. Stern, “Toward a theory of choice: socially embedded preference 
construction,” The Journal of Socio-Economics 24, issue 2 (Summer 1995): 264; Michael Hechter, 
“Values Research in the Social Behavioral Sciences,” in The Origin of Values, ed. Michael Hechter, 
Lynn Nadel and Richard E. Michod (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993), 2. 
20 Hechter, “Values Research in the Social Behavioral Sciences,” 2. 
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and psychological literature on values simply reveal “a terminological jungle.”21 
Hechter even goes as far as to ask whether, since there exists no compelling and 
substantive theory of values, should the concept be written out of the social scientist 
lexicon?22 The general consensus among scholars appears to be that the concept is 
still unclear and that it lacks any substantial theoretical framework, due to the fact 
that values can take many forms, all of which are non-empirical, intangible and 
therefore hard to define, measure or quantify properly.23 Some scholars, however, 
posit that values are “general and durable internal criteria for evaluation,” differing 
from other concepts such as preferences, attitudes and norms.24 Nevertheless, most 
social science scholars seem to agree that values are beliefs, motivations, and 
orientations that are deeply embedded in the psyche, based on which opinions, 
attitudes, norms, and actions can be explained.25 Ultimately, however, because of the 
lack of proper definition and theoretical framework, any scholarly work on the 
                                               
21 Loek Halman, “Political Values,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, ed.  Russell J. Dalton 
and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 309. 
22 Hechter Michael, “Should values be written out of the social scientist lexicon?,” Sociological 
Theory 10, no. 2 (Autumn 1992): 214-30. See also Brian Barry. Sociologists, economists and 
democracy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 180. 
23 See Steven Hitlin and Jane A. Piliavin, “Values: Reviving a Dormant Concept,” Annual Review of 
Sociology 30 (2004): 359-93; Meg J. Rohan, “A rose by any name? The values construct,” Personality 
and Social 
Psychology Review 4, issue 3 (August 2000): 255-277. 
24 “Like values, preferences and attitudes are internal; unlike them, preferences are labile rather 
than durable, and particular rather general. Whereas norms are also evaluative, general and durable, 
they are external to actors and -in contrast to values- require sanctioning for their efficacy.” Hechter, 
“Values Research in the Social Behavioral Sciences,” 3. Similarly, Milton Rokeach argues that a value 
is a “disposition of a person just like an attitude, but more basic than an attitude, often underlying it.” 
Milton Rokeach. Beliefs, Attitudes and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1968), 124. 
25 Peter Ester, Peter Mohler and Henk Vinken, “Values and the social sciences: a global world of 
global values?,” in Globalization, Value Change, and Generations: A Cross-National and 
Intergenerational Perspective, ed. Peter Ester, Michael Braun and Peter Mohler (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 
2006),  7. See also Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarborough, ed., The Impact of Values (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 21-24. 
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subject “gives each writer both the obligation and the license to define [values] de 
novo.”26  
As a working definition, and since this thesis focuses on values in the context 
of Japan-China relations, I propose that values are the best outcome, a kind of 
superposition, of all interests in question. If values were quantifiable, they would 
indicate the greatest common divisor and the greatest common multiple of all 
interests at the same time. In other words, values indicate the best interest of all 
parties involved. Since they represent an ideal state of affairs, something that is the 
best for all parties, they are only approximative from a pragmatic point of view. 
They are approximative in the sense that, no matter how close we are to realising 
them, they can never fully be achieved or reached (because they are internal, 
immaterial and unmeasurable). In other words, a value is 1) holistic in a sense that it 
carries universal validity, and 2) approximative in a sense that - it being the highest 
ideal - it is only approachable but can never fully be realised. Because of the very 
fact that they are unrealizable, it is all the more important that each party involved 
constantly strive to reach them, or get ever closer to realizing them.  
 
Political values 
Since this thesis also discusses the role of values in the Japanese government’s 
diplomatic strategies, it is important to define what values in politics are. Similar to 
the general literature on values, there is relatively little scholarship available on 
political values, or, more specifically, on the “politics of value”, which is the 
political process of “establishing and controlling what and whose values matter in 
                                               
26 Hechter, “Values Research in the Social Behavioral Sciences,” 3. 
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defining valuation criteria and subsequent value.”27 Political values are guidelines, 
orientations and principles based on which specific government policies and 
diplomatic strategies are formed, and based on which certain political behaviours, 
actions and decisions can be explained. Political values can be seen as indications of 
a desirable order, determining “whether a political situation or a political event is 
experienced as favorable or unfavorable, good or bad.”28 Simply put, political values 
are values that specifically are used in the context of politics, diplomacy, and 
political strategies. 
Political values are of course influenced by certain cultural values. However, 
in the process of modernization, different cultures, that emphasized different values 
in the past, can converge in their value preferences and adopt modern and 
democratic values.29 The more advanced a society is the more these political values 
tend to converge. Ultimately, and regardless of their traditional cultural background, 
political value change usually takes place in all advancing and industrializing 
societies, leading to the development of certain new or post-materialist, values.30 In 
this sense, certain old values that were more emphasized in the past, such as national 
security, public order, respect for authority, and conformity, become less important, 
while there is a shift towards new, or more humanistic, values such as personal 
freedom and autonomy, independence, self-fulfilment, social equality and 
                                               
27 Juliane Reinecke, “The Politics of Values: A Case Study of ‘Conflict-Free’ Gold,” in Making Things 
Valuable, ed. Martin Kornberger, Lise Justesen, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 210. 
28 Ronald Inglehart and Hans D. Klingemann, “Ideological conceptualization and value priorities,” in 
Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies, ed. Samuel M. Barnes, Max Kaase, 
et al. (Beverly Hills, California.: Sage, 1979), 207. 
29 Lucian W. Pye. Aspects of political development: An analytic study (Boston: Little Brown & 
Company, 1966), 1-28. 
30 Ronald Inglehart, “Changing values in Japan and the West,” Comparative Political Studies 14, no. 4 
(January 1982): 445. 
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emancipation at the same time.31 In other words, advanced societies often experience 
a shift from authoritarian towards liberal democratic political values.32 As a result of 
convergence, these values transcend cultural and national borders and become shared 
by a growing number of countries and societies, ultimately leading to a belief in a 




As in the case of values in general, the concept of universal values is also not clearly 
defined. At times, this set of values is also referred to as basic values, fundamental 
values, common values, shared values, or universal human values. Ali Khan simply, 
and rather generally, refers to universal values as “the values of the people of the 
world”,33 and explains that any value included in a universal treaty is a universal 
value, “since no value is placed in a universal treaty if too many nations dispute its 
legitimacy.”34 Others provide a bit more clarity around the concept, indicating that 
universal values are “universally valid” in a sense that their validity does not depend 
on any individual’s free choice and they are values that all cultures must have in 
common.35 This set of values can be understood in two ways. First, a value has 
                                               
31 Ronald Inglehart. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change 
in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 3-6.  See also Ronald Inglehart, 
“Postmodernization erodes respect for authority, but increases support for democra,” in Critical 
Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, ed. Pippa Noris (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999): 236–56. 
32 Knutsen Oddbjørn, “The end of traditional political values?,” in Globalization, Value Change, and 
Generations: A Cross-National and Intergenerational Perspective, ed. Peter Ester, Michael Braun and 
Peter Mohler (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2006), 116. See also Ronald Inglehart and Scott C. Flanagan, 
“Value changes in industrial societies,” American Political Science Review 81, issue 4 (December 
1987): 1305. 
33 L. Ali Khan, A Theory of Universal Democracy: Beyond the End of History (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), 83. 
34 Ibid., 88. 
35 Aulis Aarnio and Aleksander Peczenik, “On Values. Universal or Relative?” Ratio Juris 9, no. 4 
(December 1996), 321. 
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universal validity if it is considered valuable by everyone. According to Isaiah Berlin, 
these values are universal in a sense that “a great many human beings in the vast 
majority of places and situations, at almost all times, do in fact hold in common, 
whether consciously and explicitly or as expressed in their behaviour, gestures, 
actions.”36 Second, a universal consent is not required for something to be of 
universal value as long as people anywhere in the world “may have reason to see it 
as valuable.”37 As Amartya Sen explains, when Mahatma Gandhi argued for the 
universal value of non-violence, or Rabindranath Tagore argued for “the freedom of 
the mind” as a universal value, they did not mean that people all over the world acted 
according to these values, but rather that they all had good reason to see them as 
something valuable.38 Based on these two views, my thesis adopts an approach 
proposing that a value is a universal value if it carries value for everyone, even 
though they may not always express it in their behaviour or actions. Also, and as 
proposed by Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, “the 
validity of universal values does not depend on their being universally obeyed or 
applied,” and the function of such values is “not to eliminate all... differences, but 
rather to help us manage them with mutual respect, and without resorting to mutual 
destruction.”39 
While it is unclear when the term “universal values” was first used, claims for 
fundamental human rights to be universally protected were first made in the 1948 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN explains that the 
document was a proclamation as a “common standard of achievements for all 
                                               
36 Ramin Jahanbegloo, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin, (London: Halban Publishers, 2007), 37. 
37 Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 (1999): 12. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Kofi Annan, “Do We Still Have Universal Values?” a public lecture delivered at Tübingen University, 
Germany, 12 December 12, 2003. https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sgsm9076.doc.htm. 
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peoples and nations,” translated into more than 500 different languages.40 In the 
Declaration, all member states pledge to promote universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Based on these, the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration identifies six shared and fundamental values to be 
“essential to international relations in the twenty-first century,” namely freedom, 
equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility.41  
It is important to note that, while the UN declaration is perhaps the best source 
to turn to when referring to universal values, other sources describe them in a 
number of different ways. In its Olympic Charter the International Olympic 
Committee, which represents the “union of the five continents,” defines the 
“essential values” of Olympism as “mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, 
solidarity and fair play.”42 Others list love, peace, truth, right conduct and non-
violence as the five universal human values.43 In his speech at the 2002 Shangri-La 
Dialogue, an annual conference on Asian security, Paul Wolfowitz, then Deputy 
Secretary of Defense argued that freedom, democracy, and free enterprise are all 
“universal values borne of a common human aspiration.”44 Even Annan describes 
                                               
40 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations General Assembly, December 10, 1948. 
Accessed April 12, 2018. http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. In its own 
words, the United Nations is the “most universal and most representative organization in the world”. 
See Section I/6 of the United Nations Millennium Declaration at 
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm. Accessed April 12, 2018. 
41 “55/2. United Nations Millennium Declaration,” United Nations General Assembly, September 8, 
2000. http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm. While the document only lists 
these six values as shared by all nations, it also states that the UN and its Charter are “indispensable 
foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world”. Aren’t these also universally shared 
values then? 
42 “Olympic Charter,” International Olympic Committee, September 2017, 10-11. Accessed May 14, 
2018. https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-Olympic-
Charter.pdf. Emphasis added. 
43 Ranjit Kumar Elamadurthi, “Peace Education: Universal Human Values,” International Journal of 
Multidisciplinary Educational Research 1, issue 3 (August 2012): 248-9. 
44 Paul Wolfowitz, “"The Gathering Storm: The Threat of Global Terror and Asia/Pacific Security" 
Remarks as Prepared by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz For the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, Asia Security Conference: The Shangri-La Dialogue.” United States 
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universal values somewhat differently from how they were first put forward in the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, identifying those values as peace, 
freedom, social progress, equal rights and human dignity.45 The most comprehensive 
empirical study that has been made to date was carried out by Shalom Schwartz in 
2012, who, based on the results from a series of studies that included surveying more 
than 25,000 people from 82 countries, identified fifty-six values with universal 
characteristics and ten types of universal value, the latter of which are power, 
achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, 
tradition, conformity, and security.46 
Ultimately, there exists no single definition of universal values and different 
scholars identify different values as universal. Schwartz’s research, however, 
suggests that a high number of various culture-specific values contain some 
universal characteristics. But are there any Japan-specific values and are universal 
values important in Japan? 
 
Japanese values and nihonjinron 
It must be pointed out that this introduction heavily relies on writings of Western 
scholars. This may appear biased - particularly, and perhaps a bit ironically, from the 
point of view of universal values. However, this is due to the lack of availability of 
non-Western scholarship on the subject. For Asian cultures, and for Japan in 
                                                                                                                                    
Department of Defense, June 1, 2002. Accessed April 10, 2018. 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020601-depsecdef.html. 
Wolfowitz adds that justice, peace and prosperity, safety and security, and religious freedom are 
also universal values that the United States stands for. Ibid., 5. 
45 Kofi Annan, “Do We Still Have Universal Values?” 
46 Shalom H. Schwartz, ”An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values,” Online Readings in 
Psychology and Culture 2, no. 1 (2012): 1-20. Nevertheless, Schwartz argues that, “although the 
nature of values and their structure may be universal, individuals and groups differ substantially in 
the relative importance they attribute to the values. That is, individuals and groups have different 
value “priorities” or “hierarchies.”” Ibid., 3. 
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particular, the importance of different cultural values became an issue when their 
traditional values were threatened by Western imperialism and colonialism. By the 
nineteenth century, their growing resistance to the West turned into a movement 
called Asianism, Pan-Asianism, or Greater Asianism, which was spearheaded by the 
Japanese.47 Underlying the movement and ideology of Pan-Asianism was a belief 
that “Asian values” should take precedence over “Western values”. One of the key 
intellectuals of Pan-Asianism, Kakuzō Okakura, a Japanese art historian who played 
a central role in introducing Japanese culture and arts to the West – more specifically 
to the United States – during the Meiji period (1868-1912), criticized Western values 
and argued for the superiority of “Asian values” in his book The Ideals of the East, 
as follows: 
“ASIA is one. The Himalayas divide, only to accentuate, two 
mighty civilisations, the Chinese with its communism of 
Confucius, and the Indian with its individualism of the Vedas. But 
not even the snowy barriers can interrupt for one moment that 
broad expanse of love for the Ultimate and Universal, which is 
the common thought-inheritance of every Asiatic race, enabling 
them to produce all the great religions of the world, and 
distinguishing them from those maritime peoples of the 
Mediterranean and the Baltic, who love to dwell on the Particular, 
and to search out the means, not the end, of life.”48 
 
Interestingly, in his argument for all Asians to unite, Okakura claims that ideas of the 
ultimate and the universal belong to Asian thought. In other words, he regards ‘Asian 
values’ to be more universalistic than those he attributes to Western civilization. 
Nevertheless, not only was Japan the strongest advocate for Pan-Asianism at that 
                                               
47 Sven Saaler and Victor J. Koschmann, eds., Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, 
Regionalism and Borders (London: Routledge, 2007), 21-33. See also Christopher W. A. Szpilman and 
Sven Saaler, “Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850-Present,” The Asia-
Pacific Journal 9, issue 17, no. 1 (April 25, 2011): 1-30, https://apjjf.org/-Sven-Saaler--Christopher-W-
-A--Szpilman/3519/article.pdf. 
48 Kakuzō Okakura, The Ideals of the East, with Special Reference to the Art of Japan  (2nd ed. New 
York: Dutton, 1905), 1. 
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time, but it also turned out to be the most open and receptive among all Asian 
countries to some Western values, as one of the most powerful slogans of the Meiji 
period, “civilization and enlightenment” (bunmei kaika), indicates. The slogan was 
used to facilitate Japan’s quick modernization based on certain civilizational 
achievements of the West. 49  However, traditional social values rooted in 
Confucianism such as group solidarity (ie), obligation (giri), loyalty and obedience 
to authority, belief in seniority, filial piety and mutual dependence remained just as 
important and were, in fact, highly emphasized by the Meiji government. One key 
change was that these traditional values were intentionally incorporated in non-
kinship relations and played a significant role in Japan’s rapid and successful 
modernization at the end of the 19th century.50 In this “vertical society”, as Japanese 
anthropologist Chie Nakane calls it, social relations were, and still are, defined in 
terms of inequality, which not only exists in bureaucratic organizations, but in 
almost all aspects of life, including even the academic and artistic worlds.51 
While scholars continue to characterize Japanese society based on the above 
traditional values, similar values can also be found in other societies in East- and 
Southeast Asia, particularly in those that were significantly influenced by 
Confucianism, such as China and the Koreas. It would therefore be difficult to argue 
that such values as filial piety, obedience to authority, group solidarity and social 
harmony, or even self-sacrifice, were unique to the Japanese. 
                                               
49 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 64. 
50 These values allowed the Meiji government to mobilize people and to legitimately demand and 
obtain extraordinary investments and achievements from them. See Gisela Trommsdorff, “Value 
Change in Japan,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 7, no. 4 (1983): 339, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0147-1767(83)90042-1. See also Shigeki Nishihara, “Changed and 
unchanged characteristics of the Japanese,” Japan Echo 1 (1974): 21-32.  
51 Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), 104-20. 
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While this thesis does not focus on answering the question whether there are 
unique Japanese values – that is, certain values that only Japanese people possess or 
believe in - it must be noted that there is a substantial body of literature on the topic 
related to such questions as what it means to be Japanese and how Japanese are 
different from other peoples of the world. Interestingly, and in contrast with the 
general lack of theories on values, there are specific Japanese theories centred on 
Japanese people called nihonjinron, or “theories of Japaneseness,” that explore 
certain traits, attitudes, norms and values that allegedly make Japanese people 
special in relation to others. Yoshio Sugimoto, a sociology professor and well-
established expert of the field, argues that at the core of nihonjinron lies “a set of 
value orientations that the Japanese are supposed to share.” 52  The origins of 
nihonjinron can be traced back for many centuries, but at least to the kokugaku 
(national studies) movement of the 18th century.53 Significantly, nativist scholars of 
that time used the ideas of what was later become to known as nihonjinron to prove 
Japanese cultural superiority to China.54 It is therefore perhaps not surprising that 
advocates of nihonjinron share a fundamental assumption that “Japaneseness” is 
fundamentally different from any otherness, particularly from Westernness and 
Western value orientations. Shūichi Katō, another leading contemporary Japanese 
social thinker, maintains that two of the five defining archetypal characteristics of 
Japanese society and culture are an “absence of universalistic values” and 
                                               
52 Yoshio Sugimoto, “Making Sense of Nihonjinron,” Thesis Eleven 57 (May 1999): 82. DOI: 
10.1177/0725513699057000007. 
53 According to the famous Japanese psychology scholar, Hiroshi Minami, it is “possible to trace back 
and locate works worthy of the name "nihonjinron" to the Edo period [17th-19th centuries] and even 
before that.” Hiroshi Minami, Nihonjinron no keifu [The Genealogy of Nihonjinron] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 
1980), 3. 
54 Roy Starrs, “Introduction,” in Japanese Cultural Nationalism: At Home and in the Asia-Pacific, ed. 
Roy Starrs (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2004), 4. 
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“exclusivism and a closed attitude towards the outside world.”55 Sugimoto, however, 
also points out that the underlying assumption of nihonjinron is that the Japanese 
people can be described in culturally and racially monolithic terms, which goes 
against the empirical reality that Japan is in fact a “highly complex and differentiated 
society” that cannot be completely defined by the values put forward in 
nihonjinron.56 He argues further that the ideology behind nihonjinron was used by 
the Japanese elite as a tool to justify Japan’s cultural domination and, ultimately, the 
colonization of the Korean Peninsula and China, along with Japan’s military 
aggression towards Southeast Asia.57 Others also point to the role of the Japanese 
elite in promoting nihonjinron, arguing that rather than focusing on certain common 
values as a means of Japan’s integration into international society, the emphasis of 
nihonjinron appears to be to subtly declare Japan’s cultural superiority and to 
promote foreign understanding of Japanese culture in this context.58 Well-known 
Japanese sociologist Kazufumi Manabe and cultural anthropologist Harumi Befu 
also conclude that nihonjinron is the “world view and the ideology of the 
establishment.”59 While theories of Japaneseness were highly popular from the 1960s 
through to the 1980s, they gradually started losing their prominence with the start of 
Japan’s economic stagnation from the early 1990s.60 
                                               
55 The other three characteristics Kato lists are 1) competitive groupism; 2) present orientation as 
distinguished from past and future orientations; 3) extreme ritualism and extreme emphasis upon 
intra-group communication. Shūichi Katō, “Nihon Shakai Bunka no Kihonteki Tokuchō [The 
fundamental characteristics of Japanese society and culture],” in Nihon Bunka no Kakureta Kata [The 
hidden archetypes of Japanese culture], ed. Kiyoko Takeda. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), 91-151. 
56 Sugimoto, “Making Sense of Nihonjinron,” 83. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Walter Edwards, “Internationalization, Nihonjinron, and the Question of Japanese Identity,” JALT 
Journal 11, no. 2 (November 1989): 159-60. https://www.jalt-publications.org/jj/articles/2789-
internationalization-nihonjinron-and-question-japanese-identity. 
59 Kazufumi Manabe & Harumi Befu, “Japanese Cultural Identity,” Japanstudien 4, no. 1 (1993): 100, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09386491.1993.11827036. 
60 Nevertheless, the discourse on Japaneseness continued even into the new millennium, with 
reputable writers still producing books with such titles as “What is Japan,” “Who are we Japanese?,” 
and “Rediscovering Japaneseness.” See Sugimoto, “Making Sense of Nihonjinron,” 81-82. 
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It must be noted that, before the emerging recognition of the importance of 
universal values in Japan from the early 2000s, a New Asianism had resurfaced in 
the 1980s. This was an offshoot of the so-called “Asian values” debate, which, with 
its vaguely defined Asia-specific values, was supposed to counter the universalist 
claims of liberalism, democracy, and human rights, “values that were dismissed as 
alien (…) and inauthentic for Asians.” 61  Nevertheless, due to factors such as 
accelerated globalisation from the early 1990s, the declining interest in Asian values 
in the aftermath of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, and especially in the light 
of Japan’s economic stagnation and China’s re-emergence, references to universal 
values in both academic and political circles gradually dominated debates on Japan-
specific values by the early 2000s. As Nobukatsu Kanehara, Assistant Chief Cabinet 
Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, and one of the main architects of 
Japan’s universal values diplomacy, 62  puts it, Japan’s “value system (…) 
undoubtedly contains values that are shared by humanity as a whole. Searching for 
the universal elements in the Japanese value system is important.”63 According to 
Kanehara, those universal elements in Japanese values are respect for human dignity, 
rule of law, and democracy. 
As this chapter has shown, neither is the theoretical framework of values well 
established, nor is the concept of value itself clearly defined. Scholars writing on the 
                                               
61 At the peak of the debate, in the first half of the 1990s, Asian values were presented by regional 
elites as an alternative to Western individualist and liberal values. Asian values were supposed to be 
the foundation of an East Asian international order. In other words, they were used to demonstrate 
an East Asian perspective on globalization. Szpilman and Saaler, “Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian 
Identity and Solidarity,” 24. See also Alfred M. Boll, “The Asian values debate and its relevance to 
international humanitarian law,” International Review of the Red Cross 841 (March 31, 2001). 
Accessed April 13, 2018. https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jqzl.htm. 
62 See Chapter Three for details on universal values as a recently emerged diplomatic strategy of 
Japan. 
63 Nobukatsu Kanehara, “Japan’s Grand Strategy and Universal Values,” a lecture at Columbia 
University, US, Consulate General of Japan in New York, April 11, 2017. Accessed September 27, 
2017. http://www.ny.us.emb-japan.go.jp/pdfs/2017-MrKANEHARA.pdf. 
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subject argue that values can have different meanings in different contexts, and that 
values, or at least their importance, can even change with time. Nevertheless - and as, 
for instance, domestic discussion related to nihonjinron shows - belief in certain 
values does seem to play a considerable role in Japan’s self-image, particularly when 
defining itself in relation to others, and can also be used by the elite to advocate for 
both a certain behaviour among the domestic population and to promote a particular 




This study focuses on exploring the role of values in both Japanese academic and 
political views on contemporary Japan-China relations, and it adopts a number of 
methodologies. 
Firstly, it applies a qualitative text analysis, focusing on the implied and 
connotative meanings values play in Japanese political and academic perceptions of 
Japan-China relations. In this context, whenever this thesis provides an interpretation 
of meaning – be it of a book, an article, a conference presentation, a report, an 
interview, or a political speech – that source is regarded as a text.64 
Secondly, this research relies on rhetorical criticism and content analysis. In 
explaining subtle textual meanings, rhetorical criticism is a useful method for 
“describing, analysing, interpreting, and evaluating the persuasive force of messages 
embedded within texts.” 65  In addition, content analysis is used to “identify, 
enumerate, and analyse occurrences of specific messages and message 
                                               
64 See Alan McKee, Textual analysis: a Beginner’s Guide (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 4. 
65 Lawrence R. Frey, Carl H. Botan, and Garry L. Kreps. Investigating communication: An introduction 
to research methods (2nd ed., Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999), 78. 
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characteristics embedded in texts.”66 Since this study focuses on the meanings 
associated with various messages in relation to the use of values, a qualitative 
content analysis is applied in particular. 
Thirdly, a case study approach is applied to generate a comparative, holistic 
and in-depth understanding of the various ways values are understood and applied in 
Japan’s real-life context.67 A case study is used to highlight significant differences 
between Japan’s understanding of values in an international context, particularly in 
its approach to Japan-China relations, and the values the Japanese political elite 
appears to emphasize in a Japanese domestic context. 
It must be noted that, while a holistic and qualitative analysis provides useful 
insights into subtle meanings, it also leaves open the possibility of idiosyncratic 
interpretations. The aim of the analysis therefore is not to give a single correct 
explanation of the variety of texts and arguments presented, but rather to provide an 
analysis that helps us see Japanese views from a reflective perspective, to reveal 
more subtle and hidden meanings of both Japanese academic and political views. 
Ultimately, the purpose of this thesis is to advance an understanding the importance 
of universal values, and of how adherence to these values could, and should, help the 
Japanese better understand contemporary Japan-China relations and resolve their 
ongoing conflicts with China. 
In regards to sources of information, this study relies on primary- and 
secondary-source materials in both English and Japanese. Primary sources include 
public statements, annual reports, and white papers published mostly by the Japanese 
                                               
66 Ibid.,  80. 
67 A case study can be defined as an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” Robert K. Yin, Case 
Study Research: Design and Methods (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications, 1984), 23. 
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government and its related agencies, and policy recommendations of various 
Japanese research institutions produced for the Japanese government. In addition, 
English language sources include various books and articles produced by Japanese 
scholars writing on Japan-China relations, and Japanese language sources include the 
text of the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) 2012 draft constitution, the LDP’s 
Draft Constitution Q&A booklet, and the Japanese government’s State Secrets 
Protection Law of 2013. Secondary sources include the news coverage of various 
Japanese, Chinese, and Western media agencies, most of which are available online. 
Books and journal articles written by Japanese and Western scholars on Japan-China 
relations are also used as secondary sources. 
As this research is based on a qualitative analysis through a single and Japan-
specific case study, it carries obvious limitations in terms of applicability to other 
countries. Nevertheless, it can be argued that understanding the importance of values, 
universal values in particular, ought to play an important role in evaluating, and even 
resolving, conflicts in any bilateral or multilateral relations, be it state to state, 
between institutions, or any other form of intra-group relations.  
While of course further studies on values - including case-specific ones - must 
be carried out to understand other conflicts, careful application of some of the 
analyses and findings of this thesis might be useful to them. In addition, conflict 
resolution in Japan-China relations in a multilateral setting, such as the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, or 




This thesis consists of four chapters, as well as an introduction and a conclusion. The 
introduction clarifies the significance of the research, defines the research question 
and various concepts used in this thesis, and the methodology of the research. The 
first chapter provides an overview of the development of post-war Japan-China 
relations and its conclusion explains why a re-evalution of Japan’s relations with 
China is timely. The second chapter examines the role of values in Japanese 
academic views of Japan-China relations. It focuses particularly on how recent 
Japanese scholarship evaluates – as it presents and describes - both China and Japan, 
what values various academics emphasize when describing these two countries and 
how they view the role and responsibility of both countries in the context of ongoing 
bilateral conflict. A number of the selected scholars have a high standing in Japanese 
academic society: many of them are professors in prominent Japanese universities, 
heads of research institutes, and leading members of Japan’s international relations 
research. Not only have these scholars’ writings shaped Japanese and foreign views 
of Japan-China relations, but some of them also had a direct and personal impact on 
the recent course of Japan’s relations with China: that is, a number of them are, or 
were, policy advisers in various government bodies, and were thus able to help 
formulate certain government policies towards China. The third chapter examines 
the role of values in a variety of strategies and policy initiatives, including the East 
Asian Community, the Arch of Freedom and Prosperity and the so-called values-
oriented diplomacy that Japan has formulated vis-a-vis China both in a bilateral and 
in a broader multilateral context since the early 2000s. The last chapter is a case 
study examining the values put forward by Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, the 
party in government for almost all of Japan’s post-war history, in its 2012 draft 
constitution and the State Secrets Protection Law of 2013. The conclusion will 
provide a summary of the findings, focusing on the significant tension between 
Japan’s promotion of universal values vis-à-vis China for an international audience 
and the values emphasized domestically. Recommendations for future research will 




















Dynamics of post-Pacific War Japan-China relations: 
from normalization back to abnormality? 
 
Introduction 
No discussion about the recent history of Japan-China relations can be free from 
referring to events that occurred during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). 
Indeed, many of the existing hostilities between the two countries are the result of 
opposing views on Japan’s wartime actions in China during that period, and negative 
sentiments on both sides have been putting severe limits on the progress of recent 
Japan-China relations. Nevertheless, both China and Japan, as we know them today, 
are the products of post-war Asian and global history. Firstly, the People’s Republic 
of China was established in 1949 and Japan since 1945 has also shown a 
development trajectory very different from that of its pre-1945 history. Secondly, a 
dominant factor in the development of both countries’ relations was the Cold War 
great power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, which put a 
major constraint on both Japan’s and China’s international relations, and therefore 
determined the development of their post-war bilateral relations for decades. Thirdly, 
globalization has been a major driving force since the 1990s, which stimulated the 
development of East Asia as a region, and from which Japan and China, for the first 
time in history, have emerged as equally strong powers competing for both regional 
leadership and global influence. This chapter therefore argues that even the Pacific 
War 68  conflicts between the two East Asian neighbors and their different 
interpretations of history can only be understood in the context of post-war regional 
                                               
68 The Pacific War was an important theatre of World War II, in which its two main protagonists, the 
United States and Japan, fought over the control of maritime and land territories located across the 
Pacific. 
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and global developments. Given its obvious limits, this chapter does not engage with 
all the aspects and particularities regarding the history of Japan-China relations over 
the past seven decades. Rather, the aim here is to define the general characteristics of 
the development of Japan-China relations during that period, and therefore any 
reference to Japan’s wartime actions will also be presented in this context. In 
focusing on describing the dynamics of post-war Japan-China relations, I argue that 
the two countries have never seized the opportunity to de facto normalize their 
relations, and soon after the Cold War restraints were removed from international 
relations in East Asia in the early 1990s, their bilateral relations began worsening 
and have been on a downward spiral ever since. 
 
The events leading up to the 1972 normalization: Japan’s new dependence and 
its under-the-radar China policy 
Soon after its devastating defeat in the Pacific War, Japan was placed under the 
occupation of the United States-led Allied Powers until 1952, during which period 
the USA not only oversaw the process of rebuilding Japan’s domestic life, but also 
had effective control over Japan’s international relations, leaving little room for any 
independent manoeuvre on Japan’s part. The Americans put forward two major 
policies for Japan: complete demilitarization and democratization, with the aim of 
fully disarming the country and setting it on a path of peaceful development based 
on Western democratic ideals.69 Having to face a war-torn economy as well as severe 
limitations in its diplomacy, Japan was focusing on internal change and was trying to 
rebuild itself domestically during the immediate post-war years. At the same time, 
China focused on its own domestic developments, as its two major political forces, 
                                               
69 Mikhail I. Sladkovsky, China & Japan: Past and Present, ed. and trans. Robert F. Price (Gulf Breeze, 
FL: Academic International Press, 1975), 173. 
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the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, were preoccupied with struggling for 
political control over China. Because of the political situation in both countries, 
Japan and China had no high-level official contacts whatsoever. An important initial 
feature of domestic change in Japan was the aim to create a pacified and disarmed 
country, an effort best reflected in Japan’s so-called Peace Constitution of 1947.70 
However, the political situation still remained fragile in East Asia: the US-backed 
Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalistic government was soon expelled from mainland China, 
and the Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China in October 
1949. The newly emerging ideological divide between the capitalist and the 
communist bloc meant that Japan and China soon found themselves in opposing 
camps, closely allied with the two superpowers of the day, the United States and the 
USSR, respectively. In February 1950, the PRC signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the USSR, which stated that the 
two countries should undertake “all necessary measures within their power to 
prevent a repetition of aggression and breach of the peace by Japan or any other state 
which might directly or indirectly join with Japan in acts of aggression.” The text 
confirmed that, should either country find itself in a state of war with Japan, the 
other party must “immediately extend military and other assistance with all the 
means at its disposal.”71  
                                               
70 Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international 
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The severe ideological divide between the US and the USSR quickly 
escalated in the Korean War that started in the summer of 1950. Soon after China 
began mobilizing its PLA troops in October, Washington initiated a massive 
economic blockade against Beijing and cut off its ties with capitalist countries that 
provided three quarters of China’s foreign trade in the same year.72 In accordance 
with the deepening conflict, American policies towards Japan also took a sharp turn 
and re-building Japan as a military-economic base fighting against communist 
regimes became a top US priority, often described as the “reverse course”.73 This 
new policy meant that the US decided not to execute many Japanese war criminals 
who were tried and found guilty at the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East, and to set them free instead.74 At the same time, all of the more than 200,000 
wartime public servants who were initially purged from public office in the new 
Japan were allowed to have full civil rights and return to public office by the end of 
1951.75 In line with the new American policies, first the Police Reserve (Keisatsu 
Yobitai) was established in 1950, followed by the Security Force (Hoantai) in 1952, 
and later the Self-Defense Force (Jieitai) in 1954.76 
Under these circumstances, it was impossible for Tokyo to re-establish formal 
ties with Beijing. In fact, Japan was continuously pressured by the US not to have 
any political relations with the PRC and to refuse to recognize the sovereignty of the 
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PRC.77 The 1951 San Francisco peace negotiations that were meant to conclude the 
Pacific War were started in this divided and fragile international state of affairs. Due 
to the general disagreement on whether the CCP or the Nationalists (Kuomintang) 
were to represent the legitimate government of China, neither the PRC nor the ROC 
was invited to the negotiations, which meant that both were left out from the entire 
process of the peace settlement that was eventually imposed upon Japan.78 While 
China made it clear that it wanted compensation from Japan for both public and 
private losses, the issue was tied up with Cold War politics and therefore Japan was 
not allowed to negotiate with the People’s Republic. The US approached the 
question of Japan’s war reparations as an issue of Cold War politics rather than 
punishment, and at the beginning of the treaty negotiations, together with its closest 
ally, the United Kingdom, it even insisted that Japan should not pay any war 
reparations whatsoever. It was because of the strong opposition coming mainly from 
the Philippines that Japan’s victim countries were eventually allowed to demand 
reparations. Japan first concluded an agreement with Burma (1954), followed by the 
Philippines (1956) and Indonesia (1958), and reparations came mostly in the form of 
services and local infrastructural developments. However, Japan’s first war 
reparations agreement in East Asia, with South Korea, was not concluded until 
1965.79 
For these reasons, the San Francisco Peace Treaty had concluded the Pacific 
War as far as Japan’s relations with the major Western powers were concerned, and 
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besides other Asian countries, Japan’s relations with its largest victim, the PRC, 
continued to remain unsettled. As the PRC was on the opposite side of the Cold War 
political divide, Japan had eventually concluded a peace treaty with the Republic of 
China in 1952, acknowledging the government of the ROC as the legitimate 
government of China.80 
Even though Japan’s official position on China was clear, the nation was still 
divided internally over the issue. In fact, for many years during the 1950s, whether to 
recognize the PRC over the ROC as the only legitimate government of China was 
the “single most explosive issue in Japanese foreign policy.”81 There were also 
strong voices calling for the rejection of the San Francisco Peace Treaty as well as 
sparkling domestic debates as to whether Japan should remain neutral in military 
conflicts. Simply put, there was no substantial and widespread consensus in support 
of the so-called San Francisco System among the Japanese. Leftist thinkers opposed 
it head-on, but many conservative thinkers were also against it.82 The United States 
was aware of these heated domestic debates regarding Japan’s international relations 
and its future path. This concern was explicitly stated in a policy paper that was 
circulated in the U.S. Embassy in the 1950s explaining  the two antagonistic pulls 
exerting influence on Japan: an “oceanic pull” coming from the U.S. and a 
“continental pull” from mainland China.83 In fact, there were even negotiations 
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between Japan and the Soviet Union concerning the Kuril Islands84, but the US 
quickly intervened, making it clear that if excessive compromises were made 
regarding the status of the islands, which the Americans would regard as an obvious 
sign of Japanese-Soviet rapprochement, the USA would likely retract any 
compromise over Okinawa.85 
Since Japan’s trade and political relations were limited to the group of ‘free 
world’ countries that were allied with the United States, the various Japanese 
governments’ stance towards the PRC during the 1950s and 1960s ranged between 
neglect and ambivalence on the one hand (e.g. Prime Ministers Nobusuke Kishi and 
Eisaku Satō) and active encouragement of non-official contacts and trade links on 
the other hand (e.g. Prime Ministers Ichirō Hatoyama and Hayato Ikeda). The task of 
constructing and maintaining unofficial contacts and trade links with China was 
therefore left to interested individuals, political party organizations, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).86 Among the very few organizations that were 
allowed to maintain unofficial contacts, the most significant was perhaps the Japan-
China Friendship Association (Nicchū Yūkō Kyōkai), established on the first 
anniversary of the Communist Revolution in China, on October 1, 1950. The 
Association not only played a central role in promoting cultural and economic 
exchanges between Japan and China, but also facilitated the establishment of other 
China-related organizations such as the Committee to Commemorate Chinese 
Prisoner of War Martyrs in 1953, or the Japan-China Association for Cultural 
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Exchange in 1956. The Association’s work simply supplemented official policy, and 
it successfully maintained channels of communication with the People’s Republic 
from which official relations could later be institutionalized.87 Nevertheless, the 
impact of domestic mass movements, political debates and grassroots organizations 
was not sufficient to facilitate any significant change in Japan’s official China 
policies, and Tokyo’s dependence on US foreign policy continued to remain strong – 
indeed, it followed “America’s lead unquestioningly”.88  
In line with the US policies, the Japanese government, led by the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), did not initiate official ties with the PRC. However, Inejiro 
Asanuma, General Secretary of one of Japan’s major opposition parties, the Japan 
Socialist Party, did visit Beijing in April 1957, where he met with the PRC’s top 
leaders, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. During this meeting, Asanuma expressed his 
concerns over the US control of Japan as well as the presence of American troops on 
Japanese soil, adding that diplomatic relations with the ROK could make it 
impossible to re-establish diplomatic relations between China and Japan. Mao and 
Zhou were in agreement with Asanuma’s assessment, and Mao even added that, 
“we can conclude a mutual nonaggression treaty. Once Japan 
becomes fully independent of the United States, when there is no 
possibility of a militarist revival, and no likelihood of exploitation 
of it by outsiders, in other words, when there exists no danger of 
aggression, Japan and China can sign a nonaggression treaty.”89 
 
                                               
87 Franziska Seraphim,  “People’s Diplomacy: The Japan-China Friendship Association and Critical 
War Memory in the 1950s,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 5, no. 8 (2007): 1-19. Accessed May 8, 2018. 
https://apjjf.org/-Franziska-Seraphim/2502/article.pdf. 
88 Yoshihide Soeya, “The Evolution of Japanese Thinking and Policies on Cooperative Security in the 
1980s and 1990s,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 48., no. 1 (May 1994): 91. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357719408445125. 
89 John K. Leung and Michael Y. M. Kau, eds., The Writings of Mao Zedong: 1949-1976 (New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 493-494. Partially because of his efforts to tighten relations with the communist 
PRC, Asanuma was assassinated by a member of the right-wing Uyoku dantai group, a Japanese 
ultranationalist group in November 1960. 
 31 
Japan’s tight political control by America, combined with a strong focus on its 
successful 1960 domestic income doubling plan and with its overseas war 
reparations activities, resulted in Japan’s low-profile political and high profile 
economic presence in Asia. This went on to characterize Japan’s Asian diplomacy 
for the rest of the 1960s, which was largely dependent on US foreign policy, and 
therefore lacked any official direct engagement with the PRC. 
Change in Japan’s attitude towards China was also dependent on external 
factors. While, on the one hand, relations between China and the Soviet Union 
became strained and China gradually became alienated from the USSR in the second 
half of the 1950s, which amounted to an open conflict in 1961.90 In the opposition 
camp, the US also had to face the limitations of its Cold War strategies in Asia with 
its prolonged and unsuccessful war in Vietnam. These two factors meant that the 
interests of the PRC and those of the US gradually converged, which eventually 
resulted in the American leadership’s new approach towards China from 1969. In 
August the same year, in his speech to the National Security Council, President 
Richard Nixon announced that the Soviet Union was a greater aggressor than the 
PRC and that allowing the latter to be “smashed” by the USSR in a possible war 
would be counter to American interests.91 As if Japan was only waiting for a signal 
from the US, then Prime Minister Eisaku Satō indicated during his December 1969 
election campaign tour in Kyūshū that Japan was willing to re-establish high-level 
contacts with China and would prefer to maintain friendly relations with both 
Beijing and Taipei.92 
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Not long after Nixon’s announcement, behind-the-scenes negotiations started 
between the American and the PRC’s top leadership, resulting in US Secretary of 
State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to China in July 
1971, which prepared Nixon’s historical trip to Beijing in September 1972.93 
However, the announcement of Nixon’s visit to China to seek rapprochement was 
nothing short of a shock to the Japanese, who were only informed about the decision 
three minutes prior to Nixon’s live announcement.94 This went against an earlier 
agreement between Nixon and Satō, in which both of them committed to close 
coordination of their respective China policies.95 Many Japanese felt deeply betrayed 
by the US move. Satō later openly said that while he had “done everything” the 
Americans asked for, they still “let me down.”96 
 
Japan-China relations from their diplomatic normalization until the end of the 
Cold War (1972-1990): relative peace under control 
Even though Japan wanted to formalize relations with China for over two decades, it 
was not until the international status of the PRC changed that Japan was able to 
establish official and high-level diplomatic relations with China. This opportunity 
came when the PRC replaced Taiwan in the United Nations in October 1971. 
Having had the two Nixon shocks, on the eve of Henry Kissinger’s second 
visit to China on October 19 the same year, PM Satō delivered a policy speech, in 
which, for the first time, Japan acknowledged the PRC as the legitimate 
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representative of China.97 Nevertheless, it took almost a year until, after extensive 
negotiations with the US and a change of Prime Minister in Japan, that official ties 
between Japan and China were ready to be re-established.98 China also had a vested 
interest in having stronger ties with Japan, as its leadership aimed to create a more 
stable environment in East Asia, in which China could be drawn closer to the United 
States and Japan, and with its new ties the PRC could counter the threat of a nuclear 
attack by the Soviet Union. Therefore, after more than two decades of abnormality, 
diplomatic relations were re-established with the signing of the historical Zhou-
Tanaka Joint Communique on 29 September 1972. The communique, signed in 
Beijing, declared that the “abnormal state of affairs” that had existed between Japan 
and China was now “terminated” and that from that time Japan recognized the 
government of the People's Republic of China as the “sole legal government of 
China.” Furthermore, it stated that Tokyo was “keenly conscious of the 
responsibility for the serious damage” that Japan caused to the Chinese people 
during its occupation and the subsequent Pacific War, for which it “deeply 
reproached itself.” In return, the Chinese side renounced its demand for war 
reparations from Japan and the two governments agreed to establish 
“relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two 
countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit and peaceful co-existence.”99 
In regards to any remaining or future disputes the document declared that, 
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“in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their 
mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall 
refrain from the use or threat of force.”100 
This new chapter in modern Japan-China relations was also a historical first in that 
the joint communique set international principles as guidelines in solving any 
existing and future disputes between the two countries. One of the issues that were 
left unresolved was the ownership of the Senkaku (in Japanese)/Diaoyu (in Chinese) 
Islands. These five uninhabited islets are located in the East China Sea, and were 
formally annexed by Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which concluded the First 
Sino-Japanese War in 1895. The islets were placed under US control soon after 
Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War, but were returned to Japan as part of the Ryūkyū 
Islands with the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty.101 The PRC claimed ownership of 
the islets based on various maps and documents dating back to the 14th century. It 
also referred to the 1943 Cairo Declaration which stipulated that Japan had to return 
all Chinese territory it had annexed. The ROC also announced its sovereignty claims 
over the islets not long before they were returned to Japan. Ownership of the islands 
became an issue after a 1968 United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East report indicated the likelihood of rich natural-resource deposits in the 
seabed surrounding the islands.102 
When the issue of the islands emerged during the meetings leading up to the 
signing of the joint communique, Premier Zhou said that the islands are only “tiny 
specks you can hardly spot on maps and they have become a problem just because 
oil reserves were found around them,” suggesting that the issue of ownership should 
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not stand in the way of concluding the agreement.103 Similarly, during both his 1978 
and 1984 trip to Tokyo, Chairman Deng Xiaoping proposed that the two countries 
shelve the issue and leave its resolution for a later date.104 
As part of the agreement between the two countries, China renounced its 
earlier demand for war reparations mainly in a bid to gain more support from the 
Japanese public and to avoid antagonizing the still strong pro-Taiwan forces within 
the ruling government party, the LDP.105 The 1972 joint communique, however, only 
referred to the renouncement of public reparations demands towards Japan, and 
therefore it left the question of private demands open. While this was hardly 
surprising in an era when civil society was literally non-existent in China, it had 
significant consequences a few decades later, when Chinese private demands started 
emerging, many of them resulting in civil lawsuits against the Japanese government. 
The treaty saw the opening of embassies in both countries the following year, 
and with Japanese sumo wrestlers’ exhibition games in Beijing and Shanghai in 
1973 and numerous goodwill missions and cultural delegations to both countries, 
there was a significant increase in cultural exchanges as well. Trade and economic 
relations made an even greater progress: in the first year after the rapprochement, 28 
Japanese trade and economic missions visited China, including one led by the later 
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, a delegation from the Association for Promotion 
of International Trade (Kokubōsoku), and another headed by the president of the 
powerful Federation of Economic Organizations of Japan (Keidanren).106 Japan’s 
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trade with China in the first year following the rapprochement exceeded US$ 2 
billion, representing an increase of 83% compared to 1972.107 
Progress was obvious in many areas, but there were still some issues, mostly 
related to Taiwan, that needed to be solved to conclude a peace treaty.108 While the 
Taiwan issue appeared to be manageable, the issue of the so-called anti-hegemony 
clause appeared to be more persistent, postponing the conclusion of the peace treaty 
for years. While China insisted that an anti-hegemony clause was necessary in order 
to increase its national security against any possible threats from a third country, 
Japan was initially reluctant to include the clause in the treaty, mainly out of 
concerns of contradicting the stipulations of its peace constitution.109 These issues 
meant that the treaty negotiations reached a stalemate, from which the two countries 
did not move on for a few years, even though economic ties were further 
strengthening during these years. Progress came after two of the CCP’s top leaders, 
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, died in 1976. After two years of internal political 
unrest, Deng Xiaoping emerged as the new top political figure. Deng’s new 
leadership meant that China became less ideological and more focused on economic 
development, a change reflected in his 1978 “reform and opening-up” (gaige 
kaifang) policies.110 On the Japanese side, the leadership was still divided over the 
anti-hegemony issue, but as a result of change in China’s domestic politics as well as 
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significant pressure from both the 497-strong pro-Beijing Dietmen’s League for 
Japan-China Friendship and the Keidanren, Prime Minister Fukuda eventually 
decided to accept the anti-hegemony clause.111 The subsequent Japan-China Peace 
and Friendship Treaty was signed under these circumstances in 1978, having taken 
six years to conclude after the establishment of official bilateral ties. In the treaty, 
both Japan and China expressed their willingness to “contribute to peace and 
stability in Asia and in the world,” and declared that neither of them would seek 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that both were 
“opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such 
hegemony”.112 While the Soviet Union appeared very disappointed about the treaty, 
China considered it a huge victory against the USSR. The treaty widely enjoyed the 
support of both political and business circles in Japan, and while it was also 
appraised by many intellectuals, there were some voices criticizing the general wave 
of optimism. Having been sobered by the earlier anti-hegemony controversy, 
President Ishikawa Tadao of Keiō University, a well-known Sinologist, argued that it 
was time for Japan to overcome its sentimental attitudes towards China and assess 
the treaty based on Japan’s best national interests. Professor Iriye Michimasa of 
Kyōto Sangyō University warned against any naïve optimism, saying that China had 
already violated some of its international agreements and had expressed hostility 
toward Japan’s liberal democratic system.113  Nevertheless, Japan-China relations 
were to experience a period of relative peace and tranquility for the next decade, 
during which time both countries’ national interests converged towards the other 
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under the overarching US security umbrella, and instead of political manoeuvres, 
bilateral relations were characterized by predominantly focusing on economic 
development. The thriving economic relations were also supported by the two 
nations’ economic complementarity: Japan supplied technology and investments, 
financial support for industrial growth, and high-technology products for China, 
while China provided raw materials and low cost products for the Japanese market. 
Japan’s Official Development Assistance programme was one of its main 
diplomatic tools with which it re-established and later strengthened relations in post-
war Asia. It also played a central role in Japan-China economic cooperation. Some 
even argue that Japanese ODA served as quasi-reparation (jun baishō) for war 
damages in some cases.114 While Japan’s ODA programme in Asia might have 
served as such a tool, it was also aimed at creating a peaceful international 
environment in which steady economic development was possible. Seen in the light 
of pursuing a stable environment, it is no wonder that the two Asian countries with 
the strongest influence on Japan, China and Indonesia, were the top recipients of 
Japanese ODA loans for many years.115 Japan’s ODA to China started in December 
1979 when Tokyo granted Beijing $200 million for six construction projects and 
another $61 million to assist in the building of the China-Japan Friendship 
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Hospital.116 With that, Japan became the largest provider of economic aid to China 
and its biggest trading partner.117 
On the Chinese side, Deng’s open reform policy brought a significant change 
in its foreign relations, as economic development replaced the earlier revolutionary 
rhetoric in China’s mainstream foreign strategy, while Japan’s success served as a 
model of economic development and modernization for China. 118  Japan-China 
relations therefore revolved around economic development and cooperation for most 
part of the 1980s, and their bilateral relations during this period can be best 
understood also in the context of the Cold War divide, particularly as being part of 
the American-led US-China-Japan security triangle, which was formed to balance 
against the Soviet Union. 
While both countries were focusing predominantly on economic cooperation 
with each other, there were already many signs pointing to issues that could easily 
undermine their bilateral relations. As China abandoned its earlier domestic political 
ideology based on revolutionary rhetoric and the conflict between communist and 
capitalist-nationalist forces, the official narrative defining the Chinese everyday life 
in the 1978 reforms gradually shifted to the conflict between China and those nations 
that invaded and humiliated China in the past. This new phase of patriotic education 
represented past Chinese history as a national struggle to resist foreign aggression 
that mainly came from Japan. This narrative replaced China’s earlier struggle against 
the Kuomintang with the CCP’s legacy of its successful fight against Japanese 
                                               
116 Ibid., 95. 
117 While the ODA ran, between 1979 and 2005, Japan had provided some 3.3 trillion yen 
(approximately US$29.2 billion) in loan aid (yen loans), 157.2 billion yen (US$1.38 trillion) in grant 
aid, and 181.7 billion yen (US$1.6 billion) in technical cooperation to China. See “Overview of Official 
Development Assistance to China,” MOFA, February 1, 2016. Accessed March 28, 2016, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/e_asia/china/. 
118 Mitsuru Kitano, “China’s Foreign Strategy,” Asia-Pacific Review 18, issue 2 (December 2011): 40-
42. https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2011.630855. 
 40 
imperialist aggressors during the Pacific War. Chinese school textbooks started 
giving more coverage to a wide range of Japan’s wartime actions, providing vivid 
descriptions of the crimes committed by Japanese troops. Movies on the 1937 
Nanjing Massacre were produced and related wartime memorials were built. Chinese 
academic researchers began conducting in-depth investigations into war atrocities 
committed by the Japanese, which resulted in international conferences and the 
publishing of a large number of wartime documents.119 In addition, a number of 
buildings (museums, memorial halls) and statues were erected to commemorate 
China’s wars, particularly the ones fought against Japan, and its fallen martyrs, and 
various historical sites were designated to be of national significance all across the 
country. Visiting some of these sites and buildings became a part of China’s patriotic 
education.120  
The Japanese government quickly reacted by tightening control of information 
related to Japan’s wartime actions in its domestic education. In late 1980, Education 
Minister Tanaka Tatsuo voiced his concerns about the lack of patriotism in existing 
history textbooks in the Japanese Diet, and a few months later demanded that high 
school textbooks prepared for the 1983-86 soften their approach toward Japanese 
wartime actions and focus more on patriotic aspects of Japan’s actions.121 
During its 1980-81 school history textbook screening, the Ministry of 
Education ordered Saburō Ienaga, a leading Japanese historian at that time, to 
change certain words and expressions describing the Japanese army’s actions in the 
Pacific War. For instance, the Ministry ordered Ienaga to replace words such as 
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“military invasion” (shinryaku) with “military advancement” (shinshutsu), aiming to 
downplay the scale of the Nanking Massacre.122 In the Ministry’s view, the massacre 
was a result of the “fierce resistance by the Chinese troops, which caused great 
losses of the Japanese troops. The wrathful Japanese troops then killed many 
Chinese troops and civilians.”123 
To be sure, Ienaga had already been fighting with the Ministry for an accurate 
representation of Japan’s wartime actions in history textbooks since as early as the 
1950s. What changed in the early 1980s, however, was that the Ministry approved a 
major revision to the textbooks and this had a wider coverage in Japanese national 
media in the summer of 1982, when some journalists warned that state control over 
education was strengthened. The news was then picked up by the international media, 
stirring up wartime sentiments among many Asian countries, and resulting in official 
protests from China and South Korea.124  Japan was accused of attempting to 
whitewash its wartime history by downplaying many of the atrocities committed by 
its Imperial Army. While the Ministry of Education eventually gave in to both 
international and domestic pressure, the Chinese government continued focusing on 
Japanese wartime atrocities and the CCP’s fight against Japanese imperialists in its 
patriotic education. The history textbook controversy soon disappeared from 
Japanese public attention, but was followed by another controversy when Prime 
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone visited the Yasukuni Shrine in his official capacity on 
the 40th anniversary of Japan’s Pacific War defeat on August 15, 1985. The shrine, 
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run by a private religious corporation, serves as the resting place of the spirits (kami) 
of some 2.5 million soldiers, some of whom are Chinese and Korean, who gave their 
lives while fighting in one of Japan’s modern wars. What makes the shrine 
controversial is the fact that among those kami are the remains of 14 Class-A 
Japanese wartime criminals. Remarkably, their kami were secretly enshrined in 1978, 
not long before the signing of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty. 
Defending his actions in an LDP seminar, Nakasone argued for the importance of the 
Yasukuni visit for all Japanese people, as it showed their gratitude for the sacrifices 
of their ancestors. He then declared that it was time the “Japanese state and the 
Japanese race can walk proudly in the world.”125 
Nakasone’s visit was seen by many in China as a resurgence of Japanese 
militaristic sentiments, triggering protests in some of the major centers. Among those 
were the first anti-Japanese student demonstrations since the normalization. The 
student protest erupted on 18 September 1985, on the 54th anniversary of the 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.126 These events showed that even though 
bilateral relations were normalized and a peace and friendship treaty was concluded 
between the two countries in the 1970s, Japan was still struggling to come to terms 
with its past actions, while a number of protests in major centers throughout China 
showed that “genuine anti-Japanese sentiments were deeply entrenched among 
ordinary Chinese” even 40 years after the end of the Pacific War.127  
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Nevertheless, the dominant presence of the United States and antagonistic 
relations with the Soviet Union forestalled serious damage to Japan-China relations 
and prevented the escalation of a bilateral conflict. The two years preceding 
Nakasone’s 1985 Yasukuni visit were even referred to by some as the “the best 
period in 2000 years of Japan-China relations.”128 Even with the episodic collision of 
the two nations’ war memories, the dynamics of Japan-China relations continued to 
be characterized by relative peace and a strengthening economic cooperation for the 
rest of the 1980s.  
Japan-China Relations in the 1990s: removed constraints 
While the world was following closely the unfolding political changes in the 
Communist bloc, the June 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident came as a shock, 
affecting Japan’s relations with China. In the following month in Paris, the G-7 
summit countries, with Japan among them, unanimously condemned the Chinese 
government’s actions for violating human rights and imposed sanctions on China. 
This was also the first time that polls experienced a sharp drop in the Japanese 
public’s opinion on China. According to the annual Yomiuri-Gallup joint opinion 
surveys, post-war public opinion in Japan was always favourable towards China, 
with around 40 per cent of the population viewing Japan’s largest neighbor as the 
most trusted Asian country throughout most of the 1980s, putting China a close 
second after the United States globally. The Tiananmen Square Incident, however, 
had a profound impact on Japanese public opinion, with only 9 per cent trusting 
China in 1989. China soon dropped out from the top five most trusted countries in  
the Japanese public eye, and trust towards China never again approached the level of 
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that of the 1980s – it remained consistently around 10 per cent in the early 1990s.129 
The Japanese government, however, appeared to take a more lenient stance towards 
China, and, out of economic and political considerations, it continued its support for 
China’s international integration. It was Japan that became the first country after the 
Tiananmen Incident to help China break its international isolation by resuming its 
third yen loan programme to China in November 1990.130 
By this time, the Cold War had come to an end, resulting in huge political 
transformations, dissolving the earlier ideological barriers and opening up 
opportunities to establish new political and economic ties. Many were celebrating 
the prospects of a new international society based not on ideological differences, but 
on a liberal world order.131 While the United States’ and most of the developing 
world’s economies were suffering from either a negative growth or stagnation, East 
Asia’s economic growth continued uninterrupted. In 1991, the Japanese economy 
still produced a steady rate of 4 per cent GDP growth, while the rest of East Asia’s 
economies had an average rate of 7 per cent growth.132 This, combined with a sense 
of a power vacuum resulting from the breaking up of the Soviet Union and a 
decreased US political presence in East Asia, resulted in a growing sense of a 
regional awareness among East Asian countries, prompting Japan to pursue a more 
independent diplomacy and strengthen its international presence in the Asia-Pacific. 
In the new era, Japan, having served as a model for economic growth for many 
countries in Asia since the 1970s, attempted to strike a better balance between its 
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economic and political weight. Takakazu Kuriyama, then vice-foreign minister of 
Japan, argued in a 1990 paper that ‘the time when Japan could take for granted an 
international order sustained by U.S. strength (…) is long past’. While calling for a 
global partnership in the sharing of responsibilities for global peace and prosperity 
among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, he also stated that the Asian-
Pacific region would be “the main theater of Japan’s foreign policy” in the new 
era.133 The 1991 Diplomatic Bluebook of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reinforced 
Japan’s pursuit of a new role by stating that one of the most important objectives for 
Japanese diplomacy was to “clearly demonstrate Japan’s willingness to participate in, 
and cooperate with, international efforts to protect universal values, such as 
democracy and fundamental human rights.”134 
1992 was the year when the IMF first ranked China’s economy as the third 
largest in the world, after that of the US and Japan.135 Perhaps coincidentally, it was 
also the year when Japan started a more proactive foreign policy, while China 
showed signs of growing concern about its international security. In June 1992, the 
Japanese diet introduced the International Peace Cooperation Law in order to 
contribute to the US effort during the Iraq War, and, for the first time in its history, 
dispatched its Self Defense Forces on a UN peace-keeping operation in Cambodia. 
In this new international environment, Japan was making tangible steps towards 
contributing to international security, while China, still in relative international 
isolation after the Tiananmen Incident, continued strengthening its patriotic 
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education and increased its military budget. Beijing then introduced a Territorial 
Waters Law in 1992, based on which China claimed sovereignty over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea and the Spratly and Paracel Islands in 
the South China Sea.136 This, along with a steadily growing and not sufficiently 
transparent military budget, already indicated Beijing’s intention for an increased 
military presence in East Asia. Showing obvious signs of concern about China’s 
assertive moves, the 1992 MOFA Bluebook stated that: 
 
“some Southeast Asian countries see with concern China’s enhanced 
military capability in connection with moves regarding the territorial 
rights to the Spratly Islands. Thus, there is a need to pay careful 
attention to future developments.”137 
 
The law was seen by Tokyo as a challenge to its territorial integrity and prompted it 
to protest through a number of different diplomatic channels. On 27 February 1992, 
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa publicly stated that the islands were a part of 
Japan’s “indigenous territory,” to which the Chinese Foreign Ministry responded that 
China’s ownership of the islands was indisputable.138 Nevertheless, with President 
Jiang Zemin’s visit to Tokyo in April the same year, Japan and China agreed not to 
press one another any further on the matter of sovereignty and so the island dispute 
was shelved again. 
Even though these events did caste some shadow on the development of Sino-
Japanese relations, Japan continued its support for China’s integration into the 
international economy and overall development. In line with this policy, Emperor 
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Akihito visited Beijing in 1992, on the the 20th anniversary of the diplomatic 
normalization. This event was also a historical first as never before did a Japanese 
emperor visit China. During his visit, Akihito acknowledged that in the past Japan 
“inflicted great suffering on the people of China,” over which he expressed his “deep 
sadness.”139 His statement, however, stopped short of the apology demanded by 
many Chinese. The emperor’s words were in fact in line with the official position of 
the Japanese government, which had, for long, maintained that no outright apology 
for Japan’s past actions was necessary. 
In the meantime, China’s increasing military budget and assertiveness 
regarding territorial issues prompted Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa and 
Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata to ask the Chinese government for a greater military  
transparency in 1993. Later, in May 1995, although Tokyo asked China to suspend 
nuclear tests, it conducted an underground test soon afterwards, which was followed 
by another one in August the same year.140 China also conducted missile tests in the 
Taiwan Straits in 1995 and 1996, and these events prompted the US to send ships 
into the Taiwan Strait, resulting in “the biggest display of US military power in Asia 
since the Vietnam War.”141  
Escalated tensions resulted in a significant change in America’s approach 
towards East Asia. In February 1995, a high-level U.S. strategic report spearheaded 
by Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 
was issued. The document, titled the “U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-
Pacific Region” (also known as the Nye Report), stated that – although two similar 
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strategic reports in 1990 and 1992 envisioned post-Cold War American troop 
reductions in East Asia – the U.S. was committed to continue keeping its troops at 
the existing level of about 100,000 troops for the foreseeable future. The report also 
called for “Japan’s continuing close cooperation with the United States in a strategic 
partnership,” suggesting Japanese support for U.S. operations in the region.142  
In line with America’s new military strategy, Japan’s November 1995 National 
Defense Program Outline stated that “there still remain large-scale military 
capabilities including nuclear arsenals and many countries in the region are 
expanding or modernizing their military capabilities mainly against the background 
of their economic development,” an apparent reference to issues surrounding the 
Korean Peninsula and China. The document made it clear that “the Japan-U.S. 
Security Arrangements will continue to play a key role for the security of Japan and 
for the peace and stability in the surrounding regions of Japan.”143 
Parallel to these developments, and as a response to China’s growing power, 
the Mori faction, which advocated for a stronger defence posture against Beijing, 
gained significant strength within the LDP.144 At the same time, the power of pro-
China factions and politicians, as well as foreign ministry bureaucrats, started 
declining.145 This was also the time when voices advocating for the removal of post-
war constraints on Japan’s use of military power became stronger across all spectra 
of the Japanese political elite. For instance, right-wing politician Ichirō Ozawa, who 
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was often dubbed the “Shadow Shōgun” because of his strong behind-the-scenes 
influence, stated that Japan should become a “normal nation” that “would naturally 
fulfil its own responsibility to do what is considered natural by the international 
society.”146 In the eyes of Japanese nationalists, “normal nation” meant “a nation that 
can go to war.”147 
Because of the burst of the economic bubble, the 1990s saw the rise of 
opposition parties and coalition governments for the first time in post-war Japan. 
When Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s Social Democratic Party-led leftist 
government announced its aim to adopt a resolution for the renunciation of war in 
1995, it was met with significant resistance from the political right, which formed 
the National Committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World War II 
(Shūsen Gojushūnen Kokumin Iinkai). The Committee organized a mass rally titled 
the “Celebration of Asian Togetherness” (Ajia Kyōsei no Saiten) in May to “thank 
the war dead and praise Japan for its contribution to the independence of many Asian 
countries.”148 With the apparent aim to demonstrate that the war was fought for, and 
not against, Asia, heads of state of all major Asian countries were invited. 
Nevertheless, none attended.149  
Murayama resigned in January 1996 and a conservative right-wing LDP 
politician, Ryūtarō Hashimoto was elected as the new prime minister. Hashimoto 
was president of the influential right-wing Association of War Bereaved Families, 
but at the same time, he was also a member of the China-friendly Tanaka faction 
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within the LDP.150 His appointment suggested Tokyo’s more calculated and carefully 
balanced approach towards Beijing.  
Not long after Hashimoto assumed his role as prime minister, he generated 
more tension in Sino-Japanese relations by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in his 
official capacity on his birthday, on which day Beijing conducted its 45th nuclear 
test.151 Hashimoto then went on to sign the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security in 
April 1997, which was followed by an agreement on the New Guidelines for United 
States-Japan Defence Cooperation in September the same year 152  The two 
agreements significantly strengthened Japan-US security cooperation, of ambiguous 
status since the end of the Cold War, and opened a new phase of the US-Japan 
security alliance by allowing the US to access military facilities in Japan.  
In the meantime, in an attempt to avoid US containment, China had established 
the so-called Shanghai Five with Russia and three Central Asian countries in 1996. 
The Shanghai Five later expanded their political, economic, and military cooperation, 
and became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001.153 
While these developments indicated that Japan-China relations had become 
antagonistic, bilateral economic and trade relations continued to grow 
uninterruptedly. From the early 1990s, a number of Japanese manufacturers began 
production in China and in a few years many Japanese subsidiary companies were 
operating there, including Shanghai Sony, Dalian Toshiba, Beijing Matsushita, 
Shenzen Huaqiang Sanyo, Nanjing Sharp, and Fujian Hitachi, exporting entire 
productions lines to China. Until this time, economic development in East Asia was 
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often explained as a catch-up process, in which Japan led the way and other Asian 
countries followed its development patterns in a so-called “flying geese” formation, 
resulting in an international division of labor for entire industries. China’s economic 
success, however, put an end to this decades-long development pattern in Asia. The 
massive capital inflows into the Chinese economy, combined with cheap local labor, 
a high and steady GDP growth in China in contrast to a prolonged economic 
stagnation in Japan, led to China’s spectacular rise and Japan’s relative decline in 
East Asia starting from the mid-1990s.154 
These facts show that while bilateral trade links and economic relations 
continued to grow, relations between Tokyo and Beijing became strained when it 
came to political and security issues. The 1990s saw the dissolution of the Cold War 
US-China-Japan security triangle, resulting in a Sino-Russian rapprochement and 
strengthened Japan-US relations. In the new era, it was Japan-China relations that 
deteriorated the most in any single bilateral relation within the US-Russia-China-
Japan quadrangle.  
The 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis broke out under these circumstances. The 
crisis, on the one hand, saw a somewhat irresponsive United States that appeared to 
be reluctant to provide help to those countries that were the most affected. On the 
other hand, the region experienced a responsible China in relation to those countries 
that were hit the hardest by the crisis. This gave a significant boost in terms of 
confidence and aspirations for a regional leadership by China, which had been 
struggling with its ambiguous image since the Tiananmen Square Incident. Japan 
also became more active, providing financial aid for many of the affected countries 
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and coming forward with proposals such as the Asian Monetary Fund for a more 
coordinated and independent regional cooperation. After the Asian Crisis, during 
which many perceived that the West, especially the United States, exhibited an 
‘exploitive or opportunistic behavior’ towards Eastern and Southeast Asian countries, 
the so-called “Japan in Asia” school of thought regained strength in Japan.155 Among 
many Asian countries the crisis also strengthened the international image of China as 
a responsible power.  
The Asian Financial Crisis was the first of its kind that affected all East and 
Southeast Asian countries, although to a different extent. It thus helped East Asia to 
develop a sense of a regional identity in the face of external adversities. Since there 
existed no framework for a region-wide cooperation in Northeast Asia, its three 
major economic powers, China, Japan, and South Korea, decided to join the 10 
ASEAN countries in an attempt to strengthen their economic and financial 
cooperation. The first meeting of its kind was the ASEAN Plus Three summit in 
December 1997, while the leaders of the three East Asian countries held their first 
trilateral meeting in November 1999, in the form of an informal breakfast on the 
sidelines of the ASEAN Plus Three summit in Manila.156 While Tokyo and Beijing 
became more engaged within the general framework of the ASEAN Plus Three, their 
cooperation only strengthened in the economic field. Their separate respective 
security arrangements with Russia and the United States continued to remain in 
place, hindering the establishment of an overarching regional security framework in 
Northeast Asia. This was also the time when the “China-threat” theory was a major 
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topic among scholars and politicians alike, a discourse followed closely by Japan.157 
By this time Beijing had a significantly more active diplomacy in East- and 
Southeast Asia, and with a constantly increasing military budget, its assertiveness 
caused concerns to Tokyo. 
 
Japan-China relations in the beginning of the 21st century: hot economics, cold 
politics 
As a result, the new millennium saw a significant change in Japan-China relations. In 
terms of trade and economics, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 
December 2001 meant that it had a deeper integration in the world economy and 
could increase its influence on regional and global politics. Even Japan’s imports 
from China in the following year, when its overall imports dropped by 0.6 per cent, 
recorded an outstanding 9.9 per cent growth. At the same time, Japan’s exports to 
China expanded by 32.3 per cent.158 With these changes, China became Japan’s 
largest trade partner the same year. While the two economies became much more 
interdependent, China’s continued and rapid economic growth posed a serious 
challenge to Japan’s decades-long position as the leading economic power in Asia. 
Newly emerging regionalism following the Asian Financial Crisis saw Japan 
becoming interested in free trade agreements with South Korea and Mexico as early 
as 1998 and it signed its first FTA with Singapore in 1999. Similarly, China 
proposed an FTA with the 10 ASEAN countries in November 2000, which, after 
many rounds of negotiations, was finally signed in November 2002.159 In reaction to 
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China’s growing regional influence, Japan’s new Prime Minister, Jun`ichirō 
Koizumi, also embarked on developing Japan’s own regional strategy in 2001. He 
initiated talks for a Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership in January 
2002. 
These events indicate that economic cooperation in the form of free trade 
agreements soon became the basis of regionalism in East Asia. By the end of the 
decade, China had signed FTA agreements with ASEAN, Chile, Pakistan, and New 
Zealand, and Japan with ASEAN, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, 
the Philippines, Vietnam, Mexico, and Chile.160 The signed FTAs showed that both 
Japan and China chose countries as free trade partners that had less impact on their 
own economies, aiming to protect their domestic markets from external influences. 
This was clearly underscored by the fact that, while a significant number of free 
trade agreements between East Asian and Southeast Asian economies were signed in 
quick succession, FTA negotiations never even started between any of the three 
largest East Asian economies, China, Japan, and South Korea. Regionalism in East 
Asia thus practically meant free trade agreements with Southeast Asian countries, 
indicating a growing sense of rivalry in Northeast Asia, particularly between Japan 
and China. This also showed the premature state of East Asian regionalism in 
comparison to other regions, most notably the European Union, where economic 
cooperation was based on common security interests and similar value perceptions. 
A growing competition for influence became even more apparent with Japan’s 
prolonged economic stagnation and China’s spectacular rise that continued well into 
the 2000s, resulting in the gap between the size of the two economies becoming 
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significantly smaller: While Japan’s GDP was eight times  more than that of China at 
the end of the 1980s, this difference had shrunk to only two times by 2005.161  
In terms of political and security relations, the beginning of the 2000s also 
marked the start of a new era in Japan’s relations with China. After the September 11 
terror attacks, Prime Minister Koizumi supported Japan’s anti-terrorism measures 
law in order to be able to dispatch the Japanese Self Defense Forces to provide 
logistical support in the Indian Ocean for a war in Afghanistan. At the same time, 
China also agreed to a United Nations Security Council resolution allowing the US-
led multinational forces to engage in a war against the Taliban forces. This became 
the first instance where Tokyo dispatched its SDF and Beijing voted in principle for 
the international use of force by United Nations members against any other 
sovereign state. 162  The same year, China strengthened its security alliance by 
enlarging the Shanghai Five to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. While Japan 
and China adopted a similar stance on the war in Afghanistan, the 2003 Iraq war saw 
the collision of their views. The Koizumi administration supported the war and 
passed legislation permitting the dispatch of the Self Defense Forces and allowing 
them to use force, more specifically anti-tank weapons. Beijing, together with some 
other UNSC members, was strongly against any military attack on Iraq.163 
During the five-year-long Koizumi administration, Japan’s relations with 
China further deteriorated. One of the major reasons was the prime minister’s annual 
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. His first visit, on August 13, 2001, was seen by many 
in China as a “further step in the public resurrection and legitimisation of the 
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symbols of Japan’s militarist regimes”, but Koizumi quickly dismissed criticisms 
asking “Why do we have to select among the dead?”164 Prior to Koizumi’s visit, only 
two Japanese prime ministers had visited the shrine since the remains of the 14 Class 
A wartime criminals were secretly enshrined there in the 1970s: Yasuhiro Nakasone 
and Ryūtarō Hashimoto each paid one official visit in 1985 and 1996, respectively. 
Despite growing criticism from China and South Korea, Koizumi decided to 
continue visiting the shrine every year, paying six visits altogether while in office. 
His 2005 visit came only days before his finance minister’s, Nobutaka Machimura’s, 
scheduled visit to Beijing and Seoul, prompting both governments to cancel his visit. 
Interestingly, while Koizumi argued that it was his constitutional right to visit the 
shrine, both the Fukuoka District Court and the Osaka High Court ruled that his 
actions were in violation of the Japanese Constitution.165 
In addition to Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits, other developments further strained 
Japan-China relations in the early 2000s. As a response to China’s growing regional 
influence and patriotic education, some Japanese rightwing scholars published the 
so-called New History Textbook (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho) in 2001 in an attempt 
to strengthen Japan’s patriotic education.166 The textbook eulogized Japan’s past 
achievements while downplaying its invasion of China during the Pacific War. 
Parallel to growing conservative views and strengthening patriotic education in both 
countries, another Japan-related incident took place in China that further strained 
bilateral ties. In August 2003, local construction workers in China’s northeastern city 
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of Qiqihar stumbled upon a cache of mustard gas that had been abandoned by the 
retreating Japanese Imperial troops at the end of the Pacific War. Upon being 
unearthed, some containers started leaking, causing site workers to come into direct 
contact with the highly toxic materials. The incident left one man dead and several 
others badly burned. 167  Even though the Japanese government was quick to 
apologize, a statement was not enough to avoid the further deepening of nationalistic 
sentiments against Japan among many Chinese. Under high pressure for months 
from Beijing, the Japanese government finally agreed to give 300 million yen 
(US$2.56 million) to 44 victims of the accident. While the two governments 
considered the issue settled after the payment, the incident prompted many Chinese 
victims of Japan’s wartime actions to form a group and pursue legal action against 
the Japanese government. Their lawyer, Su Xianxiang, later stated that “what matters 
is not how much money we will get in compensation, but how the Japanese 
Government will face its history”.168 Then, just a few weeks after the Qiqihar 
incident, 400 Japanese businessmen went on a three-day sex romp including some 
500 local prostitutes in the city of Zhuhai, Southern China. The last day of the sex 
party fell on September 18, coinciding with the day Japan’s occupation of Manchuria 
started in 1931. The incident had a strong media coverage across China, with vivid 
local witness accounts, triggering national outrage. The Chinese Sohu.net website 
even conducted an online survey, which found that 90 per cent of the 85,000 
respondents thought that the Japanese businessmen went on a sex tour in order to 
further shame China on the day that already lived in Chinese memory as a national 
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day of humiliation.169 Problems over history again intensified in April 2005, when 
Beijing strongly objected to Tokyo’s attempt to reform the UNSC and to its bid to 
become a permanent member country, arguing that “Japan has not reflected on 
history”. At the same time, massive protests were organized in various cities 
throughout China, drawing tens of thousands of people onto the streets. Some 
protesters wore T-shirts emblazoned with the blood-splattered face of Japanese 
Prime Minister Jun`ichirō Koizumi, leaflets were handed out with a list of Japanese 
products to be boycotted, and banners called on Japan to face up to its wartime 
atrocities.170 This coincided with a generational change in Japanese politics, which 
saw an increased number of conservative politicians assuming leading roles in the 
Koizumi government, and a decreased influence of the pro-China Tanaka faction 
within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. 
The last top-level member in the Koizumi administration reported to have 
amicable views towards China was Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka. She was the 
daughter of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, who normalized relations with 
China in 1972. Tanaka was fired in January 2002 and was replaced by the hawkish 
Nobutaka Machimura. Tanaka, in an interview during the April 2005 street protests, 
maintained that if she had remained the Foreign Minister, “anti-Japanese 
demonstrations would not have occurred”.171 These developments coincided with 
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Tokyo’s announcement that its long-running ODA loan programme to China would 
end by 2008, the year Beijing hosted the Olympic Games.172 
After the 2005 protests, however, the Chinese government launched a national 
campaign to convince the Chinese people that stable relations with Japan were in 
China’s best interests. Indeed, while political ties between Japan and China suffered 
a significant damage during the Koizumi era, bilateral trade continued to grow 
uninterrupted, and had expanded from US 89.2 billion in 2001 to US 211.3 billion in 
2006.173 
At the end of the Koizumi era, Shinzō Abe was elected as the new Prime 
Minister in October 2006, and on his first overseas visit he went to Beijing. This 
accommodating gesture was then returned by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, and it 
appeared that Japan-China relations started slowly moving in a different direction. 
Abe later had to resign due to health issues, and he was replaced by Yasuo Fukuda, 
whose father was the Prime Minister when Japan signed the Peace and Friendship 
Treaty with China in 1978. A few months before the Beijing Olympics, in May 2008, 
Hu Jintao made a formal visit to Japan for the first time in ten years as the Chinese 
head of state.174 On the occasion, the two governments issued a joint statement that 
promoted a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests”. 
The document stated that the Sino-Japanese relationship was one of the most 
important bilateral relationships for both countries and that Japan and China bore a 
“solemn responsibility for peace, stability, and development of the Asia-Pacific 
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region and the world”.175 Accordingly, the statement declared that both countries’ 
“sole option” was to “cooperate to enhance peace and friendship over the long term.” 
The statement was a strong indication that the two governments reached a certain 
level of agreement on past issues and they were willing to focus more on their future 
relations. Nevertheless, decades-long negative sentiments harbored against one 
another did not go away easily. This was shown in the controversial Olympic torch 
relay run in Japan, where a series of pro-and anti-Chinese demonstrations took place. 
At times, protesters punched and kicked each other, leaving some injured and others 
arrested. Some 3000 police officers were reported to have been deployed, raising the 
level of security to that usually seen at public appearances of Emperor Akihito.176 
The year 2009 saw the collapse of the so-called 1955 political system in Japan. 
After over half a century of rule, the LDP was defeated by the Democratic Party of 
Japan, led by Yukio Hatoyama, the grandson of the founder and the first prime 
minister of the LDP in 1956, Ichiro Hatoyama. Having leftist and pacifist 
inclinations as indicated by his so-called fraternity (yūai) philosophy, Hatoyama 
appeared to genuinely want to promote cooperation with Asia. One of his first 
initiatives upon assuming office was the establishment of an East Asian Community. 
He also stated at the China-Japan-Korea summit in Beijing in October 2009 that 
“Japan was unduly dependent on the United States. The US-Japan alliance is 
important but I would like to formulate policies stressing Asia”.177 The party’s 2009 
manifesto also stated that the DPJ wanted to “make great efforts to develop relations 
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and mutual trust with China, South Korea, and other Asian countries.”178 While the 
Koizumi administration had very little high-level contact with China for five years, 
during the first year of DPJ rule, summit meetings were organized six times, and the 
two countries’ foreign ministers met on seven separate occasions. In November 2009, 
the Japan-China Defense Ministers’ meeting was held in Tokyo, where an agreement 
was reached on the first joint training exercise.179 The Hatoyama administration 
clearly wished to pursue more independent policies from the United States, while it 
aimed to create a stronger regional security framework based on political dialogue 
with Beijing. However, amid controversy about his earlier campaign funding and 
about his economic policies that failed to deliver on their promises, Hatoyama was 
forced to resign in June 2010. Not long after his resignation, a Chinese fishing boat 
rammed into a Japanese Coast Guard ship near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
in the East China Sea. The Coast Guard arrested the captain of the Chinese boat, and 
the Japanese government stated that since the incident occurred in Japanese 
territorial waters, it would be dealt with in accordance with Japan’s domestic laws. 
Tokyo again stated that there were no territorial issues surrounding the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, since they were an inherent part of Japan’s territory. In 
response, China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement in which it claimed that 
Japan’s actions “seriously infringed upon China’s territorial sovereignty and violated 
the human rights of Chinese citizens”. Furthermore, Wen Jiabao stated that the 
islands were part of China’s “sacred territory”, and therefore the arrest of the captain 
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was unlawful.180 In response to Japan’s arrest of the boat’s captain, China arrested 
four Japanese businessman, introduced trade bans on the export of rare earth 
elements to Japan, and suspended the exchange of people from the ministerial level 
to the high-school student level.181 Japan, conceding to pressure from China, finally 
released the captain and dropped all charges against him. After a short period of 
rapprochement, conflicts again riddled Japan-China relations. This prompted Tokyo 
to re-examine its political and security relationships with the United States, and it 
approved a new National Defense Program Guideline in December 2010. The 
guideline stated that China’s military modernization and growing maritime activities 
caused ”concern for the regional and global community” and that the Japan-US 
alliance remained “indispensable in ensuring the peace and security of Japan”.182 
Soon after the adoption of these security guidelines, Japan declared that “an 
unshakeable Japan-US alliance will be essential’ for the security of Japan and for the 
peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.183 
The United States also showed an increased presence in the region. With the 
winding down of its war in Iraq and the withdrawal of American troops from 
Afghanistan, the US administration announced that it would move the majority of its 
navy to the Pacific as part of its new pivot to Asia.184 In line with that policy, 
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Washington paid more attention to territorial disputes in Asia, declaring that it had a 
“national interest in freedom of navigation” and in the “open access to Asia’s 
maritime commons.”185 
In 2012, former governor of Tokyo, Shintarō Ishihara started a fundraising 
campaign to buy some of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. In an 
attempt to prevent this move, the Japanese government announced its intention to 
purchase three islets in the area. On September 9, during the APEC summit in 
Vladivostok, President Hu Jintao met Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and expressed 
his firm opposition against any purchasing of the islets. However, on September 10, 
the Japanese government went ahead with purchasing the islets for 2.05 billion yen 
(US$18.3 million). The same day the Chinese government issued a statement that 
strongly opposed the “nationalization” of the islets, which it described as a “gross 
violation of China's sovereignty over its own territory and is highly offensive to the 
1.3 billion Chinese people.”186 
Tensions between Japan and China continued to further escalate. In a response 
to Japan’s island purchase, China stepped up its maritime presence in the East China 
Sea by sending six surveillance ships that carried out a “patrol and law enforcement 
mission” near the disputed territories, while China’s Global Times newspaper argued 
that under the new circumstances “backing off was no longer an option” for 
Beijing.187 The Chinese government issued a white paper in the same month, which 
stated that the islands were “China's inherent territory in all historical, geographical 
and legal terms”, and that China enjoyed “indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu 
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Dao.”188 On the same day, at a press conference after the 67th United Nations General 
Assembly, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda reiterated that the 
“Senkakus are an inherent part of our territory in light of history 
and also under international law. (…)  There are no territorial issues 
as such. Therefore, there cannot be any compromise that represents 
a retreat from this position.”189 
 
The United States, that hitherto occupied a neutral position regarding the islands, 
stepped in to the dispute and threw its weight behind the Japanese side. In December 
2012, the US Senate passed a defence policy bill that guaranteed that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were covered by the existing security treaty between the US 
and Japan.190 The same month, the LDP came back to power with a sweeping victory 
in the Upper House elections, and Shinzō Abe assumed his second term as prime 
minister. Strengthened US presence and the new conservative Japanese government 
only caused more friction in Japan-China relations. Beijing soon moved to step up its 
economic activities in the East China Sea: Despite an earlier agreement between 
Japan and China in 2008, the latter unilaterally started the development of the 
Shirakaba natural gas field in the East China Sea, an area where territorial 
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Conclusion: back to the future? 
This chapter provided an overview of post-war Japan-China relations, with a 
particular focus on the growing rivalry between these two countries. It argued that 
any significant reconciliation between Japan and China was impossible with the 
conclusion of the Pacific War for a number of reasons. In particular, 1) China’s 
continued domestic power struggle for leadership between the CCP and the 
Kuomintang, 2) Japan’s placement under foreign occupation until 1952, and 3) the 
great power struggle between the US and the USSR that emerged after World War II, 
were the main factors behind the complete lack of official China-Japan contacts. The 
two countries’ relations were, for nearly a quarter of a century, predominantly 
determined by their opposing strategic alliances with the two Cold War superpowers, 
which also set their post-war development on two significantly different paths. 
Although economic and cultural relations were re-established in the early 1950s, the 
ideological and political chasm between them was the main factor defining their 
relations, fuelled by constant distrust and suspicion until the beginning of the 1970s. 
Until the normalisation of bilateral ties in 1972, Japan practised a policy of 
separating politics and economics (seikei bunri) towards China. This meant 
important ‘lost decades’ for any reconciliation between the two countries. Even with 
the 1972 normalisation, a number of significant issues remained unresolved, 
including ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the so-called anti-hegemony 
clause. Economic relations continued to be at the centre of Japan-China relations into 
the 1980s, while political tensions resurfaced with the strengthening of patriotic 
education in both countries. This brought back painful memories and a number of 
issues from the Pacific War, all of which remained unresolved due to the two 
countries’ significantly different interpretations of the not-so-distant past. 
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Nevertheless, Japan’s development aid and steadily growing bilateral trade, as well 
as a Sino-Japanese rapprochement under their security alliances with the US, meant 
that political tensions between Japan and China were easily managed and 
occasionally erupting conflicts were quickly shelved. Until the early 1980s, Beijing 
avoided the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 becoming an issue in bilateral 
relations, but its patriotic education that replaced its earlier revolutionary ideology 
brought the issue of history back in to the CCP’s domestic political rhetoric.192 Its 
struggle against the Japanese Imperial Army and the latter’s wartime actions against 
the Chinese populace became one of the CCP’s ideological centrepieces. On the 
other hand, Japan’s emerging nationalism, highlighted by the textbook issues and 
PM Nakasone’s Yasukuni visit, only provided more fuel to the two countries’ 
growingly antagonistic sentiments. 
After the end of the Cold War,  Japan-China relations had further deteriorated. 
With the demise of the Soviet Union, the US-China-Japan strategic triangle lost its 
common enemy and America appeared to show less interest in the region. This 
meant that the two East Asian neighbors were left to face their hitherto irreconcilable 
issues all alone, despite having had already lost a generation-long period of time for 
reconciliation. China’s fast economic rise and Japan’s stagnation, together with 
ongoing unresolved issues from the past, meant that, by the end of the decade, Japan 
and China openly considered one another as major competitors as well as strategic 
rivals.193 
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The two countries’ clash of historical memories, growing nationalistic 
sentiments, territorial disputes, and economic and political rivalry only strengthened 
during the 2000s.194 This meant that, by the early 2010s, Japan-China relations 
appeared to be at their worst since the 1972 normalization of diplomatic relations. 
While, for instance, Beijing was PM Abe’s initial overseas destination when he was 
first elected in 2006, he never visited China after his re-election in December 2012. 
Even during the Koizumi administration, high-level bilateral meetings were 
regularly held at least on the sidelines of international summits, and there were a 
number of visits between both countries’ foreign ministers. Due to the worsening 
relations, however, the two countries’ foreign ministers “did not exchange a word” 
during the July 2013 ASEAN summit in Brunei.195 In the same month, a Pew 
Research Institute global research showed that, among all the countries polled, Japan 
harboured the least friendly feelings towards China by far, with only five per cent of 
its population having a favourable view of its largest neighbor.196 Among Asian 
countries, South Korea came in a distant second with 46 per cent, and even 37 per 
cent of the US population viewed China favourably.  
Tourism figures between the two countries also reflected the strained relations. 
Data released by the Japan National Tourism Organization in July 2013 showed that, 
while the number of foreign visitors to Japan in the first half of 2013 increased by 
22.8 per cent and reached a record high, the number of visitors from China dropped 
by 27 per cent during the same period. Chinese government data available for the 
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same period shows that the number of Japanese tourists to China also decreased by a 
significant 25.5 per cent.197 
The 35th anniversary of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty passed 
quietly in August 2013, without any official events organized on either side. There 
was originally a two-day forum planned to mark the occasion, with some 100 experts 
invited to Beijing, but the event was postponed at China’s request. The annual event 
had been organized by the Japanese think tank Genron NPO and the China Daily 
newspaper since 2005. Nevertheless, the two organizers released the results of their 
annual opinion survey at the same time, which showed that over 90 per cent of both 
Japanese and Chinese harboured negative feelings towards the other.198 That year’s 
results were the worst since the annual survey started in 2005.199 
Japan-China relations appeared to have reached a critical point after the 
territorial dispute and have not been normalized ever since. High-level official 
meetings between the two countries were put on hold for years until their trade 
ministers had a brief and unfruitful meeting on the sidelines of the annual 2014 
APEC summit in Qingdao.200 Chinese Premier Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime 
Minister Abe also met then for the first time since both assumed office, but the 
meeting was short and no progress was made in thawing bilateral ties. The two 
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leaders did not meet for nearly another two years and their second meeting in 
September 2016 was reported as “déjà vu all over again”.201 
Japan-China relations in the early 2010s carried so much hostility and 
unresolved conflict that, in order to make qualitative progress, yet another 
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Figure 1.  GDP, current US$ million, 1988-2016: China, India, Japan, South Korea,      
USA (China is indicated in darker blue, the US in light blue) 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/.   
 
 
Figure 2. Military Expenditure, in constant (2015) US$ million, 1988-2016: China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, USA (China in darker, the US in lighter blue.) 
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Figure 3.  Military Expenditure per capita in constant (2015) US$, 1988-2016: China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, USA (China: dark blue; US: light blue) 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-
constant-2015-USD.pdf and https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth. 
 
Figure 4. Military Expenditure (% of GDP), 1988-2016: China, India, Japan, South 
Korea, USA (China: dark blue; US: light blue) 
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Source: https://newint.org/features/2016/12/01/the-coming-war-on-china. Today, over 400 US 




Japanese academic perceptions of contemporary Japan-China relations 
 
Introduction 
Tensions in Japan-China relations influenced academic research and scholarly debate 
on both sides to such an extent that a Genron NPO-China Daily joint conference 
where some 100 Japanese and Chinese scholars and other experts were expected to 
participate had to be cancelled in August 2013. Japan-China relations entered a 
prolonged period of stalemate after the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu incident, and it is this 
period’s Japanese academic scholarship that this chapter examines. 
Contemporary scholarship generally presents recent developments in Japan-
China relations as resulting from growing competition for regional leadership in East 
Asia, an issue of national security, 202  as a conflict stemming from different 
interpretations of history,203 as a struggle between different national identities,204 or 
in the light of territorial disputes and a clash over the development of the resources 
in the East China Sea205. Even though there is a great academic interest in, and 
therefore a growing body of scholarship on these aspects of Japan-China relations, 
                                               
202 Yasuhiro Takeda, “Sino-Japanese Strategic Relations in Multilateral Regional Frameworks,” in 
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little attention has been given to the approach and value perceptions that frame 
current Japanese academic thought regarding Japan-China relations. The purpose of 
this chapter, therefore, is to examine contemporary Japanese academic perceptions 
of Japan-China relations. More specifically, I aim in this chapter to engage with the 
value perceptions that underscore various contemporary Japanese scholarly positions. 
I argue that not only are Japan-China relations problematic, but so are some of the 
approaches and value perceptions with which a number of leading Japanese scholars 
view and explain them. I point out that the current state of Japan-China relations 
provides a good reason to question some of the existing approaches and frameworks 
that attempt to explain the complexity of the issues between the two countries. After 
identifying some of the shortcomings in contemporary academic views, this chapter 
finally argues that, in order to achieve real progress and qualitative change in Japan-
China relations, it is essential to re-evaluate some of the very fundamental 
approaches that underscore Japanese research and scholarly arguments. 
This chapter focuses on the analysis of the writings of contemporary Japanese 
scholars about Japan-China relations that have been published in international 
journals. The selected scholars have a high standing in Japanese academic society: 
many are professors in prominent Japanese universities, heads of research institutes, 
and leading members of Japan’s international relations research establishment. 
While these scholars’ writings have shaped Japanese academic views of Japan’s 
relations with China, some of them also have had a direct influence on the course of 
Japan’s relations with China. Professor Shin`ichi Kitaoka, a former professor of law 
and politics at the University of Tokyo, for instance, has not only held top-level 
academic positions during his career – such as Executive Director of Research at the 
Institute for International Policy Studies, president of the International University of 
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Japan and president of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) – but he 
has also served in high political roles. To name some of the most important ones, 
Kitaoka was the Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, 
then served as the government-appointed chairman of the 2009 Japan-China Joint 
Study of History. He was also the deputy chairman of Prime Minister Abe’s 
Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security and the chairman 
of PM Abe’s Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities.206 
Kitaoka’s work was essential in formulating Japan’s new National Security Strategy 
as well as reviewing the National Defense Program Guidelines. 
Another academic who also held high-level political ranks is Hitoshi Tanaka, 
the Chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research 
Institute, and a Senior Fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange: he was 
the Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau (2001-2002), the 
Director for Policy Coordination of the Foreign Policy Bureau and later served as a 
top advisor to Prime Minister Jun`ichirō Koizumi on a broad range of issues, 
including relations with China. He went on to serve as the Deputy Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Japan for three years under PM Koizumi (2002-2005).207 Tanaka 
continues to be influential in both political and academic circles in present-day Japan. 
Other high-profile academics include Ryōsei Kokubun, professor of law and politics 
at Keiō University and the Director of Keiō Center for Area Studies, whose main 
focus is Chinese politics and international relations in East Asia; Takashi Hoshiyama, 
a Keiō and Harvard graduate, who was the Director of the Cultural Policy Division 
and the Director of the Information and Communication Division in the Ministry of 
                                               
206 See Kitaoka’s profile on the Nakasone Yasuhiro Peace Institute’s website, at 
http://www.iips.org/en/experts/staff_kitaoka.pdf. Accessed February 14, 2018. 
207 See Tanaka’s profile on the Japan Center for International Exchange website, at 
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Foreign Affairs, and senior researcher in the Institute for International Policy 
Studies; Yoshihide Soeya, the Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at Keiō 
University, who was a member of the Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals 
in the 21st Century; Kazuhiko Noguchi, the Chair Professor at the Department of 
International Studies at Tokai University and a professor at the Defence Academy of 
Japan; and Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, a professor at the Graduate School of Asia Pacific 
Studies at the Ritsumeikan Asia-Pacific University. 
 
Shin`ichi Kitaoka and the question of proactive pacifism 
As noted above, Kitaoka chaired the Japanese group of scholars during the Japan-
China Joint Study of History project in 2009. The initiative was a result of an 
agreement in October 2006 between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and his 
Chinese counterpart, President Hu Jintao, to set up a joint research project on history 
between the two countries. The reason for the initiative was the May 2005 
nationwide protests in China against Japan’s bid for a seat on the UN Security 
Council, during which protesters claimed that “Japan has not reflected on history”.208 
Despite the initial agreement that the results would be published jointly, due to 
disagreements on both sides they were published separately in Japanese and Chinese 
in 2010. While it is unclear what exactly was the basis of disagreement, Kitaoka 
maintains that the Chinese side was the one that changed their mind on some of the 
agreed points, particularly about how to view certain historical events between the 
two countries in the 20th century. Kitaoka argues that the standard of the Japanese 
                                               
208 Shin`ichi Kitaoka, “A Look Back at the Work of the Joint Japanese-Chinese History Research 
Committee,” Asia-Pacific Review 17, no.1 (June 2010): 6. 
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research was higher from the beginning,209 and despite a number of attempts by 
Japan to clarify differences, the Chinese side was not open for discussion, possibly, 
argues Kitaoka, for political reasons.210 While Kitaoka maintains that “there seem to 
be virtually no Japanese historians” who think that Japan was not the aggressor 
against China during the Pacific War,211 he does not provide any particular detail 
about what the exact disagreement from the Chinese side was. One point of 
disagreement, however, might have been regarding the way in which China and 
Japan look back at Japan’s wartime conduct. Kitaoka indicates this when writing that 
there are some people who would argue that Japan’s actions during the Pacific War 
cannot be termed aggression as the “definition of aggression has only been 
established recently”, arguing that there exists a fine line between aggression and 
non-aggression.212 Also, while he concedes that the Manchurian Incident was a clear 
case of aggression and that Japan bears the lion’s share of blame for the Nanking 
Incident,213 Kitaoka does not address a significant question, which is whether Japan 
has taken enough action towards historical reconciliation. He also fails to mention 
that the Japanese government tends to send conflicting messages to its neighbors 
about Japan’s responsibilities for its wartime actions.214 Instead, Kitaoka argues that 
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while Japan was the aggressor in the past, it has changed significantly since then and 
he implies that China should simply move on and leave issues of the past where they 
belong, whether those issues have been dealt with properly or not.215 Kitaoka writes 
that the reason for deteriorating relations between China and Japan was the former’s 
patriotic education that started in the early 1990s.216 He believes that Japan has done 
enough reflection on history and ignores the issue of whether it has followed any 
reflection up with sufficient action towards China. Nevertheless, lacking any 
reference to errors on the Japanese side, his argument ultimately implies that Japan 
has already done enough in this regard and puts the onus on China to appreciate and 
acknowledge Japan’s efforts. As a result, Kitaoka’s assumption seems to be that 
China is ultimately the one responsible for the deterioration in bilateral relations. 
In an article published a year later, Kitaoka becomes more straightforward on 
how he thinks China should be viewed: He gives a thorough analysis of Beijing’s 
perceived intentions. He immediately rolls out the big picture, explaining that 
China’s rise should be viewed in the context of its hierarchic worldview, growing 
nationalism, and Beijing’s weakening control over the Chinese military.217 He warns 
that while anti-hegemony was one of Beijing’s key principles in its diplomacy 
throughout most of the Cold War, with China’s recent emergence Asia must face a 
new China that is opportunistic and actively seeks to establish hegemony in the 
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region.218 Referring to Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Kitaoka 
argues that Chinese do not respect the rule of law and therefore cannot be trusted.219 
He draws a parallel between the situation in today’s East Asia and the changes the 
region was going through during China’s Warring States period some 2,500 years 
ago, when the ultimately victorious kingdom of Qin was able to break down a joint 
opposition by other states with its “salami tactics” proposing bilateral ties with every 
other competing kingdom.220 While Kitaoka likens contemporary China to ancient 
Qin and warns that China intends to lead the world based on now presumably 
obsolete and backward perceptions of power, he draws a sharp contrast between 
Japan and China: Japan, argues Kitaoka, has experienced “decades, if not centuries” 
of the modern values of democracy and liberalism.221 According to Kitaoka, China 
envisions a kind of “packing order” of countries in a vertical hierarchy led by China 
itself, Japan’s role is to lead another group of countries: those that are opposed to 
China’s rule. These countries, for some reason, and quite ironically, are also 
vertically aligned in Kitaoka’s vision, yet their cooperation is based on supposedly 
egalitarian universal rules and principles such as democracy, human rights, and the 
rule of law. The reason for Japan leading this vertical alliance is unclear as Kitaoka 
only says that Japan is the biggest country in this alignment. But would this be 
sufficient, and even necessary, for Japan to lead? Isn’t this also an obsolete 
perception of power, which is based on size, strength, and, to an extent, hard power? 
Kitaoka’s vision is that two vertically aligned groups of countries, one led by 
China and the other by Japan, compete for presumably different values, while “one 
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old superpower in the north is watching the situation carefully.”222 Ultimately, 
Kitaoka’s analysis depicts China in unequivocally negative terms: it is described as a 
country that does not want to accept the changing realities of the twenty-first century, 
one that rejects democratic progress as well as other values and achievements of the 
past some 150 years, and one that essentially wants to rule by force. Japan, on the 
other hand, is represented in an unquestionably positive light: a country that is 
standing up for others based on perceived universal values and principles and that is 
best-suited to defend the region from China’s threat. China is presented as an 
unchanging, monolithic  and menacing force from the past, against which Japan 
holds the key leading Asia towards a brighter future. Nevertheless, concludes 
Kitaoka, a rules-based international order is not disadvantageous for China and the 
next international order must be based on the achievements made by human beings 
to date.223 Kitaoka proposes that compassion, something Japan received from many 
countries in the wake of the 2011 triple disaster, can be a key factor. While 
compassion is a recent, but arguably all the more needed, concept in the context of 
international relations, Kitaoka only applies it to China, saying that it can have a 
positive impact on Chinese leaders and people alike.224 But why, for instance, does 
he not call upon Japanese leaders and people to have a deeper understanding of 
China’s supposed inability to finally let issues of history go by exercising 
compassion? Or why does he not make a bit more effort in his article towards 
understanding through the lens of compassion China’s anxieties and even Beijing’s 
own mistakes? Compassion is an exciting concept that indeed has the potential to 
transform international relations, but it should be applied both ways and by all 
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parties involved. This should particularly be the case if one argues from a ‘universal’ 
values perspective. 
Unfortunately the concept of compassion was not explored further in Kitaoka’s 
subsequent writings. On the contrary, after he was appointed chairman of PM Abe’s 
Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities, he appeared to focus 
more on hard power balancing against China instead. In an article written in 2014, he 
introduced the concept of proactive pacifism (sekkyokuteki heiwashugi), something 
that Kitaoka alleges PM Abe had “hammered out”, and which concept was based on 
the principle of active international cooperation.225 Kitaoka contrasts this concept 
with passive pacifism, something that had defined Japan’s international presence to 
date, which for decades posited that “the less militarized Japan is, the more peaceful 
the world becomes.”226 Kitaoka argues that passive pacifism is “mistaken in the light 
of reality,” pointing out that China and North Korea now pose a direct military threat 
to Japan. Interestingly, the concept of pacifism here resonates more with self-defense 
capabilities and military power than with the concept of compassion or soft power, 
although Kitaoka maintains that the new National Security Strategy focuses on 
“software” such as regime and policy, and emphasizes the maritime rule of law and 
cooperation with countries that share universal values with Japan. 227  Yet, he 
criticizes the strategy, arguing that the equipment of Japan’s maritime and self-
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defense forces should be expanded further, and that capabilities for counterattacks 
against enemy bases should have been incorporated in the guidelines. While Kitaoka 
also mentions the necessity of more flexible attitudes towards China, such as the 
resumption of dialogue on historical issues, the predominant focus for him is to show 
resolve against China, adding that “outwitting the enemy is fundamental to the art of 
war.”228 While Kitaoka does not go as far as naming who the enemy might be, the 
countries his article refers to that pose a direct threat to Japan are China and North 
Korea, six and two times, respectively. Indirect references to China and North Korea 
as enemies and using expressions such as “art of war” may not be the best choice of 
words when a country wants to justify its new national security strategy and 
emphasize its active pursuit of pacifism at the same time. Kitaoka explains that the 
Abe administration was simply developing Japan’s post-war diplomacy further 
“within the framework of international harmony” and that this policy push had won 
international acceptance except from such countries as China and North Korea.229 
Kitaoka concludes that the defence panel plans to submit its recommendations to the 
Abe administration in the near future, which will result in a revision of the 
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. The context here, therefore, 
appears not to be the pursuit of a harmonious international society, supposedly a 
result of exploring universal values and principles or any United Nations-related 
guidelines. Rather, the pursued changes seem to be aligned with the coming revision 
of the US-Japan Defense Cooperation bilateral agreement, suggesting that the real 
driving force behind this proposal may not be an independent and autonomous 
proactive pacifist policy initiative of Tokyo. 
                                               
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid., 1. 
 83 
Overall, perhaps Kitaoka’s argument for proactive pacifism should have 
focused more on seeking cooperation based on compassion and mutual 
understanding, as he suggested in one of his earlier writings, rather than on actively 
joining the race to build up military capacities and self-defence capabilities. Also, 
and quite ironically, Kitaoka acknowledges the part in the National Security Strategy 
which mentions that “Japan should always keep the door open for dialogue with 
China,”230 a statement indicating passivity, which seemingly contradicts Japan’s new 
concept of proactive pacifism.  
It is perhaps worth mentioning that Kitaoka’s article depicts Japan as a “major 
power” in the context of military strength, a claim which Japanese politicians and 
academics alike had long tended to avoid, using terms such as ‘economic power’ or 
‘major economic power’ instead when referring to Japan. A few months after 
Kitaoka’s article, remarkably, Japan’s then-Minister of Defense, Itsunori Onodera, 
referred to Japan as a “great power” (taikoku) in a prewritten speech about Tokyo’s 
security and defense policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 
Washington.231 This self-reference was quite possibly a first in Japan’s post-Pacific 
War diplomacy. Equally remarkably, the defence minister’s choice of words did not 
trigger any comments from the audience, and they even seem to have slipped 
Beijing’s attention, which usually attempts to limit the use of great power (daguo) to 
either the United States or China. 
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Hitoshi Tanaka: from comprehensive engagement and multilateralism back to 
realism? 
As noted earlier, Hitoshi Tanaka is one of contemporary Japan’s most influential 
foreign policy experts. He is both a well-known scholar and a former top-ranking 
Japanese government official, serving as director-general of the Asian and Oceanian 
Affairs Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and later as Deputy Minister for 
Foreign Affairs from 2002 to 2005. He is currently the chairman of the Institute for 
International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute. He is also a Senior Fellow at 
the Japan Center for International Exchange, and a significant contributor to the 
same institution’s online publication series, the East Asia Insights. Tanaka is a well-
established scholar in East Asian studies, with a particular focus on Japan-China 
relations. His earlier high ranking in the Japanese government allowed him to not 
only have significant insights into Japan-China relations but, to some extent, also to 
have an influence on formulating government policies towards those relations. 
Tanaka sees relations with China as being one of the most important 
challenges facing Japan and the Asia-Pacific as a whole, and warns that Japan-China 
relations have deteriorated to new post-war lows. He views relations with China as 
crucial, arguing that “finding the right approach to China is perhaps the biggest task 
for Japan and other countries in the Asia Pacific.”232 He writes that Japan-China 
relations can be viewed as the “most immediate risk factor with the potential to 
seriously jeopardize regional stability,” and that to eliminate this risk, a strong 
political commitment, “including the espousal of a future vision for the relationship,” 
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is necessary.233 Tanaka argues that tension between Japan and China is deep-rooted 
for a number of reasons: 
1. The role of identity: the Japanese people have a benign superiority complex 
towards China that is based on Japan’s remarkable achievements prior to World War 
II and Japan’s phenomenal post-war economic recovery.234 These developments, 
maintains Tanaka, have generated a complicated mixture of veneration and 
resentment toward Japan among the Chinese people, particularly given the 
perception that Japan’s successes upset the traditional balance of power in the 
region. 235  What Tanaka calls developments include Japanese imperialism and 
militarism before the end of the Pacific War that traumatized China and many other 
countries in Asia. This, as was pointed out in Chapter One, does continue to be a 
significant issue in Sino-Japanese relations to this day. Somehow this fact is entirely 
missing from Tanaka’s analysis. One might also ask to what extent Tanaka thinks a 
superiority complex can be benign when Japan-China relations, as he himself writes, 
are riddled with unresolved issues, causing a deep-rooted tension between the two 
countries. 
2. China’s economic power: China’s rapid and prolonged economic growth, 
coupled with Japan’s prolonged economic stagnation, has resulted in predictions that 
the Chinese economy will be several times larger than that of Japan by 2030. Tanaka 
claims that it is  “unclear that the Japanese people, who have long enjoyed their 
country’s reputation as the world’s second most powerful economy, are ready to 
accept these changes.”236 He also points out that Japanese leaders are very worried 
about China’s domestic problems such as corruption and pollution, as domestic 
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unrest there could disrupt growth, which in turn would have a negative effect on 
Japan’s economy. It seems that Tanaka’s major concern here appears to be China’s 
potential disruption of Japan’s economic growth, focusing more on hard power and a 
narrow Japan-centred perspective, rather than showing a genuine concern for 
China’s domestic problems. This is certainly not a principle- or values-based 
approach. 
3. China’s military power: Tanaka is concerned about China’s rapid 
development of its military and Beijing’s lack of transparency around its military 
budget, pointing out that a non-democratic country’s military expansion is a cause 
for concern. While Tanaka does raise legitimate concerns around China’s expanding 
military power, he does not put that into context. For instance, if we compare 
China’s military spending to that of the United States, we can see a significant gap 
between the two. According to the SIPRI’s figures, the US has been the world's 
biggest military spender by far. In 2014, for instance, the US military budget, 
US$610 billion, accounted for 34.34 per cent of the global total. China’s budget for 
the same year was estimated to be US$216 billion, or 12.16 per cent of the world 
totals. While the US budget amounted to 3.5 per cent of its gross domestic product, 
China spent only 2.1 per cent of its GDP on its military.237 One also wonders how 
transparent any country’s military budget is, particularly in the case of great powers? 
Tanaka next refers to China’s foreign policy and argues that, since China’s 
political system is not a liberal democracy, the extent to which the international 
community can trust Beijing’s commitment is limited. He is also concerned about 
China’s growing nationalism, noting that Chinese hostility towards Japan has 
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seriously damaged Japanese popular impressions of China and also caused a rise of 
nationalism in Japan.238 
Despite the deep-rooted tensions, however, Tanaka maintains in an earlier 
article that it would be somewhat irresponsible to subscribe to the China threat 
theory, and that a containment strategy aiming to prevent China’s growth is entirely 
unfeasible.239 This leaves the reader wondering if non-feasibility should be the real 
reason for Japan not to attempt to contain China? In other words, if China’s 
containment were feasible, would Japan attempt to develop any containment 
strategy? Tanaka maintains that such strategy would do no good to Japan as it would 
not only damage the country’s fragile relationship with the “most populous nation on 
Earth” that “also happens to be its neighbor,” but it would also reverse the region’s 
economic growth.240  Tanaka’s major concern therefore seems to be a possible 
disruption in Japan’s economic growth, indicating that he values relations with 
China firstly for economic benefits. He then goes on to suggest that Japan needs to 
engage China in regional and global rule-based communities in order to ensure that it 
develops into a responsible player in the international system.241 In order to achieve 
that goal, argues Tanaka, Japan should support a consolidation of strategic links 
among the region’s four largest democratic states, which he sees as being Japan, 
India, Australia, and the United States. This statement is problematic as Tanaka 
writes about East Asia, and he does not specify here otherwise what region he is 
talking about. However, considering the countries he named, that region would have 
to be much larger than East Asia, covering the whole of the Indo-Asia-Pacific area. 
Or does Tanaka suggest that Japan should rely on only extra-regional partners to 
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foster relations with China? Another question that immediately arises is why Tanaka 
did not include South Korea, its immediate neighbor and one of East Asia’s largest 
democracies, in his vision of a rule-based regional democratic cooperation that has 
also relatively close ties to China? Could it also be due to the long-standing 
historical issues that cause frequent tensions between these two democracies? 
Ignoring the ongoing tensions over the two countries’ significantly different 
perceptions of history, Tanaka posits that a spread of a regional identity would also 
be beneficial for East Asia, because it would help “absorb and dissipate 
confrontational nationalistic sentiment,” and he goes on to suggest that the best way 
forward for East Asia is a pragmatic and action-oriented regionalism, through which 
countries are bound together by rules and operations, rather than values, religion, or 
political systems.242 On the one hand, this suggests that Tanaka’s aim is to look 
beyond the nation-state framework and approach the China question from an 
internationalist point of view. On the other hand, Tanaka does not clarify what 
specific values or common interests that regional identity might be based on. This 
vision also appears to somewhat contradict his earlier suggestion of bringing 
together like-minded and rules-based democracies that share the same values and 
similar political systems to team up with the goal of making China a responsible and 
fair player in the international community. Tanaka also leaves an important issue 
unaddressed: how can the two countries look beyond their own nation-state 
framework and adopt a more internationalist perspective when both are experiencing 
the rise of nationalism? As Tanaka himself argues earlier, Chinese and Japanese 
nationalism are interlinked and are feeding into one another. 
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Despite unresolved issues of history and the rise of nationalism, Tanaka 
maintains that the real issues in the region revolve around the questions of energy, 
environment, and public health. Tanaka posits that it is Japan, and not China, which 
is the most qualified country and has the greatest resources in this regard. He argues 
that Japan should therefore be the leader of the region, an indication that the question 
of leadership between Japan and China is indeed important to Tanaka. However, he 
acknowledges that Japan’s leadership would be insufficient and fragile as Japan 
alone could not achieve regional peace and stability without the continued presence 
of the United States.243 What makes Tanaka think that Japan alone is unable to lead 
the region? Also, and similarly importantly, why does Tanaka think that the region 
would not work without the presence of the United States and a Japan-US alliance? 
These questions are left unaddressed. In conclusion, Tanaka points out that Japan, 
being the most powerful democracy in the region, needs to develop a long-term 
vision and implement clear policies to that end, thus acknowledging that Tokyo is 
yet to develop such vision and policies.244 While Tanaka himself argues for the 
importance of developing such a vision, he does not attempt to provide its contours. 
His earlier writings, however, do include some important ideas of what his vision 
might be, at least as far as the question of China is concerned. In 2008, Tanaka asks 
how Japan should respond to China’s economic, political, and military expansion 
and how Tokyo can ensure that concerns about Beijing taking an aggressive course 
in the future will not become a reality.245 He goes on to suggest that Tokyo needs to 
develop a policy of comprehensive engagement and focus on further strengthening 
multilateralism and a rules-based regional cooperation that aims to “minimize the 
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negatives and maximize the positives” around China’s rise.246 He maintains that the 
single most important and urgent objective of Japanese policymakers should be to 
achieve a grand bargain with Beijing that puts issues that damage ties between the 
two countries in the context of building healthier ties, creating a “win-win 
framework” for both.247 Tanaka also warns against a policy of increasing Japan’s 
defence expenditures, arguing that it would only lead to a destabilizing arms race. 
Here, however, Tanaka instead stresses the importance of Tokyo’s reliance on its 
alliance with the US as well as other security relations in Asia to hedge against 
future uncertainties. 
It is remarkable to see how Tanaka’s views changed over time. In his series of 
writings in East Asia Insights, published by the Japan Center for International 
Exchange, he started off taking a normative approach that focused on drawing up a 
vision of cooperation and constructive engagement, and ended up taking a much 
more descriptive analysis without reiterating what he thinks needs to be done to 
amend bilateral ties and move forward. In 2008, for instance, he suggests that while 
there are concerns around China’s military expansion, Japan should not increase its 
own defense expenditures as that would lead to a destabilizing arms race in East 
Asia. Instead, argues Tanaka, it is enough for Tokyo to rely on the US-Japan alliance 
against future uncertainties and the main goal of the alliance should be to work 
together to consolidate inclusive regional multilateral frameworks and establish a 
norm of addressing issues in a cooperative manner. Tanaka maintains that Japan 
must proactively engage China and also suggests that a regular trilateral security 
dialogue should also be established between China, the US and Japan, pointing out 
that Japan has an “enormous stake” in realizing the ultimate goal of China’s peaceful 
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emergence and enmeshment within the existing global system.248 Even though here 
Tanaka does not seem to have any issues with the current US-led regional and global 
status quo, he clearly focuses on a peaceful approach and cooperative solutions. In 
2007 he points out that East Asia, as well as Tokyo, lacks a clear and long-term 
vision and he goes on to lay out his own vision for the region and Japan’s role in 
it.249 He argues that the rise of China does not have to be a zero-sum game and that it 
gives opportunity for Japan to reinvent itself as a global and regional leader in areas 
outside the economic sphere, using its soft power and reputation as a democratic 
power to facilitate positive change. Tanaka makes a case for an action-oriented 
regionalism focusing on pragmatic issues, but with the long-term goal of establishing 
an East Asian Community and a rules-based regional economic system in which 
China also plays a central role. He concludes by arguing that there has been no other 
time when Japan’s policy toward East Asia had a greater importance.250 A few years 
later in the same publication series, Tanaka strikes a significantly different tone. 
Instead of maintaining his earlier positive visions stemming from an inclusive and 
internationalist perspective on issues surrounding China, his views are framed in a 
predominantly nationalistic perspective, focusing on why Japan still matters as China 
continues to rise. He argues that the myth that Japan is in decline and is no longer 
important in the face of China’s emergence is a dangerous misperception, and that 
Japan is still one of the world’s most industrialized and technologically advanced 
nations, which is still ahead of all other Asian nations from both aspects.251 While 
criticizing Tokyo for the lack of an overarching vision for Japan’s engagement with 
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China and East Asia, Tanaka’s article itself lacks any policy suggestions in that 
regard; it instead focuses on the importance of the strengthening of the US-Japan 
alliance as the main tool of engaging with China and the region as a whole. Tanaka’s 
main suggestion is that intensive US-Japan alliance consultations are needed as an 
important first step moving forward, warning that allowing misperceptions that 
Japan and the bilateral alliance were no longer important could have grave 
consequences.252 Tanaka suddenly sees things from the perspective of Japan’s and 
the alliance’s importance. While arguing that “intensive and regularized US-Japan 
consultations” were critical to coordinate a joint approach toward China, Tanaka no 
longer deems it necessary to develop positive visions, including forms of direct 
engagement with Beijing, in Tokyo’s policy-making. Of course Japan does matter, 
and not only in the context of China’s emergence, but what about Tanaka’s earlier 
focus on what values matter for the region from a Japanese perspective, as well as on 
the importance of developing positive visions in Japanese policy-making? A year 
later in the same article series, Tanaka largely analyses Japan-China relations in the 
limited context of the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands incident, arguing that Japan 
should not bend to Chinese pressure regarding the islands dispute, as it would set a 
highly negative precedent and embolden China to use coercive methods of 
diplomacy.253 In another article, Tanaka even maintains that there is no room for a 
compromise for Tokyo regarding the islands issue, given the clear historical 
records. 254  It is important to note here that while Japan is indeed the one 
administering control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands at present, the historical record 
regarding their ownership is not as clear as Tanaka maintains. Japan took effective 
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control over the islands through prior occupation after defeating China in the first 
Sino-Japanese War in 1895. With the end of the Pacific War, Tokyo only continued 
to have control over the islands after the conclusion of the Okinawa Reversion 
Agreement in 1971, but it is not entirely clear whether the five islets in question do 
come under Okinawan territory as they were not covered under the agreement. 
Taiwan, the closest country to the five islands, has also made claims of sovereignty 
over them.255 
Interestingly, while Tanaka points out that it is counterproductive to frame the 
Japan-China relationship as focusing on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, he 
himself views bilateral relations with Beijing largely in this context. On the one hand, 
he proposes that a complete reset for East Asia is needed in the face of growing 
conflicts in the region. On the other hand, however, he does not lay out any 
particular policy initiative. Instead, his main argument is that any changes should be 
based on liberal strategic considerations, not nationalist motives, which appears to be 
a somewhat vague policy recommendation in the light of deepening tensions 
between Tokyo and Beijing, particularly in view of Tanaka’s earlier and plentiful 
suggestions for ways of bilateral and regional cooperation.256 
Throughout his scholarship on Japan-China relations, an overarching theme is 
the importance of China from an economic point of view.257 One of Tanaka’s 
recurring arguments is that neither Japan nor China can afford to allow issues 
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between them as that may lead to the undermining of their bilateral economic 
cooperation and negatively affect the Japanese economy. He maintains that the 
Japan-China relationship is: 
“critical to both countries as well as to the region 
given the two countries’ huge trade and investment 
flows, their economic complementarity, the 
interdependent nature of regional production 
networks, and their respective political 
influences.”258  
 
Therefore, Tanaka ultimately appreciates China from a market economy perspective, 
which is rather a pragmatic and interest-based approach than a values-based 
perspective. Yet he wants to regulate China from a universal values and principles 
perspective, with the help of like-minded countries that share values such as 
democracy and the rule of law. While Tanaka makes a case for rules-based 
cooperation among extra-regional players, his argument does not elaborate on the 
particular goals, norms, or principles these strategic regional links should be based 
upon. Without specifying values as well as long term goals and visions, leadership is 
likely to be confined ultimately to power contexts. Similarly, not making a strong 
case for certain policy recommendations based on well-defined and distinctive 
values would make scholarly debate on political leadership vulnerable to contexts of 
power, particularly in the troubled state of contemporary Japan-China relations. This 
is even more so given that, while Tanaka does criticize China for its military 
development and political leadership, the only criticisms he makes of the Japanese 
government is that it 1) does not have a clear vision about China and the region as a 
whole, and that 2) Tokyo must not risk its security relations with the United States. 
Even when it comes to the aforementioned territorial dispute with China, he squarely 
puts the blame on Beijing. Ultimately, in his writings Tanaka suggests that while 
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Japan is, and has been, open to China, it is Beijing that is to be blamed for 
deteriorated relations. Even when it comes to the handling of historical issues 
between the two countries, Tanaka argues that Japan has already done enough. At 
one point he admits that Japan’s “Asian neighbors” can be sensitive given Japan’s 
“history of aggression”,259 but he suggests that the issue of history has already been 
dealt with properly as far as Japan is concerned, since sufficient statements 
apologizing for Japan’s wartime actions have been made by the Japanese 
government.260 Tanaka maintains that it is “unfortunate” that “Japan’s efforts to take 
on a leadership role in the region” are still “frequently frustrated” by the issue of 
history.261 But since he ultimately maintains that Japan is not at fault, how can deep-
running problems in bilateral relations be solved if Japan is not really open to 
listening to Beijing, be it regarding issues of history or territorial disputes? Is it 
realistic, let alone fair, to expect change only from the Chinese side? 
 
Takashi Hoshiyama: Japan finally liberated from the “spell of history”? 
Hoshiyama maintains that there was a qualitative shift in Japan-China relations after 
the Koizumi era (2001-2006), in which changes on the Japanese side were 
particularly important. He argues that after a five-year period of gradually 
deteriorating bilateral relations, visits by both countries’ prime ministers, PM Shinzō 
Abe in 2006 and PM Wen Jiabao the following year, Japan-China relations appeared 
to take a turn for the better. He points to three major factors in this qualitative 
change: 
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1) Due to a generational change 60 years after the end of the Pacific War, 
Japan was “finally liberated from the spell of history” and therefore its public 
perceptions of China became “more realistic and cautious”. 
2) In light of such “threats” as China’s rise, the majority of the Japanese people 
began to hold a realistic view on national security. 
3) Japan was “forced to adopt a more positive and assertive” diplomacy due to 
changes in the ”harsh international environment in which Japan finds itself.”262  
Remarkably, the third point depicts Japan as a country that has predominantly 
been a passive and reactive country in its diplomacy, apparently a victim waking up 
to the realities of a bleak international environment, one that is pushed towards 
taking preventive actions. Also quite interestingly, Hoshiyama uses the word 
“history” no less than 90 times in his 28-page long analysis, including in the term 
“spell of history” (9 times) and the expression “liberation/liberated from the spell of 
history” (5 times). While Hoshiyama himself states initially that the spell is over, one 
starts to feel somewhat spellbound by his continued and frequent referencing of the 
term, and begins to wonder whether Japan is really finally free from the issue of 
history. In fact, Hoshiyama’s own opinion on the question of history appears 
somewhat conflicted. On the one hand, he initially writes that China “fully 
appreciated” post-war Japan’s peaceful steps in relation to what he regards as an 
“historical issue” and that Beijing acknowledged Japan’s remorse and apology. On 
the other hand, his first main concluding remark is that Japan-China relations would 
only improve on the condition that “China changed its view of history 
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dramatically.”263 He also asserts that the issue of history is merely a diplomatic 
drawcard that China tends to use to gain leverage against Japan in the international 
arena, and which “proved highly effective” in Japan until recently.264 Hoshiyama’s 
argument seems a bit too simplistic, reducing the issue of history to a political 
drawcard at the hands of the Chinese government. At one point he argues that 
China’s patriotic education that started in the 1990s was the major reason for the 
deterioration in bilateral relations.265 It appears that Hoshiyama thinks that there 
would be no issues of history between the two countries as long as China dropped 
the history card and the Japanese public became more practical-minded and gave up 
its somewhat masochistic views of wartime history. In other words, he seems to 
think it would be enough if the two countries dealt with the issue separately. 
Also significantly, most of Hoshiyama’s references to issues around history are 
framed in the context of the Japanese public’s opinion, blurring the lines between 
general society, academic research, and the political elite’s views. His argument not 
only disregards the variety of long-existing views and debates within the academic 
community and the political elite, but also diminishes the importance and 
responsibility of those circles in educating and forming the Japanese public’s views 
on Japan’s wartime history.266 He also notes that a “liberal leftist ideology with a 
pro-China flavour” was long dominant in post-war Japanese society.267 Is this the 
spell that Hoshiyama thinks is finally broken?  
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While Hoshiyama acknowledges the difference between public views of 
wartime history in Japan, China, and the United States, his only dilemma is whether 
the latter two will in the future be able to relate their respective views of history to 
the “perception of history asserted by Japan.” 268  He continues to argue that 
understanding the Japanese view would be an important indicator of whether the 
USA will be able to “move forward with a stable policy towards Japan and with its 
Asia policy, and in any comparison with China’s policy towards Japan.”269 He later 
argues that the slightest change in the American position towards Japan-China 
relations would affect Japanese diplomacy.270 It appears that, even in the question of 
history, Hoshiyama is more concerned about American than Chinese perceptions of 
Japan’s views. He maintains that it is a mistake to equate Japanese nationalism with 
Chinese nationalism and argues that the former is moving from a leftist to a centrist 
school of thought, and that it is important for the US to understand this as a “healthy 
nationalism”. 271  Nevertheless, he does not indicate what he thinks about the 
importance of China’s understanding of Japanese nationalism. Instead, Hoshiyama 
starts a longer discussion on the importance of the US perception of Japan, be it 
regarding history, Japan’s security perceptions, the nature of its nationalism, or the 
values that the two countries share with one another. Before concluding his analysis, 
Hoshiyama asks: “Which side will the USA choose – Japan or China?”. He 
immediately gives an answer, leaving the reader in no doubt, saying that America 
should favour Japan because it shares similar values and prefers the status quo of the 
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international order - in other words it supports US power and an America-centred 
global order.272 
Overall, Hoshiyama’s article does not attempt to break the spell of the 
aforementioned ambiguity of Japan’s perceptions of the importance of its relations 
with China. On the one hand, his article does provide valuable suggestions on what 
policies Japan should adopt towards China. These include the strengthening of 
bilateral diplomacy, promoting engagement and partnership, and emphasizing the 
importance of continuous dialogue and cooperation with Beijing. When it comes to 
the difference in values between the two countries, Hoshiyama even notes that while 
Tokyo should assert certain values such as democracy and freedom in its diplomacy, 
this does not mean that it should try to impose those values on Beijing. Instead its 
focus should be on coexistence with China while acknowledging some fundamental 
differences.273 
On the other hand, however, Hoshiyama’s ultimate argument is that Japan-
China relations will change only if China changes. Even after proposing a less 
passive foreign policy, including more direct and proactive engagement with China, 
one of Hoshiyama’s concluding remarks is that, if Japan were to “lose sight of the 
importance of the Japan-US relationship” and started “leaning toward an 
autonomous foreign policy,” that would upset the balance of power in East Asia.274 
Another concluding point he makes is that Japan, the USA, and the EU are facing the 
issue of overcoming differences and maintaining mutual trust and solidarity, arguing 
that Japan and the USA must reaffirm their alliance of shared values. When it comes 
to Japan-China relations, however, Hoshiyama’s conclusion is that the USA should 
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contribute as an active member of the bilateral relation, “rather than simply 
contributing to the relationship as a third party”.275 His view is that in the “many 
problems that create friction between Japan and China, Japan remains in a passive 
position,” and that therefore the United States could “ideally play an active part in 
encouraging self-restraint on the part of China in general.”276 
Overall, it appears that Hoshiyama’s major concern about Japan-China 
relations is not how to make progress in that bilateral relation but how to make sure 
that Washington understands Tokyo’s position and will therefore remain a strong 
force behind Japanese diplomacy. The status quo, in this context, does not only 
mean the maintenance of a US-led international order that has been working in favor 
of Tokyo, but it ultimately also means Hoshiyama’s implicit rejection of qualitative 
change in Japan-China relations -that is, not until Beijing is willing to change and be 
open towards a new Japan, understanding that its East Asian neighbor has already 
become free from the spell of history, and thus to stop creating frictions in Sino-
Japanese relations. 
 
Kazuhiko Noguchi and Kentarō Sakuwa: bringing realism back? 
Of all the scholars cited in this chapter, perhaps Kazuhiko Noguchi is the most 
outspoken. He maintains that the most important factors of the contemporary Asia-
Pacific are China’s rise and its “hegemonic ambition.”277 Noguchi’s main argument 
is that offensive realism, the most aggressive theory considering the use of a state’s 
power in international relations, provides the best approach to explain China’s 
behaviour. Offensive realism posits that states seek to maximize their power vis-à-
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vis one another until one of them establishes regional or global hegemony.278 A 
central tenet of the theory is that the anarchic nature of the international system and 
the states’ aim to maximize their power for their ultimate survival results in 
aggressive state behaviour in international politics. Offensive realism argues that, 
given the absence of a central authority that sits above states to protect them from 
one another, they constantly fear each other’s intentions. A state, therefore, must 
recognize that the more powerful it is in relation to its rivals, the better its chances 
are for survival. In other words, anarchy encourages states to pursue aggressive 
territorial expansion in order to ensure a greater security through their increased 
power. Offensive realists argue that great powers almost always have revisionist 
intentions so they will not refrain from using force in order to alter the balance of 
power in their favor. Since great powers always seek opportunities to gain power at 
the other states’ expense, “the world is condemned to perpetual great-power 
competition.”279  
Noguchi maintains that such conventional theories for China’s behaviour as 
liberalism, which maintains that China prefers a stable and peaceful environment for 
economic prosperity, and constructivism, which emphasizes the role of constructing 
a common identity by political and economic interactions through various 
institutions such as the ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the United 
Nations, do not provide sufficient explanation when it comes to Beijing’s intentions. 
Noguchi argues that considerable evidence suggests that China is seeking a regional 
hegemony by aiming to maximize its relative power so that it governs all the other 
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regional states and prevents other powers from influencing the region.280 The long-
term trend and pattern of China’s military spending, according to Noguchi, shows 
that Beijing is pursuing a monolithic strategy designed to maximize its military 
power and that one should regard China’s recent low-profile cooperative policy not 
as a grand strategy per se but as a tactic to buy time for completing the 
modernization of the Peoples’ Liberation Army.281 Noguchi’s ultimate conclusion is 
that Beijing’s aim is to replace the US-centric system with a new Sino-centric order 
in the Asia-Pacific in the future, and what is lacking for China now is not its 
revisionist intention but its “comprehensive national power”, particularly China’s 
current power projection capability.282 
Similar to Noguchi, Kentarō Sakuwa also views Japan-China relations from a 
realist perspective. Sakuwa’s main questions revolve around which aspect of the 
realist theory can be applied best to analyse China’s rise and whether that rise poses 
a real threat to Japan. He argues that the realist theory of power transition should be 
applied to best understand Sino-Japanese relations.283 The theory holds that wars and 
severe international conflicts are most likely to occur when the relative capabilities, 
be it political, economic or military, of the states in a bilateral relation is close to 
being equal. The likelihood of conflicts also strengthens when the power ratio in a 
bilateral relation is rapidly moving toward parity.284 Sakuwa adds, however, that the 
Sino-Japanese bilateral relation should be viewed in a larger context, particularly 
because of the fact that Asia is not a closed system as extra-regional powers, such as 
the United States or Russia, can intervene when they think their security interests are 
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at stake. The US, argues Sakuwa, requires a special consideration, since it has a 
permanent commitment to the region through a number of bilateral alliances, of 
which the US-Japanese alliance has, for decades, been the leading power which 
dominates the regional order in Asia.285 
Sakuwa explicitly assumes that this alliance is so strong that instead of anarchy, 
where there is no single strongest state and all are competing to be the main power, a 
regional order of hierarchy exists in Asia, defined by the strongest power of all, the 
US-Japan alliance. Sakuwa compares both the military and economic power 
projection capabilities of Japan and China and concludes that Japan still has a “clear 
advantage” over China when it comes to air and naval forces. This advantage is even 
more obvious, argues Sakuwa, when the US is brought into the picture and its 
alliance with Japan is taken into account. The US military capacity, according to 
Sakuwa, should be theoretically counted as Japan’s power augmentation.286 Sakuwa 
maintains that Japan will not become a military great power threatening China in the 
foreseeable future, while China, on the other hand, attempts to regain the great 
power status it lost in the dynastic era. His conclusion is that, while China’s 
hegemonic prospects are worrisome, it has “not yet achieved enough to threaten the 
leading US-Japan coalition in East Asia,” and that to maintain their power of 
deterrence against Chinese military activities, Japan and the US should focus on 
building up their respective naval and air capabilities.287 In other words, Sakuwa’s 
ultimate assumption is that the US-Japan alliance should continue defining order in 
the region and his suggestion is that the alliance should continue their respective 
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military developments. Sakuwa assumes that power will hold China in line, and that 
more power is needed to successfully fight against perceived threats of power. 
On the face of it, both Noguchi’s and Sakuwa’s arguments imply that they 
view the intentions of the US-Japan alliance as something fundamentally different 
from that of China. However, a closer look at their work reveals that the way they 
attempt to tackle the China question, their approach and the framing of their 
argument, is not that much different. They both lay out a detailed analysis on 
China’s power, both military and economic, by simply comparing it to that of Japan 
and the US-Japan alliance. They both admit that China’s military power is still less 
than that of Japan’s when it comes to air and naval capabilities, and it is lagging far 
behind that of the US. At the time their articles were published, the US accounted for 
some 39 per cent of the global total military budget, while China’s share was 9.5 per 
cent, one fourth that of the US.288 China’s military budget at the time was constantly 
between 1.9 and 2.1 per cent of its GDP. During the same period, the US, also 
having a significantly larger GDP than China, spent between 4.2 and 4.6 per cent of 
its GDP on military expenses, and Japan about 1 per cent. At that time the same 
figure for India and South Korea, for instance, was 2.6-2.7 per cent and 2.6 per cent, 
respectively.289 The difference between China, the US and Japan is even more 
significant when we look at the per capita military budget: in that regard, Japan’s 
spending was approximately three times, while the US budget was a stunning 22 
times, higher than that of China.290 
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The major difference between China and the US-Japan alliance according to 
Sakuwa and Noguchi is that while they view China’s intentions as hegemonic, with 
Beijing’s alleged ultimate goal being dominance over East Asia, they regard the US-
Japan alliance as something that can, and must, defend the region from that change 
happening. The underlying assumption in their argument is the continued 
maintenance of the power and influence of the US-Japan alliance over the region. In 
other words, neither scholars have any issue with the status quo that is founded on 
the dominance of an extra-regional and global military superpower, as long as that 
benefits Japan. Nor do they indicate whether China’s rise poses any threat to certain 
values that Japan and the US may uphold and should therefore defend. The central 
question both Noguchi and Sakuwa are seeking to answer is simply to what extent 
China poses a threat to the existing US-Japan dominance over East Asia. Ultimately, 
Noguchi’s and Sakuwa’s underlying assumption is that the status quo is good 
because it serves the interests of Japan. Since they provide no explanation as to why 
the existing regional order is good, their arguments ultimately remain in the context 
of power and interests, both of which are something Sakuwa and Noguchi point to in 
their criticism of China’s behaviour. Interestingly, Noguchi does not provide any 
policy recommendations as to how Japan should tackle the China question, apart 
from concluding that Tokyo recognize the offensive realist intention in Beijing’s 
behaviour and develop better security policies accordingly.291 Sakuwa does provide 
some general policy recommendations, such as that Japan should maintain close 
communication with China to make sure that there is no “radical change in the Asian 
regional order,” and that Japan should demonstrate that maintaining a good politico-
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military relationship with Tokyo and Washington serves China’s interests as well.292 
However, and despite having pointed out the unquestionable dominance of the US-
Japan alliance, Sakuwa’s concluding remark is that these two countries “should 
focus on naval (and air) construction.”293 
It is important to note that both Noguchi’s and Sakuwa’s arguments are 
embedded in international relations theories laid out entirely by Western scholars. 
Their writings draw upon, and even cite from, works of realist scholars such as John 
Mearsheimer and David Shambaugh. For instance, in his book The Tragedy of Great 
Power Politics, Mearsheimer argues that if the Chinese economy continues to grow, 
China will attempt to dominate Asia the way the US dominates the Western 
Hemisphere; therefore the US will go to great lengths to prevent China from 
achieving regional hegemony and ultimately “great power politics will return in full 
force”.294 To support this argument, John Mearsheimer points out that the US, the 
world’s leading superpower, has acted according to the dictates of offensive realism 
for most of its history. He concludes that chances of a future Sino-American war are 
more likely than a war between the superpowers was during the Cold War.295 
Similarly, David Shambaugh, one of the most prominent experts on China's foreign 
policy, military and security issues, argues that “China today is a dissatisfied and 
non-status quo power which seeks to change the existing international order and 
norms of inter-state relations”, and that Beijing “does not just seek a place at the 
rule-making table of international organizations and power brokers; it seeks to alter 
the rules and existing system.”296 His Chinese counterpart, Yan Xuetong, one of 
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China’s most influential international relations theorists, also argues that the 
anarchical nature of international politics means that “a rising power [like China] 
will inevitably challenge the existing hegemon and threaten its neighbors.”297 It is 
Mearsheimer’s questions, however, that are the most revealing: 
“[w]hy should we expect China to act differently than the US? 
Are the Chinese more principled than we are? More ethical? Are 
they less nationalistic? Less concerned about their survival? They 
are none of these things, which is why China is likely to follow 
basic realist logic and attempt to become a regional hegemon in 
Asia.”298  
 
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu and the question of identity 
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu approaches issues surrounding contemporary Japan-China 
relations in the context of identity and influence. His scholarship revolves around 
Japan’s diplomatic efforts to retain influence in East Asia and beyond, and the 
challenge that China’s emergence has posed in this context. Yoshimatsu points out 
that Japan has, for a long time, been able to maintain its prominent status in Asia by 
taking advantage of its economic power and foreign aid policies, through which 
Tokyo was also able to maintain political influence on certain governments.299 
However, the rise of the Chinese economy, coupled with the Japanese economy’s 
prolonged period of recession, has resulted in Beijing’s growing influence over the 
region, which, argues Yoshimatsu, is likely to force the Japanese government to 
formulate and implement external specific policies in order to sustain its position and 
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influence in the region.300 Yoshimatsu points out that many Japanese scholars apply a 
realist perspective in their analysis of contemporary Japan-China relations, but, 
significantly, his approach is embedded in a constructivist one. 
As opposed to material power relations, constructivist thought gives a central 
importance to ideational factors such as identity and norms, and the significance of 
institutions in the creation of common norms and principles, in a state’s foreign 
policy and interactions with other countries.301 Yoshimatsu posits that, when a state 
is in ‘rival relations’ with another one that has a different identity, it may take 
advantage of its own identity ‘to maintain influence’ internationally, particularly vis-
à-vis its rival state. He hypothesizes that the Japanese government ‘redefines’ its 
‘distinctive identities that are unique in Asia,’ based on which it creates specific 
policy ideas to formulate diplomatic strategies, all with the aim of maintaining its 
presence and influence in the region.302 Yoshimatsu argues that Japan is ‘forced to 
take into account the role of ideational power,’ and admits that this new strategy is 
ultimately a form of power exercise, particularly in the light of Beijing’s growing 
soft power strategies such as the Beijing Consensus and the Confucius Institute.303 
While Yoshimatsu does not attempt to define China’s state identity, he argues that 
Japan’s distinctive identity in Asia is that it has the longest history as a peaceful and 
democratic nation, which protects human rights under its constitution. However, 
Yoshimatsu admits that Japan’s “extended identity” of a nation that respects 
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universal values such as democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law, had 
only become important over recent years, particularly in promoting the idea of an 
East Asian Community and in forming strategic partnerships with other countries, 
most significantly with the United States. He argues that the inclusion of Australia, 
New Zealand and India in the East Asian Summit was expected to enhance the 
influence of Japan’s democratic partners, and India was expected to become a 
counter-power against the influence of China.304 
In his earlier writing, interestingly, Yoshimatsu maintains that East Asia is 
one of the rare ‘multi-cultural regions’ of the world that has accepted various cultural 
and ideational values while avoiding to make some values as primary or universal 
and seeking to create the co-existence of different values instead.305 He therefore 
argues that the critical challenge for cooperation in the region is, instead of seeking 
to establish common values, the formation of a shared identity and common norms. 
Similarly, he concludes, the idea of an East Asian community of countries could 
only be realized if the states in that region developed a sense of common identity and 
norms. On the one hand, while Yoshimatsu does not define what those region-
specific norms or a shared common identity should, or could, be based upon, his 
argument implies that those cannot be based on shared values, since every state has 
different values. But can shared norms and identity be established without at least a 
basic common understanding of values? 
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On the other hand, Yoshimatsu himself argues that democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law are ideals that are important to many countries.306 Ultimately, 
while it is unclear how important universal values are for Yoshimatsu, his main 
concern appears to be maintaining Japan’s influence in the region vis-à-vis China, 
and the question of upholding certain values is therefore also framed in this ultimate 
context. Yoshimatsu himself admits that Japan had to create particular policy ideas 
as banners to differentiate its diplomatic policies from those of China, and search for 
its specific identities to legitimate such ideas.307 Even though at one point he admits 
that Japanese diplomacy used universal values simply as political rhetoric, which 
should raise serious questions in regards to Tokyo’s genuine commitment to these 
values, Yoshimatsu does not appear to be too concerned about this. What he does 
take issue with, however, is the instability of Japanese domestic politics, pointing out 
in his conclusion that it is ‘crucial to guarantee long terms of office for prime 
ministers.’308  
 
Yoshihide Soeya and the question of internationalism 
Yoshihide Soeya argues that we have now reached a very important historical 
turning point, where the major issue is between the economic and the military power 
of China.309 Soeya maintains that the major question is whether China remains an 
economic power or Beijing turns its economic power into military might. This 
dilemma, argues Soeya, is not only important to Japan, but also for many other 
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countries, and the world is yet to see which path China will choose to take. China’s 
rise is welcomed by Japan, as long as the world is not reversed back to ancient times. 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, maintains Soeya, is a case in point: while 
China claims ownership over the islands based on historical evidence, Japan bases its 
claim on modern international law. The way Beijing will ultimately handle the 
territorial dispute will define China’s future course: cooperation or aggression. Soeya 
argues that Japan will not use force to settle an international dispute and the only 
solution is to talk and cooperate. He maintains that the major difference between the 
two countries is that, while China’s regional outlook is conditioned by modern 
elements of diplomacy such as strong nationalism, a sense of rivalry with the United 
States, military modernization, and territorial integrity, Japan’s foreign policies can 
largely be characterized as post-modern and post-industrial, focusing mostly on 
issues such as human security or problems around the evolution of civil society. 
Soeya here simply dismisses the issue of history as well as territorial disputes by 
saying that these issues “tend to surface in an emotional vicious cycle” between 
China and Japan at times, causing Japanese politics and society to show modern 
elements.310 While it is not clear what exactly Soeya means by this, his argument 
indicates that Japan’s society and politics are much more mature than its Chinese 
counterpart’s, and the former only falls back into the modern contexts of nationalism 
whenever challenged by the latter on these issues. 
While Soeya believes that the prospect of a Japan-South Korea genuine 
relationship is rather idealistic than realistic at this point in time, it could serve as a 
trigger in moving forward East Asian regionalism, particularly as the bilateral 
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relationship would provide an important balance in the U.S.-China great power 
relation. Nevertheless, while Soeya acknowledges the importance of community-
building efforts with Japan’s most troubled relationships, i.e. those with South Korea 
and China, he ultimately argues that Tokyo’s diplomacy should put the greatest 
emphasis on the Japan-US alliance, which is indispensable for Japan to mitigate 
modern elements of international politics and security in East Asia. With the backing 
of the United States, according to Soeya, Tokyo would have a better chance to push 
for an East Asian regionalism that is open and committed to the values important for 
human life.311 Remarkably, Soeya himself in an earlier speech indirectly admitted 
how dependent Tokyo is on Washington and the former’s lack of criticism towards 
the latter, envisioning a more autonomous national security strategy, meaning that a 
confident Japan is not afraid to question American policy.312 
In another article, Soeya points out that the biggest issue for Tokyo is the 
“perpetual, and widening, trust gap” Japan suffers from in its relations with China 
(and South Korea). He maintains that the crucial point for Tokyo when attempting to 
address the history problem in the 1990s was to be able to transform itself from the 
pacifism of the Cold War era into active internationalism after the Cold War.313 In 
other words, Soeya not only assumes that the issue of history was dealt with properly 
from the Japanese side, but that the main goal of Tokyo was never to start an honest 
conversation with Beijing and Seoul about lingering issues from the past, which 
these two countries presumably wanted to deal with, but rather to convince the likes 
of China and South Korea about Japan’s present and future policy goals and course 
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of action. Soeya then simply lists a number of Japanese official statements and 
apologies that were mainly issued by the short-lived leftist governments in the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, he admits that revisionist voices on the history problem did become 
louder and stronger in Japanese society as well, particularly in response to China’s 
and South Korea’s response to former Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine. This “vicious cycle,” as Soeya refers to it, has caused an 
atmosphere in which the Japanese public has adopted more conservative views on 
the history question, to the extent that this started creating significant problems in 
Japan’s diplomacy. As a senior Japanese government official commented in a private 
conversation with Soeya: 
“in my attempts to deal with the history issue with 
China and South Korea, much more energy is needed 
in dealing with Japanese conservatives than with my 
counterparts in Seoul and Beijing. You always have to 
be careful about friendly fire from behind.”314 
 
The question arises again: is the issue of history simply a diplomatic problem or 
there is more to it? Soeya assumes that words and official statements suffice, and 
disregards the fact that history is still not only a part of living memory for many 
people in East Asia, but still a part of their lives: incidents such as the earlier 
mentioned explosion of a toxic gas cache, which the retreating Japanese imperial 
army left behind in China, killing a construction worker and injuring a number of 
others in 2003, still occur. Referring to official statements made in the past appears 
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Discussion: strengths and weaknesses of Japanese academic scholarship 
In this chapter I summarized the positions of some of the major Japanese 
scholars on contemporary Japan-China relations, with a particular focus on how they 
view Japan and how they present China to their readers, what issues they identify 
between these two countries and how they approach those issues, including what 
words and expressions they use when describing Japan vis-à-vis China. Without 
exception, all scholars’ arguments focus on issues around the emergence of China: 
what it means for Japan and the region, and how Japan should respond to this 
challenge. In this regard, many are genuinely concerned about China’s future path, 
recognizing the dilemma that Beijing may choose to turn China’s economic power 
into military might, pointing to the fact that there appears to be a growing gap 
between China’s economic cooperation and militaristic developments in the past few 
years. Ultimately, the most important question they ask is whether China will 
become a rules-based, responsible and constructive actor that respects certain values 
of international society, or will it indeed eventually become a hegemon? In other 
words, Japan’s major dilemma is whether China will take a common value-based or 
a self-centred and self-interest based approach in dealing with other countries. This 
is indeed a very important question with which many other Asian and Western 
academics have also been grappling in regards to China, and to which the world is 
yet to know a clear answer. 
What I have shown, however, is the way the above cited Japanese scholars 
view Japan and China and, more significantly, the clear and sharp distinction they 
draw between the two countries. Without exception they all describe Japan in 
predominantly positive terms while they present China in a negative light, at times 
even in somewhat condescending ways. Words and expressions they use in reference 
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to Japan include liberalism, rules-based internationalism, most powerful democracy 
that should lead East Asia, being ahead of Asia, peaceful, upholding universal values 
such as democracy, rule of law, human rights, and the importance of civil society. 
China, on the other hand, is described as nationalistic, hierarchic, hegemonic, 
militaristic, irresponsible and not to be trusted, a menacing force from the past, a 
threat, power-maximizing to rule in East Asia in pre-modern dynastic ways, rejecting 
universal values, showcasing a sense of rivalry and, as Kitaoka implicitly refers to 
China (and North Korea), as the enemy. Perhaps the most significant, although quite 
subtle, criticism towards Japan is that, while emphasizing the importance of it being 
a peace-loving country, many of the scholars urge Tokyo to adopt a more assertive 
foreign policy to face the realities of a harsh international environment - as for 
instance Hoshiyama puts it – in which Japan finds itself. To this end, some do urge 
Tokyo to develop more relevant and proactive policies, which can be seen as a subtle 
criticism in regards to Japan being too passive and reactive, and perhaps even 
lacking in important positive visions for the future. Also, and similarly remarkably, 
when referring to the issue of history between the two countries, they univocally 
assume, or even argue, that Japan has done enough and China, for some reason, does 
not want to understand, let alone accept, Japanese apologies. Some even argue that it 
is China that should be open towards Japan in this regard, and dismiss the issue of 
history as simply something that Beijing uses as a diplomatic drawcard against Japan. 
Nevertheless, one of the most important and sensitive issues obstructing the 
progress of Japan-China relations is the issue of history. Although some scholars 
maintain that Japan is finally liberated from the spell of history, the issue not only 
seems to continue being one of the most significant factors defining contemporary 
Japan-China relations, it also appears to have a constraining effect on contemporary 
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Japanese scholarly thought: critical reflections on the history issue are 
disappointingly scarce in Japanese scholarship and arguments are predominantly 
framed in the context of China being irresponsible and not understanding. Those 
scholars who mention the issue of history argue that Japan has already done enough 
in this regard. They view China’s attitude as simply using the issue of history to 
extract concessions from the Japanese, or to spoil Japan’s international image as was 
seen in 2005 when China used the ‘history card’ against Japan’s bid for a seat in the 
UNSC.  
Simply put, Japanese academic thought appears to echo Tokyo’s official stance 
regarding its Pacific War responsibility, which is that all the issues were addressed 
and fully dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and that Japan has sufficiently 
apologised a number of times. This view is also supported by the Japanese Supreme 
Court’s ruling in 2007, which stated that the individual right for compensation of 
Chinese victims was settled with the 1972 Joint Communique, at the time of Sino-
Japanese diplomatic normalization, when the Chinese government declared that: 
“in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the 
Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation 
from Japan.”315 
 
This official standpoint, however, is a bit controversial in the light of the fact that 
even the arguably most famous Japanese international relations scholar, Takashi 
Inoguchi, argues that Japan’s post-war international relations research had, for many 
decades, revolved around the question of “what went wrong?”, in reference to the 
first half of the 20th Century. It is therefore obvious that Japan could not settle the 
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issues of its wartime conduct by merely signing a few high-level treaties and issuing 
a few apologies. In fact, moral and emotional issues are not simply a matter of 
jurisdiction and political statements. The recurring debate about whether Japan has 
properly apologized for its wartime actions is also a flawed approach and clearly 
shows the over-politicized nature of the problem in both countries, as it distracts the 
focus from the actual victims of Japanese wartime aggression. This is even more 
interesting since Japan proudly puts focus on such ‘universally accepted values’ as 
the importance of civil society and human security. Also, as Edgar Morin points out, 
Japanese apologies tend to miss their supposed goal: while they might be sincere 
apologies, they never ask for pardoning and forgiveness from the victims themselves. 
Words of their apologies only reaffirm what Japan did in the past, and the Japanese 
sense of remorse is internally complete “without any reference to those to whom the 
apologies should be directed and from whom forgiveness should be sought.”316 
Another important example is the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the official 
apologies. For instance, at the fiftieth anniversary of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, 
in an interview with the Washington Post, Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe 
expressed a deep remorse about the tremendous suffering that was inflicted upon the 
peoples of America and Asia by the Japanese Army. Soon after the interview was 
published, Foreign Ministry officials issued a comment saying that the word used in 
Watanabe’s interview, hansei, should have been translated as “introspection, 
reflection, reconsideration and soul-searching,” rather than “remorse”, and 
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emphasized that Watanabe’s statement was not intended to be an apology.317 Also, 
while the aforementioned 1995 Murayama statement is considered to be one of 
Japan’s most significant wartime apologies, it is important to bear in mind that it was 
passed in the Japanese Diet with a small margin of majority, mostly thanks to Prime 
Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s leftist coalition. The majority of those opposing the 
statement came from the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party. While it may not 
seem too important, the language order in which the Murayama statement is readable 
on the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s website is still quite telling: on the Japanese 
version’s page the first offered translation is in English, while it is the Japanese one 
on the English version page. Chinese and Korean translations are only listed as 
second and third, respectively.318 The order of the translations begs the question 
whether apologies presented to an English-speaking and a Japanese domestic 
audience are considered more important than reaching out to the Chinese and Korean 
visitors of the website. 
It is also important to note history is alive not only in the memories of many 
Chinese. For instance, there are still hundreds of thousands of chemical weapons that 
were left abandoned by the Japanese imperial army at various locations across China, 
only 46,000 from which arsenic has been recovered to date, and even that is 
improperly stored and left in containers in China. China has so far claimed up to 
2,000 Japanese chemical weapon-related victims since the end of World War II.319 
Therefore, Japanese arguments dismissing the issue of history as simply a political 
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drawcard in the hands of Beijing should be viewed with criticism, particularly if one 
focuses on a values approach in discussing the issue, placing human rights and civil 
society at the heart of the problem. Ryōsei Kokubun, President of Japan’s National 
Defense Academy, concludes that, “[o]n the Japanese side there is a failure to 
understand the Chinese “obsession’ with history, while there is a failure on the 
Chinese side to recognize the prior Japanese apologies.”320 
In other words, the only failure the Japanese are ready to accept is that they do 
not understand why Chinese are so obsessed with history.  
All this shows that a consistently overlooked fact about the history issue is that 
the real victims were, and continue to be, members of civil society on both sides, 
those who were caught in the power struggle between the two countries’ political 
elites. Scholars who have examined Japan’s own narratives of its wartime history 
describe them as narratives of victimhood, which emphasize the role of Japanese 
soldiers and the sufferings of Japan’s domestic population, giving little to no 
attention to sufferings of other societies and groups of people.321  As a result, 
narratives tend to dismiss the importance of understanding the deeper emotional and 
psychological needs of non-Japanese victims and evades the responsibility for both 
past and present suffering of them and their families. What we see today is a 
continued power struggle of the elites in both China and Japan for the narrative over 
the issue of history, while the historical suffering of their respective civil societies 
continues to be overlooked. 
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There is much left for Japanese academic scholarship to hold the Japanese 
government to account. In a way, Japan still appears to be under the spell of history: 
sincere apologies and having a sense of genuine remorse, let alone striving for 
reconciliation, cannot be a matter of semantic exercise. In other words, the issue of 
history is not yet resolved and is made even more complicated by Japanese elite 
views. As Shin Chiba points out quite clearly, the failure of the post-war Japanese 
government to “resolve the issues of war responsibility, reparation, and individual 
compensation should be reconsidered the single most fatal defect in the politics of 
democracy in post-war Japan,” the failure of which, argues Chiba, has “become the 
biggest impediment to the inauguration of good and proper international relations in 
the post-war historical context of East Asia”.322 
Another significant shortcoming of contemporary Japanese scholarship is its 
monolithic views on the United States. While scholars adopt only a slightly critical 
approach towards Japan and a very critical one on China, a perhaps similarly 
revealing fact is their consistent lack of any criticism towards the US. Without 
exception, the U.S. is viewed as an indispensable actor in Japan-China relations as 
well as in the region, and its role is always presented in an unquestionably positive 
context. The US is referred to as Japan’s number one ally, a regional and global 
status quo leader on which Japan must rely, and with which it is critical to have a 
joint approach towards China. Some even argue that Japan’s relations with the US 
are more important than that with China and that the US must choose sides between 
Japan and China and fully support Japan. The ultimate argument here, as Sakuwa 
explicitly puts it, is that the US-Japan led regional status quo is good as it is, and 
preserving it is in the interest of Japan. The reason for the lack of criticism towards 
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the US is, of course, Japan’s long-time dependence on the world’s leading 
superpower. While it is very unlikely that Japan would become a military 
superpower and make a bid to dominate in the foreseeable future, Japanese 
scholarship should pay more attention to the importance of the US not as an ally, but 
in terms of America’s historical and contemporary presence in East Asia, 
particularly in the context of US-China relations. Regardless how peaceful Japan’s 
intentions may be, it is very unlikely Japan could avoid being caught up in a conflict, 
should there be one in the future, between these two powers. It is very telling when 
Soeya points out that, if Japan opted to pursue a more autonomous security policy, 
perhaps even the US would “welcome a confident Japan that is not afraid to question 
American policy”.323 It is also important to note that not only Japan appears to align 
its foreign policy strategies with those of the US, but even the US seems to attempt 
to influence Japanese policy-making. Sakuwa himself points out that, particularly 
after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration had urged Japan to 
revise the constitution and to expand its role in global security.324 Similarly, some 
Chinese scholars also observed that the United States is driving rather than 
constraining Japan’s rearmament.325 Some argue that, prior to the 1930s, Japanese 
foreign policy was based on ‘cooperation with the leading powers of the day, Britain 
and the United States,’ and that Japanese militarism was only a short-lived departure 
from aligning with those perceived to be the most powerful.326 Others point out that, 
soon after its defeat in the Pacific War, Tokyo returned to its earlier abandoned 
“Kasumigaseki [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] orthodox foreign policy,” which 
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basically meant cooperation with the strongest power of the time, the United 
States. 327  The question is, therefore, whether Japan really joins and maintains 
alliances based on the strict and consistent observance of universal values and with 
the aim of serving the shared interests of international society 
Japanese scholarship’s general lack of criticism of the status quo is a case in 
point. There appears to be an overwhelming satisfaction with the US-Japan alliance 
as the leading power in Asia, and even as the most powerful bilateral alliance in the 
world. But is that alliance really based on universal values? The power of the US-
Japan alliance, as well as the power of the current global and regional status quo, 
normatively speaking, is only good to the extent it is based on the consistent 
upholding of universal values and international norms and principles. In other words, 
the power of any status quo is only credible and acceptable as long as it is based on 
universal values. But is the status quo in Asia based on those values? Also, if any 
alliance is truly based on universal values, there must be an assumption of equality 
among all participating countries. Is the US-Japan alliance based on equality? The 
assumption that the US is the leading power, as well as the lack of the slightest 
criticism towards the US, indicates that perceptions of power play a more significant 
role than universal values, not only in the bilateral relation itself, but also in Japanese 
scholarly writing. While going into a deeper analysis of the status quo itself would 
be out of the scope of this thesis, it must be noted that there is no status quo in 
international relations theories that is based on the upholding of universal values. 
Status quo always benefits those in power and affects negatively those that are not, 
and the term itself assumes efforts to maintain existing power structures and a 
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resistance to any change that might challenge the power of those in charge. Status 
quo itself is the result of the struggle for power. As such, status quo itself is, in fact, 
part of the problem from a values perspective. 
The lack of Japan’s self-criticism and any criticism towards the role of the 
United States, coupled with a strong criticism towards China, indicate that 
perceptions of power, rather than universal values, significantly influence Japanese 
scholarly thought. If Japanese scholarship was really values-driven, it would be more 
critical towards Japan itself. Self-criticism does exist, but not in the context of Japan-
China relations. For instance, the Institute for International Policy Studies, a Tokyo-
based influential foreign policy think tank, issued its urgent policy recommendations 
for the second Abe administration in 2013, in which it argues that the Japanese 
education system had undergone no fundamental reform since the end of World War 
Two. The paper maintains that in the wake of global advances Japanese education no 
longer fulfils the basic goal of properly equipping students to become useful 
members of society.328 It argues that there is a lack of internationalism among the 
Japanese domestic workforce, and that it would be desirable to instil a sense of 
internationalism in Japanese students in the course of their education, including 
introducing “proper values” at the elementary level and ultimately producing the 
right kind of people for a globalized society at the tertiary level, those who are able 
to survive in international society. 329  While the paper does not specify what 
particular values should be instilled into Japanese pupils, it does assume that certain 
values that would enable Japanese people to have a global perspective have been 
missing in Japan’s post-war education system. The question therefore arises: how 
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can Japan view, and even promote, itself as a country that upholds universal values, 
and a leader of Asia in this regard, if those fundamental globalist/internationalist 
values are missing from its education system? No society’s values are embedded 
entirely in universal values and no society has a fully and consistently global 
perspective at its core. Japanese scholarship must, therefore, also be critical towards 
Japan itself, to avoid any loss of credibility from a truly universal values-oriented 
perspective. 
There also appears to be an issue around the question of normativity. When 
writing about conflicts, scholars cannot, should not, avoid engaging with writing 
about possible solutions. In other words, while a descriptive style is important to 
understand causes of problems, a normative style that offers solutions is just as 
important. This is particularly important in the case of Japanese scholars writing 
about Japan-China relations, and especially significant from a values-based 
perspective. As Noriko Kamachi, a scholar of modern Japanese studies on China, 
argues, the strength of Japanese scholars should come from “the fact that they are 
confronted with the real question of how to get along with China in a changing 
world,” because to the Japanese China is “much more than merely a research object 
to satisfy their intellectual curiosity.” Significantly, she argues that China is also 
important for the Japanese scholars’ own moral integrity.330 
However, while all scholars acknowledge the key importance of Japan’s 
relations with China and many of them also the significance of solving problems in 
order to move forward, they provide little substance when it comes to the latter. 
Kokubun writes that, while issues of the past are crucial, they should not be 
subordinated to the future, and that Japan and China should focus on values they 
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both share, including regional stability. In the long term, he maintains, the two 
countries should look at the creation of common norms and values.331 Kokubun 
comes short of proposing what those norms and values should be, or, apart from the 
issue of history, what obstacles need to be removed in order to get there. 
Kitaoka argues that an international order based on the rule of law is 
something that would also benefit China, and that world order in the 21st century 
needs to be based on certain values that have been achieved since the 
Enlightenment.332 Nevertheless, he comes short of discussing what Japan could do to 
facilitate China’s peaceful rise, although he does argue, in general, that Japan needs 
to be more proactively pacifist. Hoshiyama maintains that “there is room for great 
improvement […] if China restricts its use of hard power,” but, in the meantime, 
Japan should focus on maintaining its alliance with the US, arguing that: 
“if Japan forgets the importance of the Japan-US alliance, it 
may lead to Japan changing its position leaning toward a 
more autonomous foreign policy.”333 
 
Sakuwa also writes that Japan should focus on its relations with the US, and that 
together they should build up their military capabilities. Similarly, Noguchi does not 
provide any possible solution on how to move forward. Soeya writes that Japan has a 
“post-industrial outlook” on regionalism and therefore needs to work together with 
like-minded countries for an open and more inclusive regionalism. Similarly, Tanaka 
opines that China understands the necessity of a peaceful external environment and 
that Japan’s response to China’s rise should be comprehensive engagement and 
multilateralism. However, when it comes to actual policy-level recommendations, 
neither of them provide any, apart from lip-service. Tanaka writes that the single 
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most important and urgent objective of Japanese policymakers should be to achieve 
a grand bargain with China with the goal of creating a win-win framework, while 
Tokyo should rely on the US-Japan alliance and other US security relationships in 
the region as a hedge against future uncertainties. He maintains that Tokyo must 
engage Beijing through multilateral frameworks and aim to establish a trilateral 
security framework among the US, China and Japan, Tokyo must proactively 
persuade Washington to maintain its military presence in the region.334 In other 
words, Tanaka believes that direct talks with Beijing are not that important and that 
Japan is only able to deal with China when others, particularly the United States, are 
involved. The obvious lack of direct engagement with China may also enhance 
Beijing’s threat perceptions, while it also ignores the fact that a number of 
outstanding issues between the two countries can only be dealt with in a bilateral 
context. 
Overall, Japanese scholarship tends to be more descriptive than normative. In 
line with Kitaoka’s argument about Japan needing to be a pacifist country – which 
also entails that Tokyo’s policies have, for a long time, been predominantly passive, 
reactive, and reliant on US policies –, Japanese scholarship must also become more 
proactive and normative when it comes to working on possible solutions in Japan-
China relations. This also includes being more critical towards Japan’s foreign 
policies and the US-Japan alliance. From a values perspective, the fragile situation 
between Japan and China is all the more reason for Japanese scholars to have a 
stronger focus on possible solutions, particularly because of the fact that they are 
well positioned to see the complexities of Japan-China relations. They must avoid 
current political conflicts to put limits on their views of Japan-China relations, as 
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those views appear to be framed mostly in the contexts of power and competition for 
influence. 
Japanese scholarship is very sensitive to Beijing’s assertiveness and is very 
concerned about what future course China may take. Its views on China not being 
open to conversation and cooperation are not unfounded. What it appears not to 
question, however, is how much Japan is open to converse and cooperate with China 
and, indeed, how much scholars themselves are open to understand China – not to 
mention being compassionate towards it, as Kitaoka suggests. If values really played 
a central role in Japanese academic writings, scholars would focus more on what 
Japan, and others like the US, could do better, rather than simply putting the onus on 
China to change. In a situation where an authoritarian and isolationist China and a 
supposedly internationalist and values-oriented Japan are facing each other, the only 
scenario towards a solution is that the more mature and open one, presumably Japan 
in this case, will adopt a more self-critical attitude and do some in-depth soul-
searching. 
In other words, a central challenge for Japanese scholarship appears to be to 
focus more on inclusive value-based solutions rather than short-term and ultimately 
exclusive, power- and interest-based approaches that can be traced behind to 
universal values-based arguments. As long as perceptions of power and prestige 
limit the focus of research, Japanese academic writing will be just as problematic as 
Japan-China relations. Japanese research needs to establish progressive value-based 
approaches, which include reflections on its own perceptions of power and critical 
analysis of the roles of Japan and the United States, as well as of its own premises. 
This challenge is perhaps the single most urgent one facing contemporary Japanese 
academic scholarship. 
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Masaru Tamamoto, a professor of Asian studies at the University of 
Cambridge, writes that what Japan sees as progress is in reality its mistaken ability to 
imitate outside models. But, he argues: 
“if progress is defined by pursuing a vision of a 
desirable future, then the Japanese never progressed. 
What we had was a concept of order and placement, 
which is essentially stasis. (…) We have run out of 
outside models to imitate. We must start from 
scratch, embracing an idea of progress that is based 
on innovation, ambition and dynamism.”335 
 
Drawing on Tamamoto’s critical reflections, Japan not only needs to be more 
proactive but it also needs to reflect on what progress really entails, and to come up 
with its own solutions accordingly. Working on better approaches and research 
models based on universal values would be an ideal way of moving forward. 
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Chapter Three 
The role of values in Japan’s political strategies vis-à-vis China 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the diplomatic strategies Japan has formulated in regards to 
its relations with China since the beginning of the 2000s, such as the concept of an 
East Asian Community, the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, and the so-called 
values-oriented diplomacy (kachi gaikō). The chapter has a particular focus on the 
development of values-oriented diplomacy, a concept that emerged in the mid-2000s 
and played an important recurring, yet ambiguous, role in Japan’s relations with 
China over the past decade, starting from the first Abe administration that took office 
in 2006. In this chapter I argue that, while the values-oriented diplomacy initially 
aimed at strengthening Japan’s international influence and fostering a closer 
cooperation with like-minded’ countries, it ultimately served as a tool to counter-
balance China’s growing economic power and political influence. Japan’s values-
oriented diplomacy could therefore be viewed both as a direct and indirect 
diplomatic strategy to counter China’s influence and an attempt to create a new 
Japanese national identity and an international image clearly different from that of 
China’s ‘values’ and international image. Ultimately, Japan’s values-oriented 
diplomacy resulted in distancing Japan from China, hence it not only became 
counterproductive, an obstacle to strengthening Sino-Japanese relations, but it also 
conflicted with the principles it was supposed, by its own value-assumptions, to 
uphold. The chapter also looks into the development of Japan’s other regional 
strategies and argues that, particularly in the light of frequent changes of government 
in the 2000s and early 2010s, Japan’s regional strategies became hectic and erratic, 
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showing a significant lack of consistency and ultimately a disregard for some of the 
very values its foreign policy strategies were meant to uphold and advocate for. 
 
Japan’s ambiguity towards values in its relations with China and East Asia 
from the end of the Cold War until the early 2000s 
As argued earlier, Japan’s dominant approach towards its international relations has 
been realism throughout most of its modern history, and its approach towards China 
was no different. Japan’s handling of the 1989 Tiananmen Square events and of their 
aftermath is a case in point. 
The international community had imposed a number of sanctions on China in 
the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident. In line with international sanctions, 
Tokyo’s political relations with Beijing were suspended soon after the Chinese 
government’s crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protests.336 At the same time, 
however, Tokyo embarked on a conscious policy that aimed to bring China back 
from its international isolation, and Japan became the first major country to befriend 
China337 after the Tiananmen incident. Japan’s policy at the time was not known as 
terribly sensitive to human rights issues.338 Japan’s approach was rather pragmatic 
and focused on practical engagement with China instead of advocating for certain 
values or principles. This was highlighted by a number of mutual foreign ministerial 
and prime ministerial level visits between Tokyo and Beijing in 1991 and 1992,339 
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and finally by the Japanese Emperor’s highly symbolic visit to Beijing on the 
anniversary of the establishment of the two countries’ diplomatic relations in 
October 1992.340 While for the United States, Japan’s major Cold War ally, China’s 
importance had significantly declined with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing 
continued to play a significant role for Tokyo as a vital pillar for both regional 
stability in East Asia and for an emerging new international order in which Tokyo 
could play a more proactive and  possibly leading role, given that East Asia was no 
longer constrained by the ideological divide that defined international relations in the 
region during the Cold War.341 
Even though the Japanese economy experienced a sudden and abrupt downturn 
in the early 1990s, a first in the post-war period, as still the leading economic power 
in Asia by far, Japan was confident in its quick recovery and continued strengthening 
its economic diplomacy in China.342 While seeing value in its relations with China 
from an economic point of view, Japan also considered it important to relate to some 
of the cultural and historical values it had long shared with China. As Takashi 
Sugimoto points out, based on a sense of shared cultural roots such as a ‘Confucian 
concept of social order, Japan opted to give it time and wait patiently for China to 
organize its domestic order so that Beijing could avoid a lasting and damaging 
internal political turmoil. In line with that policy, Tokyo deliberately kept quiet 
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about ongoing and serious human rights issues in order not to further isolate China 
and force it into a possible open confrontation with the West.343 
At that time Japan considered itself to be an advanced Western type of country, 
boasting a strong market economy and the oldest democratic system in Asia. Having 
the best of the two worlds, Japan thought it was best positioned to be both an 
economic and political model country for its Asian counterparts, a bridge between 
East and West344. Japan’s outstanding performance in Asia, which had resulted in the 
country becoming the world’s second strongest economy by the late 1960s, was 
considered to be a result of its successful amalgamation of modern Western and 
traditional Asian values. This ambiguous relation between Western values, such as 
democracy and the respect for human rights and freedoms, and traditional Asian 
values,345 such as a social hierarchy based on Confucian ideals, the principle of 
collectivism and the restriction of personal freedom for the sake of society and the 
nation, had continued to influence Japan’s views on China and on its role in East 
Asia for the rest of the 1990s, and even into the 2000s. For example, the 2003 Tokyo 
Declaration envisioned an East Asian Community of nations ‘upholding Asian 
traditions and values, while respecting universal rules and principles’ at the same 
time, thus advocating both Asian traditional values and universal rules and 
principles.346 While being a strong advocate for both Asian/Eastern and Western 
values, Tokyo never made it clear how those two different sets of values could 
successfully be observed in practice, let alone attempting to synthesize them in a 
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new system where both Asian/Eastern and Western values coexisted harmoniously. 
In fact, Japan had many times attempted to brush aside this ambiguity by opting for a 
more pragmatic approach and leaving the reconciliation of Asian/Eastern and 
Western values open. Japan’s continued ambiguity towards values can be best 
observed in the 2004 Issue Papers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which the 
ministry argued that there was no single and unified understanding about universal 
values and that while Asian values could provide for some common ground for East 
Asian community building, the understanding of those values could still differ 
between different groups of people: 
“[e]ven on universally recognized principles, like democracy and 
human rights, our positions sometimes differ. Asian values and 
traditions may also provide certain grounds for commonness. But 
they are often shared only among people of the same ethnic and 
other belongings.” 347 
 
While this argument pointed to the fact that there was no clear definition as to the 
meaning of those values, Japan’s actions at the time were still guided by the 
motivation to ultimately overcome these differences and work towards establishing 
shared values and common interests with its neighbors in order to achieve the long 
term goal of successful community building among East Asian countries. 
Japan’s own answer to this ‘universal values challenge’ started to take shape 
with the creation of the Council on East Asian Community, a half-private, half-
public think tank that was funded by the Japanese government. The CEAC, 
inaugurated in Tokyo in May 2004, was led by ex-diplomat and political scientist 
Kenichi Itō, sponsored by former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, and its 
membership consisted of representatives of public policy think tanks, business 
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corporations, ex-bureaucrats, scholars, journalists, and politicians.348 The think tank 
was an intellectual response to the China-initiated Network of East Asian Think 
Tanks (NEAT). At the NEAT’s 2nd Annual Conference in Beijing, Itō saw ‘for the 
first time in my life Asians coming from different countries speaking in one voice 
and working for one purpose’, and was deeply touched by the aspiration of the 
participating countries to work towards a common purpose of building an East Asian 
community. Having returned to Japan from the conference, Itō and his colleagues 
called for an all-Japan intellectual platform where proper research and discussion 
regarding the concept of an East Asian community could be facilitated.349 In his 
commentary on the Japanese perspective of community building in East Asia, Itō 
argued that this goal could not be achieved by the “mere promotion of the functional 
cooperation alone,” and that the creation of the sense of community or a shared 
identity among the people of East Asia was necessary.350 In this publication Itō 
further argued that something more powerful than a common interest was needed, 
pointing out that a regional community needs to be based on “common values” that 
are shared by every country in East Asia. He broadly identified those necessary 
common values as a sense of respect and the principle of equality.351 A year later Itō 
was still vague about defining particular regional values, and while he reiterated his 
stance on the importance of creating an East Asian identity based on shared values, 
the underlying vision of his argument was that countries of the region should work 
together on the realization of such Western-originated universal values as liberal 
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democracy and market economy.352 This interesting ambiguity between advocating 
universal values and seeking at the same time to establish common values in East 
Asia based on the specific history of the region was a unique characteristic of 
Japanese policy-making until the mid-2000s. However, the China-wide anti-Japan 
protests and China’s opposition to Japan’s bid for a seat in the UNSC marked a 
turning point in Sino-Japan relations in 2005, which resulted in a significant shift in 
Japan’s views on shared values. 
Based on Itō’s and the CEAC’s suggestions, Tokyo decided to focus on 
advocating for universal values in the beginning of that year, a change marked by 
Kanehara’s speech at the Japan Information and Culture Center. In his policy speech 
on January 27, Kanehara, the political minister at the Japanese Embassy in 
Washington at that time, laid out Japan’s Grand Strategy for the 21st Century. He 
argued that “Japan is no longer a small defeated nation” as Prime Minister Yoshida 
saw the country some 50 years ago, and therefore “it needs to stand up to do 
something good to (sic) the international community to which it owes today’s 
prosperity.”353 
Japan’s goal, according to Kanehara, should be to promote democracy, free 
market, and to enhance stability and prosperity in the region, which, maintained 
Kanehara, were not only in Japan’s and America’s interests.  
“Today’s spread of democracy in the region is nothing but the result of tireless 
and colossi (sic) efforts by the United States to be a beacon of democracy 
worldwide,” argued Kanehara, and added that it therefore came natural that ‘the 
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Japan-US Alliance, the alliance of the two biggest industrial democracies in the 
Asia-Pacific region, is and will be the best vehicle to achieve this daunting goal’. 
Kanehara concluded that while China had different values and political regime, 
Japan needed to help reform powers like China and make them constructive partners. 
Based on Kanehara’s guidelines, Japan argued for expressing the importance 
of universal values at the inaugural East Asia Summit in December 2005, and 
succeeded in convincing other participant countries to include in the EAS statement 
that the summit “will be an open, inclusive, transparent and outward-looking forum 
in which we strive to strengthen global norms and universally recognised values.”354  
The EAS meeting clearly showed the difference between China’s and Japan’s 
vision for the region: China was in favour of a closed regionalism that was exclusive 
to East and South East Asian countries, while Japan preferred an open regionalism 
that welcomed extra-regional countries as well. Behind the two differing visions for 
East Asian regionalism appeared to be a growing struggle for regional leadership 
between Japan and China. Based on its staggering economic growth that coincided 
with Japan’s prolonged economic decline, Beijing’s aim was to organize regional 
institutions and cooperation based on Chinese leadership. Although Beijing opposed 
this, Japan’s purpose was to bring in extra-regional countries such as the United 
States, India, Australia, and New Zealand, in order to counter China’s growing 
influence. At the time East Asia was still very much in the making, and Tokyo’s and 
Beijing’s visions were the two main competing ones in creating an overarching 
structure for the region that would have long term consequences for regional 
leadership, values, structures, and decision-making processes. The inaugural East 
Asia Summit in December 2005 showed both Japan’s and China’s partial success in 
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advocating their own visions and values for the region. Japan was partly successful 
in that extra-regional countries such as India, Australia, and New Zealand were also 
invited as participants. On the other hand Japan’s major ally, the United States, was 
left off the list, which indicated China’s partial success.355 The US reacted with 
obvious concern to being left out from the first East Asia Summit in 2005, and 
firmly objected to an East Asian regionalism that was exclusive of the United 
States.356 The events of 2005 had drawn the interests of Japan and the United States 
close to each other, and references to both common and universal values became 
more frequent in their joint statements, to a point where Koizumi reiterated the 
importance of a value alliance (kachi dōmei) during his last trip to Washington in 
June 2006. The US-Japan Joint Statement clearly stated that the bilateral alliance 
was based on universal values and common interests: 
“The United States and Japan stand together not only 
against mutual threats but also for the advancement of 
core universal values such as freedom, human dignity 
and human rights, democracy, market economy, and 
rule of law.”357 
 
The text also explicitly stated that these core universal values were deeply rooted in 
the long historic traditions of both countries. A values-based alliance with the United 
States provided an essential pillar of Japan’s direct, as well as indirect, engagement 
with the rest of Asia in the following years, while Tokyo’s pursuit of a rather 
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pragmatic diplomacy also continued to play an important role in its international 
relations. This continued tension between value-oriented diplomacy and pragmatic 
realism growingly defined Japan’s foreign policies in the 2000s and beyond, as this 
chapter explores in detail next. 
 
Values versus pragmatism: the emergence of the concepts of the East Asian 
Community and the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 
As established earlier in the chapter, Japan’s ambiguous approach to values in its 
relations with China, and other countries in Asia, continued from the 1990s into the 
2000s. However, with the development of the universal values concept in Tokyo’s 
foreign policy, this ambiguity could not only be observed in the contexts of Asian’ 
versus Western values, but also in terms of a growing tension between advocating 
for certain values at some times while giving priority to practical interests in Tokyo’s 
foreign policy strategies at other times. This newly emerging ‘dualist foreign policy’ 
of pursuing values and pragmatic interests at the same time can best be observed in 
Japan’s two, remarkably different, visions for regional cooperation: the concept of an 
East Asian Community (Higashi Ajia Kyōdōtai) and the concept of an Arc of 
Freedom and Prosperity (Jiyū to Han’ei no Kō). 
 
The East Asian Community initiative 
The 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis brought an abrupt end to the so-called Asian 
values debate and instead of a continued debate on what Asian values meant for Asia 
and how those fit with Western values, for instance, South East and East Asia started 
focusing on deepening regional economic development and cooperation. This 
coincided with China’s becoming a member of the World Trade Organization in the 
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year 2000, resulting in China’s deeper integration into the world economy and 
providing new opportunities for economic cooperation. China’s handling of the 
Asian Financial Crisis was in sharp contrast with that of the United States and some 
Western institutions, such as the U.S.-led World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, that appeared to attempt to exploit the financial fragility of the most 
affected Asian countries in order to achieve more market penetration into the region. 
China’s image among Asian countries who had been cautious and measured toward 
Beijing since the Tiananmen Square events therefore changed to that of a more 
reliable and responsible country. As a result, regionalism based on economic 
cooperation had deepened among Asian countries from the late 1990s. An important 
milestone in this was when the leaders of both China and ASEAN member states 
signed the Framework Agreement on China-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation at the sixth China-ASEAN Summit in November 2002. This would 
eventually lead to a free trade agreement in the coming years.358 
While Japan had been reluctant to propose any initiative for regional 
cooperation until the late 1990s, the Asian Financial Crisis and China’s subsequent 
elevated position as a possible future leader in Asia meant that Tokyo had to face a 
new set of circumstances and opportunities that required it to take a more proactive 
approach towards the region if it wanted to stay in a leading position. As a result of 
its efforts to be at the helm of regional cooperation and community-building, Japan’s 
concept of an East Asian Community had emerged by the beginning of the 2000s. At 
a meeting with ASEAN countries in Singapore in January 2002, then Japanese Prime 
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Minister Jun`ichirō Koizumi proposed the creation of a “community that acts 
together and advances together.”359 
In his speech, Koizumi envisioned a community of East Asian countries that 
was able to put aside historical, cultural, and political differences and instead focus 
on pragmatic goals, predominantly on regional cooperation and economic 
development. In the same speech Koizumi also pointed to the importance of Japan’s 
deepening cooperation with China, praising the active role Beijing was willing to 
play in regional cooperation, and emphasized China’s wealth and huge economic 
potential. While Koizumi’s speech placed a particular importance on Japan’s 
relations with China and the Republic of Korea, the occasion and place of his 
presentation suggested that Tokyo believed the Japan-ASEAN relationship should 
form the core of an East Asian Community, based upon which cooperation with 
other Asian countries like China and South Korea should be built. 
Subsequent debates about the establishment of an East Asian Community were 
centred around membership. While China was in favour of a closed type of 
regionalism that limited membership to the ASEAN+3 countries360, Japan advocated 
for an “outward-looking”361 community which was open to countries outside the 
region, particularly Australia and New Zealand. As a response to growing debates on 
membership, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs created its Issue Papers, first 
presented to the ASEAN+3 Foreign Ministers meeting in 2004, in which it expanded 
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on its vision for an EAC.362 The papers acknowledged difficulty in creating an EAC 
based on shared values and principles, and proposed to focus on practical 
community-building based on functional cooperation instead. At the same time, as 
Akihiko Tanaka explains, Japan continued to incorporate like-minded countries like 
Australia and New Zealand in its vision for an EAC.363 Similarly, Hitoshi Tanaka, 
who was deeply involved as Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs 
Bureau in MOFA, also maintains that, while the emphasis was placed on cooperation 
among the ASEAN member states, China, Japan and South Korea, the proposal to 
include Australia and New Zealand was a strategic addition by Tokyo in order to 
strengthen Japan’s influence by mitigating China’s growing leverage in the region.364 
The very first East Asian Summit meeting in December 2005 saw the further 
deepening of debates around the membership of Australia and New Zealand. China 
and Malaysia firmly opposed expanding membership beyond the ASEAN+3 group, 
while the Japanese delegates advocated for the inclusion of the two extra-regional 
countries.365 However, the summit was preceded by anti-Japanese demonstrations in 
China and the Republic of Korea, which caused significant damage to Japan’s 
international image and outreach in East Asia. By this time, Sino-Japanese relations 
reached a significant turning point due to a number of reasons. 
Japan-China relations reached a turning point during the tenure of Prime 
Minister Koizumi (2001-2006), when bilateral relations, especially in regional 
arrangements, had gradually become more competitive than cooperative. Koizumi’s 
generally unapologetic attitude towards Japan’s role in the Pacific War, and his 
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annual visits as prime minister to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine 
that is considered to be one of the strongest links to Japan’s imperial past and 
wartime atrocities by the Chinese, caused a growing resentment in China.366 In 
November 2004, a Chinese nuclear submarine intruded into Japanese territorial 
waters, which incident triggered the Japanese government to execute its Maritime 
Security Action Plan for only the second time in history.367 Remarkably, between 
2004 and 2005, the number of Chinese electronic warfare planes violating Japan’s 
air defense zone had increased eightfold, going up from 13 times in 2004 to 107 
times in 2005.368 As a result, Japan’s 2004 National Defense Guidelines identified 
China as a potential threat to Japan for the first time, stating that Japan has to 
“remain attentive to [China’s] future actions.”369 
Interestingly, this period coincided with Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on 
the UNSC, which met with a strong resistance from Beijing, generating street 
protests in a number of major Chinese cities. Some of these protests eventually 
turned into anti-Japanese riots, during which Japanese business properties were 
intentionally damaged. Japan eventually failed to secure a seat on the Security 
Council, largely due to Beijing’s political opposition. Growing tensions in Sino-
Japanese relations could also clearly be observed in the sharp drop in the expressions 
of affinity towards each other in a public opinion poll conducted by the Japanese 
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government in 2004 and 2005, plummeting to some of the lowest levels since the 
Pacific War.370 Another indication of a strengthening Sino-Japanese competition was 
the fact that Chinese GDP growth was rapidly catching up with that of a stagnating 
Japan: while Japanese GDP was four times larger than that of China in 2000, this 
gap had dropped to 200 per cent by 2005, with strong indications that China’s GDP 
was on track to overtake Japan’s in the next few years.371 
In the light of these developments, Japan looked for ways in which it could 
curb China’s influence and growing power in the region while strengthening 
Tokyo’s position. As a result, Takio Yamada, Director of the Regional Policy 
Division in the Asian and Oceanian Bureau at MOFA, officially set out four 
principles for an East Asian Community in November 2005. These were 1) open 
regionalism inclusive of extra regional countries; 2) functional cooperation; 3) 
confidence-building in the area of security; and 4) encouraging a forward-looking 
transformation of East Asia. Yamada argued that the region’s emerging new middle 
class was the generation of globalisation and expressed his hope that universal 
values would therefore become much more deeply rooted in the region. He pointed 
out that Japan should encourage such forward-looking transformation and “strive to 
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create conditions where universal values like democracy are respected and can 
flourish throughout the entire region.”372 
As a result, and particularly in the shadow of a rapidly emerging China, Japan 
had opted to work towards an East Asian Community that openly upholds universal 
values and aimed to receive support also from extra-regional democracies such as 
India, Australia, and New Zealand. 
However, strengthening competition had further widened the gap between 
Japan’s and China’s vision for an East Asian Community, and the two countries 
were unable to reach consensus in relation to issues around membership and 
leadership. Under such circumstances there was no apparent will or passion to make 
any progress with community-building in East Asia, and growing frictions between 
the region’s two largest powers had by 2005 turned the concept of an East Asian 
Community into a dead-end idea.373 
 
The rise and decline of value-oriented diplomacy and the “Arc of Freedom and 
Prosperity”  
Having realized its failure to improve relations with China, Japan set about 
constructing a new diplomatic strategy, in which a strengthened alliance with the 
United States and the promotion of universal values such as democracy and human 
rights came to play a central role. The importance of such values in Japan-US 
relations, however, was not new at the time. One of the more recent examples was a 
joint statement issued in the light of the September 11 terrorist attacks, which states 
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that basic values of freedom and democracy are shared by the two nations and that 
the attacks posed a serious threat to these values shared by the US, Japan, and the 
international community.374 Nevertheless, the active promotion of universal values 
became a common policy initiative with the issuance of the Joint Statement of the 
U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee in February 2005, which defined the 
promotion of fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the 
rule of law in the international community as a top global common strategic 
objective.375 Interestingly, the joint statement came not long after Kanehara had 
delivered his aforementioned speech on Japan’s 21st Century Grand Strategy in 
January the same year. In it Kanehara placed a central importance on the Japan-US 
alliance, the alliance of the two biggest industrial democracies in the Asia-Pacific 
region, as being the best vehicle to maintain a strategic stability and economic 
prosperity in the entire region.376 Most importantly, Kanehara added that promoting 
these goals along with the values of democracy and free market was the historic 
mission of the Japan-US Alliance, in which mission Japan also needed to cooperate 
with other industrial democracies such as South Korea and Australia.377 His speech 
in Washington and the subsequent joint US-Japan statement on actively promoting 
universal values would be hard to see as a mere coincidence given the deepening 
tensions in Japan-China relations. 
Having forged a values-based alliance with the United States and with the 
inauguration of Shinzō Abe, who was generally regarded as having a hawkish stance 
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on China, as Japan’s new prime minister in September 2006, universal values came 
to play a central role in Japan’s developing foreign policy strategies. Japan started 
looking for partners that were likely to share the same values in an effort to 
strengthen those values in the region. In the same year he was elected, Abe published 
a book titled Towards a Beautiful Country (Utsukushii Kuni e), in which he explains 
his political philosophy and his vision for Japan as a beautiful and confident country. 
In the book he states that Japan needs to show leadership in contributing to and 
cooperating on the sharing of universal values with other countries, especially in 
Asia. In order to achieve this, maintained Abe, it would be important to convene a 
summit or ministerial meeting among Japan, Australia, the United States, and India 
in order to achieve the strategic goal of promoting such values across the region.378  
In a speech to the Japanese Diet in early 2007, Abe introduced a new concept 
of “Proactive Diplomacy,” signalling his intention to make Japan more actively 
contribute towards pressing global issues, “a country that will serve as a new role 
model in the international community of the 21st century.” 
Abe’s Proactive Diplomacy was founded on three pillars: (a) strengthening 
partnerships with countries that share the fundamental values of freedom, democracy, 
basic human rights and rule of law, (b) creating an Asia that is open and rich in 
innovation, and (c) contributing to global peace and stability. While Abe did not 
make a direct reference to China, he argued that the security environment 
surrounding Japan was changing drastically and that the cornerstone of Japan's 
diplomacy is the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia.379 
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During Abe’s first government, Tarō Asō assumed the role of Japan’s foreign 
minister. Asō was the grandson of Shigeru Yoshida, Japan’s first Prime Minister 
after the Pacific War, who became famous for adopting a strategy that defined 
Japan’s foreign policy in the latter half of the 20th century.380 Asō, another right-wing 
Liberal Democratic Party politician with a hawkish view on China, had developed a 
new foreign policy concept, in which the ideas formulated in Kanehara’s speech and 
Abe’s book played a central role. A few months after the reaffirmation of the US-
Japan alliance along the lines of promoting universal values,381 in November 2006, 
Asō delivered a speech to the Japan Institute of International Affairs, a foreign 
policy think tank founded by his grandfather. In his speech Asō stressed that 
Japanese diplomacy needed a vision. Japan’s answer to this challenge, argued Asō, 
was its formulation of a value oriented diplomacy which involved placing emphasis 
on universal values. He argued that, looking back on history, Japan had long 
honoured universal values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law, and in that regard, Japan “deserves to be considered as one of the true veteran 
players out there on the field.”382 
In his view, Japanese democracy went back as early as the Meiji period, but 
concepts such as the rule of law had existed earlier, possibly going back as far as 
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1,400 years ago.383 Asō expressed his determination to actively promote universal 
values and introduced the term “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” as being the other 
new visionary concept of Japan’s proactive foreign policy strategy. In his speech he 
explained that this new concept was designed to help democratic nations come 
together in the outer rim of the Eurasian landmass,384 with the aim to strengthen 
universal values in those nations. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 2007 Bluebook further expands on Asō’s 
vision:  
“This new pillar of Japanese diplomacy involves 
placing emphasis on universal values such as freedom, 
democracy, fundamental human rights, the rule of law, 
and the market economy and creating an Arc of 
Freedom and Prosperity. This Arc would start from 
Northern Europe and traverse the Baltic states, 
Central and South Eastern Europe, Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Indian 
subcontinent, then cross Southeast Asia finally to 
reach Northeast Asia. Here, a region of stability and 
plenty with its basis in universal values - the Arc of 
Freedom and Prosperity - would take shape, and 
indeed it is just such a region that this initiative seeks 
to create. It is crucial that there be the protection of 
freedom and fundamental human rights as well as the 
establishment of a market economy through a system 
that features both democracy and the rule of law. It is 
only when citizens are free that political stability and 
economic prosperity will come to last. The path Japan 
travelled in the 60 years since the end of World War II 
demonstrates this plainly.”385 
 
The document states that the concept of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity is a new 
pillar supporting Japan’s existing foreign policy strategy to reinforce the Japan-US 
alliance and international cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations, as 
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well as to enhance relationships with neighboring countries, including that with 
China. It also emphasizes that the creation of an international society having 
universal values at its core should not be limited to only the geographical regions 
covered by the concept of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity; these values should 
also be shared with China, Latin America and Africa.386 While acknowledging the 
importance of enhancing relationships with neighboring countries such as China and 
the Republic of Korea, when it comes to diplomatic strategies towards Japan’s 
neighbors, the Bluebook does not outline any particular vision, let alone policy, of 
direct engagement with China. Instead, the Bluebook positions relations with 
ASEAN countries as the core of Japan’s Asian diplomacy, and notes that ASEAN 
had been developing as the growth centre of the globe and is the engine of regional 
integration, while its member states had been making steady progress in 
democratization.387 
Despite lacking any particular vision or policy of engagement with China, 
Prime Minister Abe did initially make a noticeable attempt to deflate tensions 
between Japan and China by visiting Beijing in October 2006. This was his first trip 
overseas as Japan’s prime minister and his visit was welcomed as yet another turning 
point in Sino-Japanese relations by the Chinese government.388 In a sharp contrast to 
Japan’s newly emerged foreign policy strategy for Asia, however, the subsequent 
Japan-China Joint Press Statement did not contain any reference to universal values. 
Instead, the document noted that both sides acknowledged that “Japan-China 
relations have become one of the most important bilateral relations for both 
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countries,” recognized the mutual interdependence between both countries, stated 
that Japan and China would “strengthen coordination and cooperation on 
international and regional issues” and that it was “the solemn responsibility of both 
countries and of the bilateral relations in the new era to contribute constructively to 
the peace, stability, and development of Asia and the world.”389 
The statement even committed to start a joint research of history by setting up 
a group of research scholars in both countries. It seemed that despite Japan’s rhetoric 
about a firm commitment to universal values and an underlying criticism of China 
for violating those values, Japan was still able and willing to strike a more 
cooperative tone with China and focus on practical issues of cooperation and 
strengthening trust between the two countries. Overall, Abe’s visit to Beijing was 
intended to remove the deadlock between the two countries and give new 
momentum to bilateral relations by putting the focus on practical challenges rather 
than on common values. However, as Ryōsei Kokubun points out, this new 
orientation based on “common strategic interests” was only agreed in principle and 
no specific content was clarified at that point.390 A similar statement was issued 
when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan in April the following year, in 
which the two sides promised to build a mutually beneficial relationship based on 
common strategic interests. 391  No detailed agreements or particular cooperation 
followed.  
Instead, what the Abe government had in mind, however, was to place the real 
emphasis on cooperation with extra-regional and like-minded countries such as the 
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US, Australia, and India, as Abe himself explains in his book Towards a Beautiful 
Country. In line with that idea, Abe embarked on a tour to strengthen relations with 
those countries. Accordingly, Abe and Australian Prime Minister John Howard 
agreed to enter into formal talks about a bilateral economic partnership agreement in 
December 2006, which led to the signing of the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on 
Security Cooperation in March the following year. The Declaration affirmed that the 
two countries’ strategic partnership was based on democratic values, a commitment 
to human rights, freedom and the rule of law, and committed to the continuing 
development of their strategic partnership to reflect shared values and interests.392 
Among others, the agreement stated that Japan and Australia will strengthen 
cooperation on issues of common strategic interest in the broader Asia-Pacific region 
and beyond, including border security, counter-terrorism, peace operations, maritime 
and aviation security, exchange of strategic assessments and related information, and 
contingency planning. The Declaration concluded that the two countries would 
develop an action plan with specific measures to advance security cooperation, and 
that bilateral strategic dialogue between Japan and Australia would further be 
strengthened, including an annual dialogue between their respective Foreign 
Ministers and Defence Ministers. 393 The document was followed by a number of 
bilateral meetings and other agreements, including the Memorandum on Defence 
Cooperation in December 2008, 394  which promised to strengthen defence 
cooperation within a trilateral framework among Japan, Australia and the United 
States and expand cooperation in regional multilateral frameworks such as the 
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ASEAN Regional Forum, a key forum for security dialogue in Asia in which 
Australia, the United States and India participate as dialogue members.395 At the 
same time, Tokyo strengthened its relationship with New Delhi as well: Abe and 
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed the Joint Statement Towards a 
Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership, in which the two leaders affirmed that 
India and Japan are “natural partners as the largest and most developed democracies 
of Asia” and agreed that the two countries share a “common commitment to 
democracy, open society, human rights, rule of law and a free market economy.”396 
The two prime ministers also launched the India-Japan Friendship Year 2007 
campaign aimed at strengthening cultural and economic ties between the two 
countries, and announced the India-Japan Special Economic Partnership Initiative.397 
The joint statement was later followed by the Joint Declaration on Security 
Cooperation between Japan and India,398 signed in Tokyo in October 2008, which 
was the third declaration on security cooperation that Japan signed, following similar 
declarations with the US and Australia. The document reaffirmed bilateral 
cooperation consonant with the values that the earlier joint statement emphasized. 
Quite remarkably, the start of Japan’s value-oriented diplomacy coincided with 
NATO’s new initiative of an Alliance with global partners launched in April 2006, 
which aimed at reaching beyond its traditional partnership and establishing deeper 
relations with countries such as Australia and Japan and regions such as Central 
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Asia.399 Seizing this opportunity, Abe visited the NATO headquarters in Brussels in 
January 2007, a first such visit by a Japanese prime minister. There he made a 
speech in which he asserted that NATO and Japan are partners that have in common 
such fundamental values as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, 
therefore “[i]t is only natural that we cooperate in protecting and promoting those 
values.”400 
He acknowledged that while China presented great opportunities to all, there 
were some uncertainties around its increasing defence expenditures and lack of 
transparency, therefore “[w]e need to pay close attention to the future of this nation,” 
and concluded that Japan and NATO “have to elevate democracy in places where it 
is emerging; consolidate respect for human rights where it is suppressed.”401 
As part of Foreign Minister Tarō Asō’s Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 
initiative, Japan also sought to strengthen and formalize relations with countries in 
the Mekong region, where China had started expanding its political and economic 
influence. Accordingly, Japan invited the foreign ministers of Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam to Tokyo, where the First Japan-Mekong Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting was held in January 2008. During the meeting, Japan pledged to 
further expand its Overseas Development Aid programme and economic cooperation 
through three regional economic corridors, and the participating countries announced 
the Japan-Mekong Region Partnership Program as well as the launching of the 
Mekong-Japan Exchange Year 2009. As a later Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
document explains, one of the three priority areas of the deepening partnership 
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program was the pursuing of universal values and common goals of the region.402 
Asō also placed emphasis on other existing multilateral frameworks such as the 
“Central Asia Plus Japan” dialogue between Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan; 403  the “Visegrad Four and Japan” 
(consisting of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary) talks; dialogue 
with the GUAM countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova); and 
cooperation with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC).404 In the meantime, no progress was made in Sino-Japanese bilateral 
relations, as the signing of the 2007 Japan-China Joint Press Statement was not 
followed by any concrete action or more substantial agreements. Relatively regular 
high level VIP visits between the countries also ceased from 2007.405 
The value-oriented diplomacy and the concept of the Arc of Freedom and 
Prosperity were aggressively pushed forward by Abe and Asō, but suffered a serious 
blow in July 2007, when the coalition government was defeated in the election of the 
House of Councillors. Soon after that Abe was forced to reshuffle his Cabinet and 
Asō resigned from his post of Foreign Minister, taking office as the Secretary-
General of the Liberal Democratic Party. The second blow to the value-oriented 
diplomacy came just months later, when Abe suddenly resigned citing health issues 
in September 2007. Yasuō Fukuda succeeded Abe as prime minister. He was 
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considered to be a political rival of Asō and, as such, frequently voiced his criticism 
of Asō’s foreign policy, including his flagship concept of the Arc of Freedom and 
Prosperity. The new Foreign Minister, Nobutaka Machimura, who was the leader of 
a rival faction to Asō within the LDP, did not continue advancing Asō’s foreign 
policy strategies.406 Instead, the new Fukuda cabinet gave priority to more stable 
relations with China and emphasized the importance of reconciliation with East Asia. 
As a result, Fukuda built a team from those LDP members who were more open to 
the idea of an East Asian Community.407 Abe’s value-oriented diplomacy was no 
longer emphasized and the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity literally vanished from 
Japan’s foreign policy strategy. 
 
The start of a prolonged period of political instability: further inconsistencies in 
Japan’s foreign policy strategies 
When it came to foreign policy making, Fukuda was known to prefer pragmatism 
over values or certain principles, and rejected the idea that East Asian regionalism 
was in a “zero sum” type of conflict with the Japan-US alliance. He preferred to 
advocate for both, being convinced that proactive and constructive relations with 
Japan’s East Asian neighbors and its most important ally could be mutually 
reinforcing.408 As opposed to Koizumi, who paid annual visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine, sparking criticism from China and South Korea, and Abe, who refused to 
comment on the Yasukuni issue, Fukuda publicly announced that he would not make 
                                               
406 Takeshi, “Consolidating “Value-Oriented Diplomacy” towards Eurasia? The “Arc of Freedom and 
Prosperity” and Beyond,” 60. 
407 Hosoya, “The Rise and Fall of Japan's Grand Strategy,” 19. 
408 Hitoshi Tanaka, “Japanese Foreign Policy under Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda,” East Asia Insights 
2, no. 6 (October 2007): 1. Accessed May 4, 2018. http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/2-6.pdf.  
 156 
any visits to the shrine while prime minister409 and was open to strengthen bilateral 
ties with China. Beijing also appeared to favour improved relations and it proposed 
the joint development of the Shirakaba/Chunxiao undersea gas fields in the East 
China Sea.410 
A period of Sino-Japanese rapprochement started with a series of consultations 
that resulted in the June 2008 issuing of a joint statement on bilateral cooperation in 
exploiting the resources of the gas field.411 The joint agreement came after Chinese 
President Hu Jintao made a visit to Tokyo a month before, where he had a highly 
symbolic meeting with the Emperor and held talks with Fukuda. The result of his 
visit was a joint statement on the comprehensive promotion of a mutually beneficial 
Sino-Japanese relationship which not only recognized the Japan-China relationship 
as one of the most important bilateral relationships but acknowledged that the two 
countries’ sole option was to cooperate to enhance peace and friendship over the 
long term.412 
However, the LDP was going through a period of instability within the party at 
that time, which ended in Fukuda’s subsequent resignation in August the same year. 
Ironically, the result of the LDP’s internal power struggle was that Fukuda was 
succeeded by Asō, whose earlier foreign policy strategy focused on strengthening 
relations with like-minded democratic countries, neglecting China. As a result, 
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Beijing soon retreated from the joint Shirakaba/Chunxiao gas field development 
agreement and started drilling in the East China Sea.413 Because of ongoing internal 
factional disputes within the LDP, Asō attempted to silence his critics within the 
party. A part of his carefully balancing policies was the abandonment of his earlier 
foreign policy concept of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity. As opposed to his 
diplomatic strategies as foreign minister in the earlier Abe cabinet, Asō attempted to 
have more direct engagement with China and conducted meetings with President Hu 
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao a number of times.414 Nevertheless, Beijing remained 
cautious and no significant progress was made in bilateral relations. 
A year after Asō became prime minister, Japanese domestic politics took yet 
another dramatic turn when the LDP suffered a historic defeat to the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) in September 2009. The DPJ was looking for new directions in 
Japan’s foreign policy, not least to distance itself from the long ruling LDP. With 
Yukio Hatoyama becoming the new prime minister, that direction indeed changed 
significantly. Hatoyama published an article in The New York Times titled “A New 
Path for Japan” just before the elections in August, voicing his strong criticism of the 
United States’ “fundamentalist pursuit of market capitalism,” according to which 
people are treated not as an end but as a means, resulting in the loss of human 
dignity. 415  Hatoyama distanced himself from a US-led globalism and put the 
principle of fraternity at the centre of his political views, explaining that with this 
concept his aim was to reduce the excesses of globalized capitalism and favour local 
and traditional economic practices. 
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He argued that a national goal emerging from the concept of fraternity is the 
creation of an East Asian Community. When becoming prime minister a month later, 
he indicated that he would exclude the US from such a community. While 
recognizing the US-Japan alliance as remaining the cornerstone of Japanese foreign 
policy, Hatoyama’s and the DPJ’s diplomatic strategy placed a great significance on 
Japan’s relations with China. When Hatoyama arrived as new prime minister in New 
York to attend the UN General Assembly, he first met with Chinese President Hu 
Jintao before meeting US President Obama. Later on that year, upon meeting in 
Tokyo with Wang Jiarui, the Director of the International Department of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, DPJ Secretary-General Ichiro Ozawa 
stated that the Japan-China relationship should be the core of DPJ’s foreign 
relations.416 Hatoyama visited Beijing weeks after his inauguration, and Ozawa took 
more than 140 DPJ Diet members to China in December 2009, where each member 
had a personal photo taken with Hu Jintao.417 With the change of government and the 
start of Hatoyama’s so-called fraternity diplomacy (yūai gaikō),418 Japan’s value-
oriented diplomacy had come to a sudden and complete halt. 
As Hatoyama explained to the members of the Japan Press Club, fraternity 
diplomacy was in sharp contrast with the LDP’s values-oriented diplomacy as he 
believed that “diplomacy implies a skill of how the states with different values 
establish the relationship of co-existence and co-prosperity.”419 
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In his address on Japan’s Asian policy in Singapore in November 2009, 
Hatoyama reaffirmed that his new government attached great importance to Asian 
diplomacy, and that the “main pillar of this policy is the initiative for an East Asian 
Community.”420 
The DPJ’s new diplomatic strategy came at a time when China started 
becoming more assertive in its foreign policy, including strengthening its military 
and expanding its maritime activities in the South China Sea, and therefore it also 
coincided with the Obama administration’s development of its rebalancing strategy, 
which later became known as the pivot to Asia.421 Hatoyama, however, did not 
assume the role of prime minister long enough to be able to make substantial 
progress with his new foreign policy strategy. He became entangled in a political 
battle about his promise to relocate Okinawa’s US Marine Corps Air Station 
Futenma422 at a time when the US appeared to expect much more cooperation from 
Japan as its strongest ally in Asia. Hatoyama was forced to resign in June 2010, less 
than nine months into his presidency, with US-Japan ties significantly damaged and 
China still being cautious about the lack of consistency and predictability in Tokyo’s 
foreign policy because of the turbulence in Japan’s domestic politics. Making 
Beijing even more suspicious was the fact that Hatoyama did not instruct the Foreign 
Ministry to implement certain policies for East Asian community building or lay 
groundwork for recruiting potential member countries. There was also an apparent 
lack of consensus between Hatoyama and his Foreign Minister, Okada Katsuya, as to 
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the membership of an East Asian Community, especially as to whether the United 
States should be involved as a member, and the two of them made contradictory 
public statements on the matter.423 
Hatoyama was succeeded by Prime Minister Naoto Kan, who quickly 
abandoned Hatoyama’s vaguely designed concept of fraternity diplomacy and 
assumed a more pragmatic and balanced approach in his foreign policy. At a press 
conference on the day of his inauguration, Kan made clear that a main focus of his 
foreign policy was to repair damaged ties with the US by recognizing that the 
Futenma Air Station issue had caused anxiety among the Japanese public concerning 
Japan-US relations. While acknowledging the issue as “very difficult,” Japan must 
proceed to solve it on the basis of its alliance agreement with the US. Kan also made 
a quick, but quite revealing, reference to China, saying that when he visited the 
country not long before, despite its booming economy: 
“Japanese companies were not getting much more 
than subcontracts offered by European firms. What 
is going on here? I believe this is the result of an 
absence of political leadership over the past two 
decades.”424 
 
Kan was invited for an official visit to Beijing soon after his election, but he decided 
to send Hatoyama as his deputy instead.425 The idea of an East Asian Community 
was again thrown out of the window and with the appointment of the pro-American 
Seiji Maehara as Kan’s Foreign Minister in September, the work on fixing the 
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damaged Japan-US alliance had started.426 While Kan, who was generally considered 
as a centrist politician, may not have intended to cut ties with Beijing, the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fishing boat incident in September 2010 further pushed 
Tokyo towards Washington while distancing it from Beijing. Japan’s subsequent 
National Defense Program Guidelines reaffirmed the Japan-US alliance and stated 
that Tokyo “will strengthen its cooperation with the Republic of Korea and Australia, 
which are allies of the United States and share basic values and many security-
related interests with Japan.”427 With that, the essence of value oriented diplomacy –
i.e. focusing on cooperation with like-minded countries based on a sense of sharing 
common values- was back again in Japan’s foreign policy. In line with that, the Kan 
government started negotiations on civilian nuclear cooperation with India, which 
was followed by a Japan-India joint declaration on a Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement in October 2010.428 On a highly symbolic first bilateral trip 
overseas, in November, Foreign Minister Maehara visited Australia, where an 
agreement was made to speed up negotiations on the General Security of Military 
Information Agreement and to plan for a Japan-Australia 2+2 meeting in 2011.429 
In yet another turn, which was in part due to political issues around the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster, Kan resigned from office in August 2011. His successor 
was Yoshihiko Noda, who, unlike Hatoyama and Kan, came from a more 
conservative faction of the DPJ and was thought to have a strong realism-oriented 
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foreign policy approach, focusing on defense and national security. He made clear 
his intentions of further strengthening the Japan-US alliance as the “cornerstone” of 
Japan’s foreign policy and national security, and argued for a more proactive defense 
policy a year before becoming prime minister. He reaffirmed this position soon after 
getting elected in September 2011 in an article, proclaiming adherence to the Japan-
US alliance while stating that the idea of an East Asian Community “need not be 
developed” until the region achieves a greater political stability.430 Noda was also 
supportive of the US-led free trade initiative, the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, which was seen to counter the China-led Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership free trade initiative.431 
Tensions over territorial disputes with China regarding the ownership of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands deepened in 2011, further damaging relations between 
Japan and China. Instead of initiating any high-level bilateral meeting with Beijing, 
however, the Noda administration was more interested in addressing China’s 
growing maritime activities and assertiveness in a multilateral setting. Part of this 
effort was when Noda proposed a joint initiative outlining the principles for 
maritime security in East Asia at the East Asia Summit in November 2011.432 
Relations with China reached a new low in 2012 when, facing a growing number of 
intrusions by Chinese vessels into territory around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 
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Japan nationalised three of the five islets, prompting China’s Ministry of Defense to 
accuse Japan of “playing with fire.”433 
 
Back to relative political stability: the second Abe government 
The LDP won the next general elections with a landslide victory in December 2012, 
and Abe became the Prime Minister again, becoming the seventh prime minister in 
six years and inheriting a significantly damaged Sino-Japanese relations, especially 
in light of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands conflict. Before his first term as prime 
minister, he defended Koizumi’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine but refrained 
from visiting the shrine during his first term. He made no secret of his intention to 
revise Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the so-called peace article that is 
generally seen as a guarantee prohibiting Japanese militarism. His first step was to 
amend the definition of self-defense to include collective self-defense, opening up 
the possibility for Japanese self-defense forces to join the US military in combat 
under certain conditions. From the time of Abe’s re-election, Japan’s defense budget 
started increasing and, in August 2013, the Maritime Self Defense Force launched 
Izumo, Japan’s largest battleship since the end of the Pacific War.434 As opposed to 
excercising self-restraint during his first term, Abe paid a visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine on the first anniversary of his re-election in December 2013. In the same 
month he established the National Security Council, which was followed by the 
passing of the highly controversial State Secrets Protection Law two days later. On 
December 17, Abe adopted Japan’s first National Security Strategy and approved the 
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National Defense Program Guidelines.435 One of Abe’s main strategic advisers, 
Shin`ichi Kitaoka, explained that it was necessary for Japan to upgrade its defense 
forces as a result of having to face a growingly assertive China, and he labelled 
Japan’s new defense strategy “proactive pacifism”. 436  Kitaoka argued that the 
concept of passive pacifism was mistaken in light of the rapid expansion of the 
Chinese military, so that, for instance, Japan's defense spending had remained nearly 
flat in the preceding 25 years, while China's defense spending had grown by a factor 
of 33 during the same period.437 
Proactive pacifism meant that Japan started shoring up its military defense 
capabilities and continued to strengthen relations with ‘like-minded countries’ based 
on a sense of shared values, particularly with India and the United States. In Abe’s 
first two years, a series of bilateral meetings were held with India’s Prime Minister, 
Narendra Modi, including Abe attending India’s Republic Day parade as chief 
guest.438 In July the same year, India invited Japan to take part for the first time in a 
joint US-India naval exercise, reflecting a deepening relationship between the two 
countries.439 Finally, in September 2014, Abe and Modi signed a number of key 
agreements, including one in which they agreed to upgrade the Japan-India 
relationship to a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.”440 During this time, 
                                               
435 All these were preceded by China announcing a month earlier the establishment of its National 
Security Commission and the creation of an Air Defense Identification Zone over an area in the East 
China Sea that overlaps with that of Japan. See Shin`ichi Kitaoka, “The Turnabout of Japan’s Security 
Policy: Toward “Proactive Pacifism”,” Nippon.com, April 2, 2014. Accessed 23 November 23, 2017. 
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438 “Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to be Republic Day chief guest,” The Times of India, January 
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440 Japan-India Relations (Basic Data),” MOFA, September 25, 2017. Accessed November 24, 2017. 
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Japan continued its efforts to further strengthen relations with the US, which 
included holding a large naval exercise near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 
November 2013, reinterpreting Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution to allow collective 
self-defense in certain situations, and issuing a new Guidelines for Japan-US 
Defense Cooperation, extending the area in which Japan could cooperate with the 
US military, with a focus on contingencies that might directly affect Japan.441 Abe 
also went on to lift Japan’s decades-long self-imposed ban on arms exports in April 
2014, when his administration replaced the highly restrictive “Three Principles” on 
weapons and military technology export, something which had been in place since 
1967, with more permissive guidelines.442 
At the same time, no significant effort was made by the Abe administration to 
make progress in Sino-Japanese relations. In one of his first speeches in the 
beginning of his second term in February 2013, Abe declared that the "doors are 
always open on my side for the Chinese leaders." He made this comment during a 
speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, where he 
also pointed out that it was “high time (…) for Japan to bear even more 
responsibility to promote our shared rules and values.”443 Both Tokyo and Beijing 
appeared to be passively open, waiting for the other side to initiate talks, resulting in 
the two countries’ leaders’ failure to meet for nearly two years. When Abe and 
President Xi Jinping finally met on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Beijing in 
November 2014, the meeting was reported to last for merely 25 minutes, during 
which time both leaders appeared to be reserved, and produced a “vaguely worded 
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statement” in which both sides recognized their “different views” over the 
emergence of territorial disputes444 In the meantime, Abe had visited a “quarter of 
the world,”445 49 countries, including trips to the ASEAN countries, Mongolia, a 
number of countries in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, South America, and North 
America, with two visits to the United States, during which trips he frequently 
referred to the importance of shared values. 
 
Discussion: the controversial role of values in Japan’s foreign policy strategies 
The concept of regionalism with Japanese leadership is not new in Japan’s foreign 
policy strategies. In fact, some of the earliest visions of region-building in East Asia 
were proposed by Japan. Before the Pacific War, for instance, Tokyo formulated a 
number of concepts for region-building, such as the “New Order in East Asia” (Tōa 
Shin Chitsujo) and the “Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (Dai Tōa 
Kyōeiken).446 Central to these concepts was a strategic control over Japan’s East 
Asian neighbors, most notably China. As these concepts were formulated to serve 
Japan’s imperialism during the war, Tokyo not only abandoned them with Japan’s 
defeat at the end of the Pacific War but it also opted to maintain a low-profile 
foreign policy. This diplomatic strategy was referred to as “leadership from behind,” 
“quiet diplomacy,” or at times “check book diplomacy,” as Japan focused on re-
                                               
444 “Abe meet Xi for first China-Japan summit in more than two years,” The Japan Times, November 
10, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2017. 
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establishing and maintaining regional ties based largely on economic 
development.447 Until the 1990s, Japan pursued bilateral ties with Southeast and East 
Asian nations, rather than pursuing regionalism in a multilateral framework. 
Diplomatic strategies towards China during this period were no different. With the 
normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1972, and in line 
with its low-key diplomatic strategy, Tokyo started to pursue a bilateral policy of 
“separating political and economic spheres of interaction” (seikei bunkai) with 
Beijing.448 This passive and low-key diplomatic strategy, focusing on maintaining 
peaceful relations based on economic cooperation rather than advocating for certain 
values, defined Japan’s foreign policy-making throughout the Cold War and into the 
1990s. However, with the removal of the Cold War political divide that defined and 
significantly restrained intra-regional ties in Asia, a new type of regionalism 
emerged in the 1990s. This coincided with the Japanese economy entering a 
prolonged period of stagnation from the beginning of the 1990s and with China’s 
economy constantly producing an annual double-digit growth at the same time. The 
proliferation of bilateral free-trade agreements across the region and China’s 
booming economy posed a growing challenge to the stalled Japanese economy and 
Tokyo’s decades-long low-key diplomacy. With a weakening economy in the face of 
China’s rapid emergence,449  Japanese foreign policy makers had to adopt new 
strategies. In response to these new challenges, Tokyo became much more assertive 
and proactive in its foreign policy strategies. By the mid-2000s, major strategies had 
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emerged: the idea of an EAC, proposed by Prime Minister Koizumi in Singapore in 
2002, and the concept of universal-values-based diplomacy that was forged in 
Japan’s foreign policy think tanks in the beginning of the 2000s. The former can be 
regarded as predominantly an “interest based” foreign policy as it stressed the 
importance of community building focusing on direct interaction and emphasizing 
pragmatic cooperation between East Asian countries, with the aim of maximizing 
economic benefits. The latter can be viewed as Japan’s “value based” diplomatic 
strategy as it stressed the importance of community building based on a sense of 
shared values with like-minded countries across the region and beyond. These two 
strategies were initially pursued parallel to one another, but the focus shifted to the 
latter after growing tensions with China during 2004 and 2005. As a result, the 
concept of a “values oriented diplomacy” was put forward by Prime Minister Abe as 
Japan’s central foreign policy strategy in 2006. Part of Abe’s values diplomacy was 
to rely on the US-Japan alliance and strengthen cooperation with like-minded 
countries such as India and Australia, countries which had a long tradition of 
upholding universal values such as freedom, human rights, democracy, and the rule 
of law. A central tenet of the values oriented diplomacy was the concept of the Arc 
of Freedom and Prosperity, developed originally by foreign ministry officials such as 
Nobukatsu Kanehara and Abe’s senior adviser Shōtarō Yachi, and which became an 
integral part of Tokyo’s foreign policy under Abe’s foreign minister, Tarō Asō, in 
2006. The idea behind the concept was to create a belt of countries committed to 
“universal values” stretching from Japan through Southeast Asia to Central Asia and 
Eastern Europe. In this belt, Asō started actively pursuing the strengthening of 
“universal values” in bilateral and multilateral settings. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of issues concerning Japan’s value-oriented diplomacy. 
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Firstly, there was a problem of definition. Japan’s concept of “universal values” 
was defined vaguely. Apart from repeatedly emphasizing the importance of 
democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law in bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, Tokyo’s foreign ministry never clarified what exactly it meant by these 
concepts and how these values should be strengthened with the ‘Arc countries’. 
Secondly, there was a problem of credibility. While Japan stressed the 
importance of these values, it failed to propose certain initiatives, including regional 
frameworks, by which these values could be further strengthened in collaboration 
with those countries chosen to constitute the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’. One 
would think that developing particular strategies aimed at strengthening universal 
values would have been important in Japan’s chosen ‘Arc countries’ such as 
Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand in Southeast Asia, former USSR countries in 
Central Asia and former communist countries in Eastern Europe and Western Asia, 
where the state of human rights, the rule of law and democratic institutions could 
certainly be improved. Even setting its own domestic political and institutional 
examples of good practice and showing how Tokyo was committed to strengthening 
those values domestically could have been useful if values were truly at the heart of 
its values-oriented diplomacy. Instead, it appears that frequent references to 
universal values were merely used to advance Tokyo’s own political interests in a 
larger geopolitical game: it is hard to think it was a pure coincidence that Japan 
emphasized exactly those values that China rejected. The concept of the Arc of 
Freedom and Prosperity incorporated a large number of countries that had 
significantly different political systems with a huge variability in terms of traditions, 
political institutions and laws when it came to concepts of democracy, freedom of 
speech and human rights. Had Japan genuinely intended to strengthen cooperation 
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based on shared universal values, it would have struggled to find any common 
ground among the ‘Arc countries’. In fact, forging cooperation among these 
countries would have only made sense from a certain a geopolitical aspect. Taking a 
look at the image of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity visualized in the MOFA 
Bluebook’s map, it is striking to see that the belt broadly encircles China on the 
‘outer countries’ of the Asian continent, which can be considered as China’s 
geopolitical backyard: the Arc incorporates countries and regions where influence is 
crucial to China from a geopolitical perspective (see Appendix at the end of this 
chapter). Credibility also posed a personal challenge to two of the most prominent 
advocates of values diplomacy: Abe and Asō. Abe is widely considered a 
conservative right-wing politician domestically. His grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, 
was a prominent politician in Japan’s wartime government, and Abe is known to 
have particular views when it comes to Japan’s wartime atrocities. For instance, he 
rejected the use of the words ‘aggression’ and ‘invasion’ when referring to Japan’s 
wartime actions in China, and, at the time of the emergence of Japan’s values-
oriented diplomacy, he denied that the Japanese imperial government was involved 
in coercing “comfort women” into brothels during the Pacific War. Similarly, Asō 
argued in 2003 that Koreans voluntarily adopted Japanese names during Japan’s 
occupation of the Korean Peninsula, a statement he refused to retract later.450 Also, in 
his 2007 book titled Incredible Japan, he states that Japan should express a “humble 
regret” for its wartime actions, but later praises Sensō Ron (Theory of War), a book 
written by far-right nationalist Yoshinori Kobayashi, which provides an extremely 
distorted view of Japan’s wartime history.451 Such views had called the genuine 
                                               
450 David Fouse, "Japan's 'values-oriented diplomacy': A Double-Edged Sword." Pacific Forum CSIS, March16, 
2007. Accessed November 27, 2017. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
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451 Tarō Asō, Totetsumonai Nihon [Incredible Japan] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2007), 23 and 58, respectively. 
 171 
intentions behind Japan’s values-oriented diplomacy into question, and had 
presumably damaged Abe’s and Asō’s personal credibility in the eyes of other 
countries as far as commitment to values such as human rights and the rule of law. In 
that regard as well as in light of unsettled historical issues between Japan and its East 
Asian neighbors, values diplomacy’s indirect criticism towards China for its 
disregard of universal values appears to be somewhat difficult to defend. 
 When the concept of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity was revealed, a 
number of foreign ministry officials insisted that Japan’s economic interests should 
be given priority over ideology, and therefore Tokyo should continue pursuing 
strong relations with China. Differences in views within the ministry were so great 
that when Shōtarō Yachi was appointed in Abe’s second term as head of the 
National Security Council, the latter did not bring back value-oriented diplomacy. 
Instead, Yachi recognized the importance of friendly ties with China, and 
emphasized the more pragmatic concept of a “mutually beneficial relationship based 
on common strategic interests” in Sino-Japanese relations.452 Where the lack of 
consistency becomes even more apparent, however, is in the frequent change of 
governments. While Japanese domestic politics were relatively stable under Koizumi 
between 2001 and 2006, after that Tokyo went through a period of political 
uncertainty signified by rapid changes in the government: in the space of six years, 
seven different governments were formed under different prime ministers, including 
three coming from the Democratic Party of Japan between 2009 and 2012, 
something that was unprecedented in post-war Japan. Each successive prime 
minister changed his respective foreign policy approach towards China and therefore 
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placed different importance, if at all, on “universal values”. Tokyo’s oscillations 
between pragmatism and “universal values” was motivated less by a deep 
commitment to those values and more by its strategic concerns with China. 
While Tokyo became more assertive in its foreign policy, diplomatic strategies 
showed a significant lack of bilateral engagement with China. Apart from a few and 
largely symbolic high-level meetings, Japan has engaged with China mostly on a 
regional level, in multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6453 
meetings, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Council and the now largely defunct China-South Korea-Japan Trilateral 
Summit.454 At the same time and after a few unexpected turns during the Hatoyama 
government, Tokyo significantly strengthened its relations with the US, and the 
updated US-Japan defence guidelines of 2015 can be viewed as Tokyo’s 
commitment to the US’s rebalancing to Asia. 
In hindsight, Japan’s values-oriented foreign policy appears to have been 
operating predominantly on a rhetorical level, aimed at mitigating China’s influence 
in Asia by expanding the scope of cooperation with extra-regional countries. It can 
be regarded as one of Tokyo’s soft-power initiatives, with the goal of appealing to 
Asian countries and elevating Japan’s national image vis-à-vis China. While the 
values-oriented diplomacy has gradually faded out as a central pillar of Japan’s 
foreign policy strategies over recent years, references to “universal values” are still 
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made at times. Kanehara, who works as Deputy Secretary General of Japan’s 
National Security Secretariat as well as Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary in the 
Prime Minister’s Office, just recently made a speech titled “Japan’s Grand Strategy 
and Universal Values”, in which he argues that states in the twenty-first century 
“must always keep in mind the common interests of humankind as a whole” when 
defining their national interests. Kanehara maintains that those interests must be 
approached from a universal-values perspective as there was “reason to believe” that 
a “basic or core universal value system common to all humankind” exists. At the end 
of the speech, Kanehara concludes that “Japan has been upholding and will continue 
to uphold universal values and principles to lead.”455 
At times, even Prime Minister Abe continues to refer to the importance of 
universal values when speaking to an audience, whether overseas or domestically. 
For instance, at a symposium organized by the Tokyo Foundation, Abe eloquently 
spoke of how “values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law were “universal” 
among the peoples of Asia and Africa in the true sense,” maintaining that “the 
universal values we speak of have become values that cover more people than any 
other region in the world, and “universal” in the true sense of the word.” He then 
added: “[c]an you think of anything else that could please us more?”456 
The fact that universal values were used merely as a rhetorical concept 
becomes even more obvious when we look into two significant documents that were 
produced by the Japanese political elite to advance its own domestic agenda: the 
LDP’s draft constitution of 2012 and the Japanese government State Secrets 
Protection Law of 2013 These two documents testify that in its own domestic arena, 
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Tokyo appears to have been drifting away from the very values it upheld and so 
eagerly advocated in its foreign policy. The next chapter provides a detailed analysis 
of these two documents. 
 
 
Map 2. The “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” 
 
 
Source:     “A new Pillar for Japanese Diplomacy: Creating an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,” 






A challenge to Japan’s commitment to universal values: The LDP’s 
constitutional values and the State Secrets Protection Law 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter Three I showed how Japan’s universal values argument has developed 
over the past decade, through which Japan perceives and promotes itself as a 
democratic, rules-based, values- and norms-oriented mature nation, and as a 
responsible member and an integral part of international society. Japan has used this 
argument to distance itself from China, which it sees as a country where universal 
values and norms are not respected, and ideas such as democracy and the rule of law 
do not hold. Japan’s strong criticism towards China, whether from its political or 
scholarly establishment, is therefore deeply rooted in its self-proclaimed upholding 
and respecting of universal values and norms. While Chapter Two pointed out the 
inconsistencies and shortcomings of leading scholarly arguments in this respect, the 
current chapter reveals a significant gap between Japan’s official universal values 
and norms argument to an international audience and the Liberal Democratic Party’s 
2012 Draft Constitution, which was written for a domestic audience and for domestic 
purposes. By taking a closer look at some of the most significant changes put 
forward in the text of the LDP’s draft, the aim of this chapter is to point out a 
number of disturbing inconsistencies and contradictions between Japan’s aim of 
maintaining a values and rules-based international country image and the reality 
behind its ruling party’s aim of creating a rather specific set of values and norms 
based on Japan’s unique historical, social, and political traditions. The LDP’s 
intention of re-establishing this set of Japan-specific values and norms is quite far 
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from the country’s universal norms and values argument against China, even though 
this has been widely promoted to an overseas audience. 
 
The creation of Japan’s post-war Constitution 
On July 26, 1945, the leaders of the Allied Powers issued the Potsdam Declaration 
that defined the terms for Japan’s surrender. The Declaration also outlined some of 
the major goals of the post-surrender Allied Occupation of Japan, stating that: 
“The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival 
and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese 
people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as 
respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.”457 
 
Parts of the text of the Declaration and the initial measures taken by Douglas 
MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at the beginning of the 
Allied Occupation, reflected the aim of setting Japan on the path of pacifism and 
democracy and encouraged Japanese leaders to take part in establishing a new 
political system and initiate reforms accordingly. The SCAP prohibited any 
governmental support for Shinto in December 1945, and subsequently made the 
Emperor proclaim that he was a human being, not a living god, in January 1946. The 
SCAP’s initiatives of setting Japan on the path of a peaceful and democratic country 
included the replacement of the 1889 Meiji Constitution, which reserved almost 
unrestricted power for the divine Emperor, and based on which Japan’s leaders were 
able to create a highly standardized, centralized, and militaristic nation in the first 
half of the Twentieth Century. To avoid this happening again, one of the most 
fundamental tasks was the drafting of a new constitution, which was based on the 
aim of promoting Western ideals of liberalism, democracy, and human rights. 
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Rewriting the constitution as a document that guarantees these rights and introduces 
Western values was met with strong opposition from the household of the Emperor, 
Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara, and most of his cabinet members.458 Shidehara 
appointed Jōji Matsumoto as head of a committee of constitutional scholars to 
suggest changes to the Meiji Constitution. The so-called Matsumoto Commission’s 
(Kenpō Mondai Chōsa Iinkai) recommendations were so minimal that General 
MacArthur rejected them outright and ordered his staff to draft an entirely new 
constitution.459 This so-called MacArthur draft was nevertheless still influenced by 
the views of various Japanese groups, including lawyers and especially by the draft 
presented by the Constitution Research Association (Kenpō Kenkyū Kai), which 
consisted of Japanese constitutional scholars. 460  After a number of rounds of 
discussions and amendments by the Japanese counterparts, including amendments 
made by both chambers of the Japanese Diet, the new post-war Constitution was 
approved by the Lower House on 6 October 1946, followed by the approval by the 
House of Representatives the next day. It then went on to receive the Emperor’s 
assent on 3 November, and ultimately came into force six months later, on 3 May 
1947.461 This episode of struggle against the new national constitution showed that 
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The significance of the post-war Constitution 
The Constitution, for the first time in Japan’s history, was founded on the principle 
of popular sovereignty: It was proclaimed in the name of all Japanese and declared 
that the sovereign power resides with the people. This statement was particularly 
significant as Japan’s previous constitution claimed that sovereignty resided with the 
Emperor.462 The new constitution also stated that: 
“The government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for 
which is derived from the people, the powers of which are 
exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of 
which are enjoyed by the people.”463  
 
It was claimed that the above statement was a universal principle of mankind upon 
which the new constitution was founded. The Preamble of the Constitution also 
declared that the laws of political morality are universal. In other words, Japan’s new 
constitution was founded in the context of Western values, offering full protection of 
the rights of individuals as fundamental human rights and guaranteeing 
representative democracy. In line with these new values, the Meiji Constitution’s 
notion of imperial subject (shinmin) was also changed to the notion of citizen or 
national (kokumin). 
The initial concept of the constitution as the supreme law of the nation was 
originally developed in the United Kingdom, but the first actual constitution was 
enacted as a supreme national law in the United States after its independence in 1787. 
It was followed by the 1791 constitution of France after the French Revolution. Both 
the notion of a national constitution and its putting into practice were based on the 
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concept of the power of the people, on the concept of individual and fundamental 
human rights, and its aim was to guarantee liberal democratic decision-making by 
putting restraints on the power of the government and not on private power. In other 
words, the primary purpose of these nations’ constitutions was to guarantee various 
rights of their citizens such as freedom of speech, religion, assembly, and to keep 
government power over citizens checked and limited. By adopting its new 
constitution, Japan joined this group of Western nations soon after the end of the 
Pacific War, acknowledging the significance of what were later to be referred to as 
universal values. 
The current Japanese constitution has never been amended since its 
promulgation in 1946. This is largely because it was designed in a way that made 
any amendment difficult, requiring firstly a two-third majority of votes in both 
Houses of the Diet and then approval by a majority vote by the Japanese public in a 
national referendum. Specifically, any amendment to the constitution could only be:  
“initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or 
more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be 
submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the 
affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon.”464 
 
While the above described events that led up to the creation of Japan’s post-war 
constitution clearly indicate the Japanese elite’s resistance to change, the country’s 
new constitution based on Western ideals was widely accepted and embraced by the 
Japanese general public. Nevertheless, Japan’s long-time ruling political party, the 
LDP, has since its founding in 1955 aimed to change the constitution many times, 
arguing that it was imposed upon Japan by foreign powers. In fact, the idea of 
changing the constitution is so deeply embedded in the thinking of the LDP that it 
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has been one of the party’s principles since its inception in 1955.465 Owing to the 
strict amendment requirements posited in the current constitution, however, all the 
LDP’s attempts to change it have been unsuccessful to date. 
 
The LDP’s Draft Constitution 
In 2004, the LDP created a Constitution Drafting Committee. Based on this 
committee’s suggestions, the LDP released its first draft proposal to reform the 
Constitution in November 2005, when the party celebrated its fiftieth anniversary.466 
Nevertheless, the draft proposal was shelved for years thereafter and was never 
presented to the Diet or to the public, and therefore never generated any significant 
discussion. 
It was not until 2012 that the LDP’s draft proposal gained political momentum. 
In the lead-up to the political elections of December 2012, the party published its 
second draft called the ‘Draft Reform of the Japanese Constitution’ (Nihonkoku 
kenpō kaisei sōan), which presented a much more detailed set of the party’s 
proposed revisions of the current constitution.467 Since the LDP had sought a revision 
of the post-war constitution for almost six decades, it is not surprising that the date 
of the release of its proposed constitutional draft, 28th of April 2012, was not simply 
a randomly selected day: the date coincided with the 60th anniversary of the end of 
Japan’s occupation by the Allied powers. The LDP also went on to release an 88-
page-long Q&A pamphlet in October 2012 with the intention of explaining the 
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language of its draft proposal, since ordinary Japanese readers might find it 
complicated.468 
The LDP’s 2012 draft proposal would affect most of the 103 articles of the 
current Constitution, with many deleted sections and added texts.469 While many of 
the amendments appear to result in minor changes to the 1947 Constitution, the draft 
also contains a number of proposals that appear to fundamentally alter the spirit of 
the post-war Constitution, which, should the draft become legislation, would result 
in significant changes in the delicate balance of power between the Japanese 
government and Japan’s civil society. 
While Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and the LDP’s top leaders have never fully 
endorsed the draft, at least not in public, the fact that it was uploaded to the LDP’s 
website and that the party has gone to such lengths that it even issued an 88-page-
long Q&A document to explain the proposed changes shows that the draft is much 
more than a simple experimental exercise and it does have a great significance.470 
Moreover, the LDP not only established an official body, the so-called Headquarters 
for the Promotion of Revision to the Constitution, to discuss and promote the idea of 
a new constitution, but its chairman, Okiharu Yasuoka, stated that the draft “clarifies 
the party’s tentative stance” on constitutional revision and it will therefore  remain 
an “official document” of the LDP,  to which its “lawmakers are welcome to refer 
when drawing up new proposals.”471 In line with Yasuoka’s October 2016 statement, 
the draft has since been continuously available on the LDP’s homepage. 
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Taking a closer look at some of the proposed changes sheds light on how the 
original values advocated and upheld by Japan’s post-war Constitution are perceived 
by the LDP. To begin with, I compare the proposed preamble of the LDP’s 2012 
draft constitution with the wording of the existing Constitution’s preamble. 
 
The Preamble 
The Preamble of Japan’s current Constitution reads: 
“We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected 
representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall 
secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful 
cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty 
throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be 
visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, 
do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do 
firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of 
the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the 
powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the 
people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This 
is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution 
is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, 
ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith. 
We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply 
conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and 
we have determined to preserve our security and existence, 
trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the 
world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international 
society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment 
of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time 
from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have 
the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. 
We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that 
laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to 
such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their 
own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with 
other nations. 
We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish 
these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.”472 
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To summarize, the 1947 Preamble focuses on the sovereignty of the Japanese people 
and their determination to achieve peace with all countries and aims to secure these 
for generations to come. It states that the government represents the will of people, 
its authority is derived from the people, and that it shall strive to work for the benefit 
of the people. The Preamble also implies that the 1947 Constitution was created in 
the spirit of this principle, which is not unique to Japan but rather represents a 
universal principle of all mankind. The Preamble openly rejects all legislations that 
are in conflict with these universal principles, and it is founded on the implicit belief 
that the laws of morality are universal. In contrast, the preamble of the LDP’s 2012 
draft sets out a remarkably different tone: 
“Japan is a nation with a long history and a unique culture, with 
the Emperor symbolising the unity of the people. Besides the 
sovereignty of the people, governance is based on the separation 
of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Our country, 
having developed through overcoming devastations of previous 
wars and a number of natural disasters, now occupies an 
important place in international society, besides being pacifist, 
promotes friendly relations with foreign countries and 
contributes to the peace and prosperity of the world. The 
Japanese people protect their country and birthplace with pride 
and a strong spirit, respect fundamental human rights and peace, 
and families and the whole of society work together to create the 
national family. We respect freedom and the rule of law, protect 
our beautiful national territory and nature, promote education, 
science and technology, and grow our country through vital 
economic activity. The Japanese people created this constitution 
in order to pass on our traditions and country to our 
grandchildren for eternity.”473 
 
Taking a closer look at the text of the two preambles reveals significant differences. 
Firstly, it strikes the reader that there are important statements in the current 
Constitution that are completely removed from the proposed draft, such as “we, the 
Japanese people (…) proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people,” as well 
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as the “government is a sacred trust of the people” which is a “universal principle of 
mankind,” and that the Japanese people “have determined to preserve our security 
and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the 
world.” 
From its very first sentence it seems clear that the focus of the LDP’s proposed 
preamble is given more to Japan’s own history and the country’s uniqueness than to 
the universal principles underlying the 1946 preamble. The figure of the Emperor 
assumes an essential role in the preamble by being the symbol of the unity of the 
Japanese people, invoking times when the Emperor was the head of state and was at 
the core of Japan’s national identity. The preamble goes on to indicate that it is the 
duty of the Japanese people to protect their country and beautiful national territory 
while respecting peace and aiming for friendly relations with other countries. The 
focus here has shifted towards protecting the national family and preserving Japan’s 
traditions, and also towards passing on those traditions to future generations, 
although leaving unspecified what those traditions might be. 
The focus of the current Constitution is clearly on universal principles: These 
define Japan’s place in international society, and the Japanese peoples’ desire for 
peace for all time and their peaceful cooperation with all nations are founded on 
these very principles. In contrast, the new draft brings the emphasis back to a much 
more narrowly defined nation-state centred approach in which protecting traditions 
appears to override the principles of international society and the notion of universal 
values. 
In an apparent attempt to significantly alter the checks and balances guaranteed 
by the current Constitution, the LDP’s draft deletes the full text of Article 3 which 
declares that the “advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of 
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the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefore.”474 A 
part of the current Article 4 which states that the “Emperor may delegate the 
performance of his acts in matters of state as may be provided by law”475 is also 
omitted. These proposed changes would remove an important legal restraint that 
guarantees the power of the government over the actions of the Emperor, thereby 
allowing more autonomy for the Emperor and, by extension, the Imperial Household 
to act in matters of the Japanese state. 
The Preamble of the LDP’s 2012 draft already calls the universality of human 
rights into question by focusing on the differences that make Japan unique in relation 
to other countries and by putting the figure of the Emperor as the defining symbol of 
the unity of the people. 
 
The most significant value changes proposed by the LDP 
As far as the Japanese people’s rights are concerned, the LDP’s Q&A Pamphlet 
explains that: 
“rights are gradually formulated through the history, 
tradition and culture of each community. Therefore we 
believe that the provisions concerning human rights 
should reflect the history, culture and tradition of 
Japan.”476 
 
While the pamphlet does not provide any definition or immediate explanation as to 
how Japan’s unique culture and tradition-based human rights might be different from 
the universal human rights, it does imply that a new, Japan-specific set of human 
rights would have significant implications for the Japanese people, and, by extension, 
for Japan’s relations with the rest of the world. 
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Recognition of the universal nature of human rights is the fundamental 
principle that underlies the post-war global human rights regime. Article 1. of the 
1945 Charter of the United Nations promotes and encourages ‘respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion’ as one of the organization’s four primary purposes.477 
In 1948, a year after Japan’s Constitution came into effect, the UN General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 217A, generally known as the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. The declaration claims to be a ‘common standard of achievements 
for all peoples and all nations’, and sets out that fundamental human rights are to be 
“universally protected.”478 Its Preamble declares that “the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world” and that every member state shall strive to “promote respect for 
these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, 
(…) secure their universal and effective recognition and observance.”479 While the 
LDP’s Q&A does not address what unique historical and traditional aspects of 
Japanese culture should serve as a basis of Japan’s nation-specific human rights, 
abandoning the UN’s notion of universal human rights would have significant 
implications for the Japanese people and may affect Japan’s conduct of its 
international relations. Other proposed changes in the draft constitution also indicate 
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Reinstating kimigayo and hinomaru as national symbols 
Article 3 of the LDP’s draft proposes that ‘the national flag is the rising sun and the 
national anthem is kimigayo,’ and that the Japanese people ‘must respect the national 
flag and the national anthem.’480 
The rising sun flag (nisshōki) and the anthem (kimigayo) have represented 
Japan unofficially since at least the early years of the Meiji period, and both symbols 
are linked to past Japanese militarism and imperialism. Kimigayo literally means the 
‘Reign of Your Majesty’. According to the Japanese Cabinet’s research office, the 
rising sun, refererred to as hinomaru or nisshōki, first appeared in Japanese literature 
in the late Heian period (12th century), when the Tale of Heike cited warriors 
carrying military fans with a hinomaru emblem on them.481 The national anthem was 
first played on the Meiji Emperor’s birthday in 1880, at the dawn of Japanese 
militarism. The Ministry of Education incorporated the anthem into the public school 
curriculum and required that it be sung at public school ceremonies from 1893.482 
The anthem’s text praises the Emperor’s rule and wishes him eternal prosperity. 
The rising sun and the anthem were already formally recognized as national 
symbols with the promulgation of the Act on National Flag and Anthem (Kokki 
Oyobi Kokka ni Kansuru Hōritsu) on 13 August 1999.483  The legislation was 
considered to be one of the most controversial of the 1990s, lacking widespread 
support from both Diet members and the general public to the extent that, upon its 
passing, then Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi and other LDP leaders promised that it 
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would not entail any mandatory duties.484 In fact, the Japanese government decided 
not to specify on what occasions and how hinomaru and kimigayo were to be used, 
and it did not make their observance mandatory because of its concerns that the bill 
would not pass.485 One of the strongest oppositions against the bill came from the 
Japan Teachers’ Union, yet the Ministry of Education made hoisting the flag and 
singing the anthem mandatory at school ceremonies. This was something that many 
teachers refused to do, as they regarded such ceremonies as a revival of rituals that 
encouraged militarism and imperialism in Japan’s not-so-distant past. As a result of 
their non-compliance, the Tokyo Prefectural Education Board - whose members are 
appointed by the governor of Tokyo - punished more than 200 teachers who acted 
against the Ministry’s policy at school graduation ceremonies by removing them 
from classrooms and cutting their salaries.486  These punishments of public school 
teachers were imposed by local governments that were headed by conservative-
nationalist politicians such as Tokyo’s Governor Shintarō Ishihara, but the LDP’s 
draft constitution would take this issue one significant step further by proposing to 
empower the central government to exercise the right of punishment for any form of 
such disobedience by Japan’s entire population. 
Overall, the LDP proposes to embed kimigayo and hinomaru into the 
constitution as the mandatory symbols of the state, and it also wants to make it the 
duty of all Japanese to pay due respect to them. Besides having created much 
controversy in Japan, the pressure to use the above symbols compulsorily even had a 
victim in 1999, when Toshihiro Ishikawa, a public high school principal in 
Hiroshima, hanged himself in his home the day before his school’s graduation 
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ceremony. He was enmeshed in a dilemma between “instructions” coming from his 
local education board to fly the nisshōki and sing kimigayo and, on the other hand, to 
honour demands by some of the teachers and students that he not obey the 
instructions.487 
 
Elevating the status of the Emperor and Shinto 
Before the present constitution was promulgated in November 1946, Japan was 
governed under the Imperial Constitution of 1889, often referred to as the ‘Meiji 
Constitution’. Sovereignty was then in the hands of the Emperor, who claimed to 
rule by divine right. He held supreme power, while all popular rights were 
circumscribed and the duty of people to serve and obey him was absolute. In sharp 
contrast, the post-war constitution proclaimed the sovereignty of the people, defined 
a set of unequivocal rights, established formal separation of powers and also a strict 
separation of state and religion, and declared pacifism to be a central policy of the 
state. 
The LDP’s draft would amend Article 1 of the Constitution by proposing that 
the Emperor shall not only be the symbolic figure of the State and of the unity of the 
Japanese people, but also “the head of the State.”488 In addition to that, Article 6 of 
the draft states that the Emperor shall “attend ceremonies held by the State, local 
governments or other public entities, and shall perform other public activities.”489 
Interestingly, while the first article of the LDP’s constitution begins with elevating 
the status of the Emperor, mention of him disappears in Article 102, which currently 
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declares that the “Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of 
the Diet, judges, and all other public officials” are obliged to respect and uphold 
Japan’s Constitution. 490 References to the Emperor and the Regent are omitted from 
the LDP’s draft and replaced with “all people.”491 While the Emperor does not have 
any real political power according to the current Constitution, by declaring him head 
of State and stating explicitly that he shall attend ceremonies of the State and of 
other political and public entities, the LDP clearly aims to elevate the status of the 
Emperor and make him more visible in Japanese society. At the same time, the 
LDP’s draft is unclear on whether the Emperor should respect and uphold Japan’s 
constitution, leaving open the possibility that he might be positioned above the 
binding powers of the constitution. 
This is all the more concerning since, in Japan’s first modern constitution, the 
Meiji Emperor was an active ruler who held considerable political power and the 
military-industrial modernization of the nation was carried out in his name, setting 
Japan on a path that ultimately led to the catastrophic events of the Pacific War. The 
Meiji government also designated Japan’s native religion, Shinto, as the state 
religion, exploiting it to serve as a lynchpin of state ideology in which Shinto priests 
were encouraged in carrying out their religious practices to emphasize the Emperor 
as a divine being.492 While Japan’s current constitution guarantees full freedom of 
religion and separates state from church, Article 20 of the LDP’s draft would allow 
the “State, local governments and other public entities” to participate in certain 
religious rituals, as long as they “do not exceed the scope of social rituals or 
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customary practices.”493 Article 89 of the current constitution prohibits the use of any 
public money or other property to “be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit 
or maintenance of any religious institution or association.”494 The LDP’s draft would 
make the state, local governments and other public entities exempt from this rule, as 
long as this does not conflict with the stipulations of the above mentioned Article 20 
of the LDP draft.495 The proposed changes to articles 20 and 89 would practically 
allow for the state to finance traditional religious, in other words Shinto and 
Buddhist, institutions and associations to perform customary social practices and 
religious activities. In other words, public money could now be given to religious 
institutions as long as the state has supervision, and presumably a certain level of 
control, over the way that money is spent, which borders on breaching the current 
constitution’s mandatory separation of state and church and explicit guarantee of 
religious freedom. 
While the LDP’s draft is still far from aiming to restore the power of the 
Emperor to anything close to that declared in the Meiji Constitution, or to re-
establish Shinto as the state religion, it is clear that the LDP wants both to play a 
more significant role in Japanese society. In fact, the LDP’s leader and Prime 
Minister Shinzō Abe has a central role in a number of political groups that have 
close ties with Shinto organizations or with conservative right-wing groups that 
believe Japan’s unique national character and values are based on ancient traditions 
such as Shinto and the traditional central role of the Emperor, and who in turn argue 
that these should be central again in organizing state and society in Japan. For 
example, Abe is a member of the liaison group of Diet members that was formed to 
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cooperate with the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership (SASL). SASL is the 
main group or “mother body” (botai) of Jinja Honchō, the Association of Shinto 
Shrines, that was established after the Second World War and incorporates more 
than 80,000 Shinto shrines across the country. The latter is by far the largest Shinto 
organization in Japan. It was founded as an umbrella organization of Shinto shrines 
and promotes the religion and its main temple, the Grand Ise Shrine, as the “Soul of 
Japan.”496 Among SASL’s major goals are to “proudly show to the world the 
Imperial Family and create a society that values Japan’s cultural tradition,” to “create 
a proud new Constitution that is based on Japan’s history and national character,” 
and to “establish state rituals that revere the heroes of Yasukuni [Shrine].”497 Most 
remarkably, Abe was the head of the SASL’s parliamentary liaison group, Shinseiren 
Giinkon, in 2012, at the time when the LDP’s draft constitution was published.498 
The liaison group’s influence on Japanese lawmakers is significant: in 2016, 19 of 
the Abe Cabinet’s 20 ministers and more than 300 politicians of the Japanese Diet 
were active members of the group.499 
It is not surprising that one of Abe’s long-time and fundamental political goals, 
that he inherited from his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi, a wartime leader and Class A 
war crime suspect, has been to “escape from the post-war regime”: to reverse the 
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political reforms introduced to Japan during the post-war Allied occupation.500 These 
goals were first laid out in detail in Abe’s aforementioned book Towards a Beautiful 
Country, which is widely considered to be written as his political manifesto. His 
visions for Japan are very similar to the ones that are promoted by groups like the 
Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership.  
Abe, along with the majority of his Cabinet members, is also a member of 
Nippon Kaigi, or the Japan Conference, which is Japan’s largest and most powerful 
conservative right-wing organization.501  Nippon Kaigi’s ideological foundations are 
rooted in two major modern Japanese religious organizations, of which one is the 
aforementioned Jinja Honchō, the Association of Shinto Shrines.502 Nippon Kaigi’s 
agendas are thought to be closely aligned with Abe’s political views, most notably 
with his aim to revise Japan’s post-war Constitution.503 As the organization’s website 
states, Nippon Kaigi’s first two major goals are to restore the pride of the Imperial 
Family on which the Japanese nation was built and promote the worship of the 
imperial family accordingly, and to repeal Japan’s current constitution that was 
created by the post-war occupying forces and replace it with a new constitution that 
reflects the history and traditions of Japan.504 Nippon Kaigi was founded in 1997 by a 
merger of two earlier groups: the Society for the Protection of Japan (Nihon wo 
Mamoru Kai) and the People’s Conference to Protect Japan (Nihon wo Mamoru 
Kokumin Kaigi). The former group was created as a union of Shinto and Buddhist 
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organizations, and the latter consisted of right-wing activists, business leaders and 
Imperial Army veterans, whose aim was to make the Emperor the head of state again 
and change the constitution.505 Significantly, Article 1 of the LDP’s draft explicitly 
proposes the Emperor to be ‘the head of the State’.506  While Nippon Kaigi does not 
appear to have a wide supporting base among the Japanese population, it does have a 
strong and direct influence in the Japanese Diet through its direct connections of the 
280 members of the Parliamentary League for Nippon Kaigi (Kokkai Giin 
Kondankai), of which Abe is a special advisor, and the Local Assembly Union 
(Nippon Kaigi Chihō Giin Renmei).507 Among the positions advocated by such 
conservative right-wing groups as the Nippon Kaigi are that Japan should be 
applauded for liberating much of East Asia from Western colonial powers, that the 
1946-1948 Tokyo War Crimes tribunals were illegitimate, and that the killings by 
Imperial Japanese troops during the 1937 “Nanjing massacre” were exaggerated or 
fabricated.508 This is all the more disturbing since Nippon Kaigi’s presidents are 
usually high-profile public figures, with professor emeritus Tadae Takubo being the 
current chairman, succeeding Tōru Miyoshi, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court. 509  In fact, many of the Japanese academics who are proponents of 
constitutional change are also members of Nippon Kaigi. For instance, when public 
protests erupted against the LDP-proposed constitutional revision, Cabinet Secretary 
Yoshihide Suga claimed that a number of constitutional scholars also supported the 
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proposed changes. He cited three academics, all of whom turned out to be Nippon 
Kaigi members. These academics also happened to be members of Nippon Kaigi’s 
two offshoot organizations: the National Society to Create a Constitution for a 
Beautiful Japan (Utsukushii Nihon no Kenpo wo Tsukuru Kokumin no Kai), and the 
Association of Experts on the Constitution for 21st Century Japan (21 Seiki no Nihon 
to Kenpō Yūshikisha Kaigi).510 As their names indicate, both organization’s major 
aims are to change the constitution and create a society that is based on reviving 
Japan’s traditional values. It was also conservative right-wing groups, forerunners of 
Nippon Kaigi, that successfully pushed through the 1999 law that recognized 
hinomaru and kimigayo as Japan’s official national flag and anthem, respectively.511 
It was these groups’ activists who collected 5.2 million signatures opposing the 
famous Murayama Statement, which is widely regarded as Japan’s strongest official 
apology to its neighbors on its wartime conduct to date, and who campaigned to 
collect 10 million signatures to revise Japan’s constitution.512 In November 2015 the 
above-mentioned Nippon Kaigi-affiliated group, the National Society to Create a 
Constitution for a Beautiful Japan, packed Tokyo’s Nippon Budōkan Hall in an effort 
to collect the 10 million signatures supporting constitutional change. By that time, 
the group had collected 4.45 million signatures, including those of 422 Diet 
members. The rally was greeted by PM Abe, whose congratulatory video message 
was played in front of a crowd of more than 11,000 people. In his message, Abe said 
that “…the time has come to seek a Constitution suitable for the 21st century,” and 
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proposed that proponents of a new constitution make ”steady steps toward 
[constitutional] revision.”513 
It is clear that the aforementioned conservative and right-wing groups are 
influential and instrumental among Diet lawmakers in pushing for constitutional 
change. By holding the highest ranks in some of these groups and attending their 
meetings, PM Abe is one of the most closely affiliated and influenced politicians 
among all Diet members. 
 
Public order versus public freedom and individual rights 
While Article 12 of the LDP’s draft constitution maintains the guarantee of the 
freedoms and rights of the people, as worded in the current constitution, it then adds 
that the people “shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights, shall be 
aware of the fact that there are responsibilities and duties that accompany these 
freedoms and rights, and shall not infringe the public interest and public order.”514 
While the draft does not clarify those responsibilities and duties, it stipulates that 
people’s freedoms and rights shall be subordinated to the public interest and public 
order. Although the public interest and order also remain undefined in the draft, the 
LDP’s Q&A pamphlet does provide some clarification: the notion of “public order” 
(kō no chitsujo) equals ‘social order’ (shakai chitsujo), which is further defined as 
“peaceful social life” (heion na shakai seikatsu). In addition to rewriting Article 12, 
in its attempt that appears to strengthen the purpose of restricting public freedoms, 
the LDP’s draft also proposes to amend Article 21. The related passage of the current 
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constitution says that “freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press 
and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.” The LDP would add to this that 
“engaging in activities with the purpose of damaging the public interest or public 
order, or associating with others for such purposes, shall not be recognized.”515 
On the one hand, maintaining public order is clearly in the interest of every 
Japanese citizen. On the other hand, however, a revised Article 12 and 21 can be a 
powerful tool in the hands of the government, giving it the right to suppress freedom 
of speech, association of individuals and public assembly in the name of public order 
and interest. It could dissolve public protests and political demonstrations, or even 
stop them from happening in the first place as it sees fit, arguing that these could 
cause disturbance to the general public, including obstructing traffic or upsetting 
members of the public in one way or another. A fundamental right in any democratic 
society is the freedom to speak out and protest against, or for, public issues and 
policies, and by doing so, some level of inconvenience caused to other members of 
society is simply unavoidable. By removing the individual’s constitutional protection 
for the right of association, anyone affiliated with a group whose protest is deemed 
unlawful by the government can be prosecuted on the grounds that they are 
associated with the group in question, whether or not they are physically part of the 
protest. There is no doubt that any government committed to democratic values 
should understand and accept this and should therefore not try to limit the right of 
members of the public to give voice to their opinion. The new draft also calls into 
question the freedom of the press, public thinkers, scholars and academics. To what 
extent will expressing their opinion on public matters be deemed by the government 
unlawful is unclear, but the LDP’s draft would put in place legal barriers to their 
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intellectual freedom and their ability to openly express dissenting views on certain 
issues, particularly in case those are highly critical of the government.  
Freedom of expression is already a contested issue in Japan, with NGO 
Reporters Without Borders ranking the country 72nd out of 180, one of the lowest 
among the developed countries, in its 2017 World Press Freedom Index.516 Japan’s 
ranking is not only by far the lowest among the G7 countries, but it shows an 
alarming drop from its number eleven spot in 2010. Examples for a growing state 
control over the Japanese media are numerous. In October 2014 it was reported that 
NHK, Japan’s national broadcaster, sent a notice to journalists on its English-
language services which allegedly banned any references to the Nanking massacre 
and to the Japanese use of “comfort women” (ianfu), the euphemism used to refer to 
wartime sex slaves recruited or kidnapped by Japan’s Imperial Army. Both issues are 
regarded as highly controversial among Japan’s neighbors, particularly in China and 
in the two Koreas. As Sophia University’s professor Kōichi Nakano observed, with 
its new leadership having close ties with the LDP, the NHK is becoming 
“increasingly like a mirror of CCTV,” China’s state broadcaster, and turning into a 
tool of the Japanese government.517 
In the LDP’s further attempt to redefine the current Japanese constitution’s 
notion of fundamental human rights, its draft proposes to fully delete the following 
passage from Article 97: “The fundamental human rights by this Constitution 
guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age- old struggle of man to be free; 
they have survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this 
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and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate.” 518 The LDP’s Q&A 
pamphlet does not provide any explanation as to why the paragraph is omitted from 
the draft. Nevertheless, based on its proposed changes to Article 12 and 21, we can 
assume that the issue here was the age-old struggle of man to be free, which can be 
regarded as a universal motivation of all mankind to seek for the truth, break away 
from ignorance by critical thinking and challenge the power of any authoritarian 
power structure that attempts to control personal and societal freedom. If the passage 
was left in the constitution as it is, it could encourage various forms of criticism and 
struggle against the power of the state. Maintaining public interest and public order 
as unilaterally defined by the state clearly overrides civil rights and popular struggle. 
 
Eliminating the notion of the “individual” and defining new duties for the 
people 
Article 13 of the current constitution states that “All of the people shall be respected 
as individuals,” and that they have the “right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.” This notion of individual freedoms and goals originally comes from 
Western societies’ “age-old struggle” for individual freedoms emerging from the 
French Revolution, and it also provided a strong ideological foundation for the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence.519 The LDP proposes to change the word “individual” 
(kojin) to “person” (hito). Just as when it rejected the notion of universal human 
rights and replaced them with Japan-specific rights derived from the nation’s culture 
and traditions, the LDP’s aim here again appears to go against the Western theory of 
natural - inalienable - human rights, something that the Japanese government 
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considers so important in its views of China. The LDP’s Q&A booklet provides 
some further explanation: “The current Constitution includes some provisions based 
on the Western theory of natural rights. We think that those provisions need to be 
revised.”520 The proposal of turning individuals into persons may seem harmless on 
the face of it, but it recalls Japan’s traditional social values, and how people were 
positioned in the hierarchic system of the family, the society, and ultimately the state. 
Yōichi Higuchi, a constitutional scholar at the University of Tokyo, points out that 
the concept of the ‘individual’ did not exist in pre-war Japan and it was the current 
constitution that put an end to the patriarchal family system by creating the notion of 
the individual and granting rights to the concept.521 As Kazuyuki Takahashi of the 
University of Tokyo, a leading law scholar puts it: 
“Before we learned the idea [of constitutionalism] 
from Westerners, we did not know the idea of 
imposing law on rulers. Law had always come from 
rulers; obedience to the law had been a virtue of the 
people; rulers had ruled by law instead of being 
ruled by law.”522 
 
Indeed, there is clearly a shift in the LDP’s draft from emphasizing the importance of 
the individual rights of the citizens towards making the people’s duties uniform; in 
other words, giving more power to the state over its citizens while weakening the 
rights of the individuals to keep the power of the government at bay. 
With the proposed elevated status of the Emperor, state sponsorship of 
traditional religious events, curbing human rights and freedoms and now turning the 
individual into a person, the LDP’s aim appears to be to dissolve the autonomous 
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and critically-thinking individual into a more generalized and uniformist, group-
oriented and obedient person, resulting in a reduced vitality of Japanese citizens and 
in a less self-conscious civil society that could actively challenge the government, 
particularly in cases of its possible abuse of power. This view of the individual is a 
big step back towards the notion of imperial subjects under the Meiji Constitution. 
 
The family as the “natural and fundamental unit of society” 
Article 24 of the current constitution sets out the basic principles regarding family 
and marriage. The LDP’s draft would amend the article by declaring that the “family 
shall be respected as the natural and fundamental unit of society,” and that “family 
members must support each other.”523 
The LDP’s aim of rejecting people’s rights as individuals - who are respected 
as being the sovereign social unit - and instead attempting to create a society based 
on the more uniformalised notion of “persons” is apparent in its proposal to amend 
Article 13 of the current constitution, as discussed above. This purpose would be 
further served by replacing the individual, or person, with the family as the basic unit 
of society. The centrality of family, or household (ie) system, is indeed a long-
standing and fundamental feature of traditional Japanese society, and the family was 
codified in the 1890 Meiji Constitution and Civil Code as the smallest unit of society. 
Historically, however, the head of the house and the dominant figure of the family 
was the male, who not only maintained and managed issues of the household, but 
also protected, supervised, and represented other members of the family. The 
traditional ie system was also defined by a gender-based division of labour and other 
roles that every member of the household was expected to uphold. 
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Some scholars make the point that while Japan’s current constitution does 
guarantee the rights of husband and wife as equals, the ie system still appears to 
persist both as an extra-legal set of customary practices and as a legal entity through 
the koseki, or household registration system, making the patriarchal extended family 
household positioned to still practically be the primary social unit in today’s Japan.524 
The LDP’s aim appears to be to reinstate some of the historical roles of the family 
instead of to eradicate remnants of centuries-old practices in order to create a more 
egalitarian society. 
 
Granting new powers to the Prime Minister 
Article 41 of the Japanese constitution stipulates that the Diet shall be the highest 
organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.525 Article 
66 adds to this that, in exercising the executive power, the Cabinet shall be 
collectively responsible to the Diet.526 In other words, the government’s power is 
currently limited by the Japanese Diet, as  would be the case in any constitutional 
democracy. The LDP’s draft, however, appears to also do away with this important 
limitation and give special powers to the prime minister and the Cabinet. Article 98 
of the party’s draft proposes that the prime minister shall have a special right to issue 
a declaration of a state of emergency in case of an event of armed attack on Japan, 
“disturbances of the social order due to internal strife (…) large-scale natural 
disasters due to earthquakes, etc., or other states of emergency.”527 
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Firstly, this is a very broad range of circumstances. Secondly, those cases 
allowing for the government to declare a national emergency are not clearly defined. 
Would the government use its power to declare emergency in such cases as a nuclear 
accident (e.g. the recent one in Fukushima), in case of a North Korean missile test 
(e.g. the one that flew through Japanese airspace in August 2017), an incident with 
China (e.g. in case of the reignited territorial disputes around the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands with China, such as in 2010, when a Chinese fishing boat rammed a Japanese 
coast guard ship in waters administered by Japan), a large-scale domestic protest (e.g. 
the ongoing nation-wide street protests against the use of any nuclear power in 
Japan)? 
This is all left unclear in the draft. What is made clear, however, is that the 
government would have the right to do so. While Article 98 also proposes that a 
prior or a subsequent approval of the Diet is needed for declaring a state of 
emergency, the reality is that any government that has a simple majority in the Diet, 
which normally is the case, could push through such an approval. According to this 
proposal, any prime minister would have 100 days before they need an approval for 
extension of the national emergency, during which time the Diet would be 
dysfunctional. This process could be repeated for as long as the prime minister and 
the Cabinet sees fit, and again: with a simple majority vote in the Diet, which would 
resume for the time of voting. Furthermore, Article 99 of the LDP’s draft proposes 
that when a state of emergency has been decreed, the Cabinet would have the power 
to enact orders having an effect equivalent to that of law, while the prime minister 
could issue necessary orders to chief executive officers to local governments, and 
every person shall be subject to the orders of the State and other public organs. 528 
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In other words, while the Diet would be dysfunctional during a declared state 
of national emergency, the prime minister and their Cabinet would be given full 
power to run the country without the control of the Diet. This would allow the 
government to make decisions without any transparency, including those decisions 
challenged by members of the opposition parties, as  would normally be the case 
during any Diet session. The lack of parliamentary debates would mean that general 
members of the public would also be left uninformed, as there would not be any 
televised parliamentary debates discussing the pros and cons of any proposed bills. 
While the LDP’s proposal would uphold earlier provisions regarding basic human 
rights during a state of emergency, one would assume that those rights could be 
limited even further on the basis of the priority of public interest and public order. 
 
The end of the Peace Constitution? Article 9 
Article 9 of the current constitution is widely regarded as a fundamental guarantee 
that Japan will remain a peaceful and peace-observing nation. It states the Japanese 
people’s sincere aspirations to uphold international peace based on justice and order, 
and declares that the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of 
the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes, 
concluding accordingly that land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, 
will never be maintained.529 For this simple, clear and firm declaration, Japan’s post-
war constitution is also referred to as a pacifist, or peace, constitution. The LDP 
intends to make significant changes to Article 9, to the extent that the constitution 
itself may no longer be considered a guarantee of peace. Firstly, it proposes that the 
word “forever” be omitted from the text, which would make the Japanese people’s 
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intention to renounce war as a sovereign right of the state not permanent but 
temporary and subject to change depending on the circumstances. Secondly, the draft 
deletes the passage that prohibits maintaining land, air and sea forces and the state’s 
right to belligerency. Thirdly, and accordingly, the draft would allow Japan the right 
to exercise self-defence and, in order to achieve that, it proposes that a “National 
Defence Military shall be retained with the Prime Minister as the supreme 
commander.”530 Moreover, this military force shall conduct international cooperative 
activities, as well as maintain public order.531 In other words, the LDP’s draft would 
allow Japan to maintain a military force that it could deploy beyond its borders, as 
long as an argument for self-defense can be made, but also domestically, as long as 
an argument about threats to the public order can be made. Furthermore, Article 66 
of the current constitution states that the prime minister and other ministers of the 
state must be civilians, but the LDP’s draft would allow these positions to be filled 
by military personnel as well, as long as they are not on active duty.532 
 Overall, the LDP’s proposal to change Article 9 would allow for the Japanese 
government to legally deploy a proper military force overseas in case of conflict, but 
also to use its military domestically against its own population, should the overriding 
principle of maintaining public order require that. When the new powers proposed 
for the prime minister and the Cabinet in case of a state emergency are added to this, 
the risk of engaging in a military conflict overseas and the possibility of abusing the 
state’s power over its own domestic population would be much higher, and even 
constitutionally allowed for. 
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Paving the way for future constitutional changes 
As stated earlier in this chapter, changes to Japan’s current constitution have never 
been made since its 1947 promulgation. The reasons lie in Japan’s complicated 
political system and also in the fact that Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution 
requires at least a two-thirds majority vote in both houses in order to make any 
constitutional amendments. Article 100 of the LDP’s draft proposes to lower the bar 
for any changes to a simple majority vote in both the House of Representatives and 
the House of Councillors before putting changes up for a majority popular vote. As 
Lawrence Repeta, professor of law at Meiji University and director of the Japan 
Civil Liberties Union, points out, the reason for keeping the bar to make any 
constitutional changes at a two-thirds supermajority vote is that individual rights 
such as the right to freedom of expression and religious freedom are so fundamental 
to the functioning of a free society and democratic government that those should not 
be subject to change by a simple majority vote.533 
The constitution should not be so easily subject to changes in any healthy 
democracy, especially when public opinion can sway so quickly at times of stress, 
resulting in temporary majorities of political coalitions. If any government of the day 
could so easily change the constitution, people’s belief in democratic values and 
institutions and in their fundamental rights to counter excessive governmental power 
with strong checks and balances guaranteed by the constitution would be challenged, 
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Domestic criticism of the LDP’s constitution 
While the extent of changes the LDP’s draft wants to introduce is yet to sink into the 
minds of the general public, some Japanese law experts and constitutional scholars 
have openly come out criticizing the proposal. 
Setsu Kobayashi, a professor of constitutional law at Keiō University, argues 
that the 2012 draft constitution shows that Japan’s long-ruling party, the LDP, does 
not understand at all the basics of what a (modern) constitution should be, which is 
to “protect the rights of the people from abuse of power [by the state].”534 In order to 
avoid historical incidents when entities or individuals wielded absolute power and 
used it to oppress people, modern constitutions were created to “protect citizens from 
tyranny and corruption by laying out rules that restrain governing entities,” points 
out Kobayashi.535  
Similarly, Shōjirō Sakaguchi, professor of law at Hitotsubashi University, 
points out that the LDP’s draft simply “denies individualism and the universal 
character of constitutional rights,” and concludes that it “is no exaggeration to say 
that the proposed draft is a kind of declaration of independence from Western 
constitutionalism.”536  
Some of the critics point to an even larger and ongoing problem in Japan’s 
domestic politics, something that appears to have been deeply embedded in the 
thought of many in the ruling post-war political elite. In his book Five Decades of 
Constitutionalism in Japanese Society, Yōichi Higuchi, professor emeritus at the 
University of Tokyo and a leading authority on constitutional law, argues that liberal 
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constitutional scholars in post-war Japan have been haunted by the fact that the 
political forces in power have failed to accept the legitimacy of the Constitution and 
to fully embrace constitutionalism. He explains that some Japanese conservative 
politicians often aim to defend a historic national identity and traditional values, as 
they think that  Japanese society should be based on the authority of the emperor.537  
In an apparent agreement with Kobayashi, Higuchi argues that the premise 
behind constitutionalism is that government authorities would be naturally inclined 
to abuse their power if they are left unchecked;538 therefore constitutions are made 
for the civil society to have legal means to limit the power of the state. Kobayashi 
and Higuchi both argue that this is the exact reason why Japan’s new constitution 
was put in place after the Pacific War, and why it is widely regarded as a guarantee 
to protect the right of the individual against any excessive power of the state.  
University of Tokyo philosophy professor Tetsuya Takahashi sees the biggest 
difference between Japan’s current constitution and the LDP’s draft is that the latter 
is not based on “natural human rights,” something which the former implicitly 
acknowledges people are born with. He explains that the LDP’s proposal resembles a 
top-down system in which a state led by the Emperor and a unique culture exist prior 
to the people. Ultimately, the LDP thinks human rights only exist when they are 
recognized by the state, argues Takahashi.539 The new balance of power between 
authorities and civil society guaranteed by the post-war constitution is exactly what 
the LDP appears to be willing to change significantly, in a way turning the wheels of 
history back to more authoritarian times. As Higuchi concludes, “it is no 
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exaggeration to say that if there were an enemy of democracy and freedom in post-
war Japan, it would be the LDP itself.”540 
While there has been no significant large-scale public debate about the LDP’s 
draft, some citizens’ groups have been formed to protest some of the proposed 
changes, those largely related to Article 9 that guarantees that Japan will stay on a 
peaceful path. Ryō Motoo, head of the Women’s Article 9 Association (Josei Kyūjō 
no Kai), warns that Abe is trying to “revive the mores of his grandfather’s era,” 
which she fears will result in a society full of restrictions that “does not recognize 
diversity of opinions and puts restraints on the freedom of speech as in the past.”541 
In a rare occurrence, even one lawmaker seems to agree with her point. 
“There are some in both houses (of parliament) who don’t really understand 
the role of a modern constitution (…) The constitution is there to tie the hands of 
government, not put duties on the people,” says Tarō Kōnō, member of the ruling 
LDP, who is known to challenge his party’s views at times. 
Since the late 1990s, Japan’s current prime minister, Shinzō Abe, and his right-
wing conservative base have long been calling for “getting free of the post-war 
regime” (“sengo regime karano dakkyaku”)542 By challenging the basic values and 
principles of Japan’s post-war constitution, the LDP’s draft proposal appears to aim 
to do just that, and thus to establish a nationalistic and authoritarian state whose 
powers are left largely unchecked by Japanese civil society. 
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Japan’s State Secrets Law: another significant step threatening individual and 
universal values 
Unlike the proposed new constitution that still needs to be passed, the Liberal 
Democratic Party’s comprehensive Specially Designated Secrets Protection Act 
(Tokutei Himitsu no Hogo ni Kansuru Hōritsu)543, commonly referred to as the State 
Secrets Law, has already been adopted by the Japanese Diet. The law was passed on 
6 December 2013, one year after the LDP was re-elected with a stable majority in 
both houses of the Diet. The SSL allows for the government agencies to classify a 
wide range of information as state secrets, while it introduces strict criminal 
penalties on those – bureaucrats, journalist and members of the public alike – who 
leak any information designated as a state secret in any possible form. According to 
the new law, heads of all major government organs, including the Prime Minister the 
Cabinet ministers, and even the head of the Imperial Household Agency, have the 
right to designate information as a state secret.544 The SSL lists defence, international 
relations, terrorism countermeasures, and spying on behalf of a foreign power, as the 
four categories of state secrets. However, the law does not provide a clear definition 
of what information in these categories should be defined as state secrets, and leaves 
this to be determined by the above heads of agencies instead. Article 18 provides full 
rights to the Prime Minister to set the standards of classifying and declassifying 
information, as well as to provide security clearances to state secrets.545 Although the 
prime minister is required to consult an advisory committee, that committee does not 
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have authority over the prime minister’s final decision, its recommendations are non-
binding. 
Furthermore, the SSL stipulates that the government agencies have the power 
to designate state secrets for up to 30 years, but after this period it is left up to the 
Cabinet to decide about further extension. Also, when a government agency decides 
to destroy any designated state secret, it only has to obtain the approval of the prime 
minister before doing so, but is not required to consult other agencies, including 
public ones.546  
Article 23 of the SSL strictly penalises all government officials and private 
contractors who leak any state secrets to members of the public or to the media, 
imposing a maximum prison sentence of ten years and a penalty fee of up to ten 
million yen on them.547 The SSL makes no exception in these cases. Even those 
whistle-blowers who disclose state fraud, corruption and other threats to the public 
would face serious penalties from the state, even if it could be argued that their 
actions have served the interest of the general public. Ironically, this stipulation 
seems to be in contradiction with the idea of serving the public interest above all in 
the related part of the LDP’s proposed new constitution. 
The State Secrets Law was passed hastily and without any substantial debate in 
either chamber of the Diet; neither was any consultation or feedback allowed from 
the public or from related professional associations such as Japan’s National Bar 
Organization, although the latter expressed its strong opposition to the proposed bill 
a number of times.548 There was widespread domestic criticism, ranging from public 
writers and civil rights groups to scholars and media experts. The Japan Civil 
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Liberties Union, a citizens group founded in the year Japan’s post-war constitution 
took effect, formally opposed the bill and organized a series of “emergency 
gatherings” (kinkyū shūkai) where activists and public intellectuals spoke out against 
the bill. 549  Regular anti-secrecy demonstrations were held opposite the Prime 
Minister’s Office. 
A group of 24 prominent Japanese scholars issued a declaration against the bill 
on 11 October 2013, criticising it as being unconstitutional, as something that gives 
the state extended power of secrecy and as “threatening fundamental human 
rights”.550 The online petition had gathered support from 271 constitutional, media, 
and criminal law experts from across Japan by the end of the month. With over 80 
per cent of Japan’s population opposing the bill, street protests drew crowds of up to 
10,000 people in Tokyo.551 While PM Abe said that he would quit office “if there is a 
case where news reporting is suppressed” and attempted to reassure the general 
public that the law was aimed at terrorists and spies552 instead of normal Japanese 
citizens, Shigeru Ishiba, Secretary General and second-in-command of the LDP, 
likened those who were protesting against the bill to be terrorists themselves.553 
                                               
549 Ibid. 
550 “Himitsu hogohō no seitei ni hantaisuru kenpō, mediahō, keijihō kenkyūsha no seimei no shōkai 
[Introducing the statements of constitutional, media, and criminal law experts opposing the 
implementation of the Secrets Law],“ Livedoor Blog, October 29, 2013. Accessed September 19, 
2017. http://blog.livedoor.jp/nihonkokukenpou/archives/51748396.html. 
551 Lucy Craft, “Japan's State Secrets Law: Hailed By U.S., Denounced By Japanese,” National Public 
Radio, December 31, 2013. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/12/31/258655342/japans-state-secrets-law-hailed-by-
u-s-denounced-by-japanese. 
552 Jeff Kingston, “Abe’s secrets law undermines Japan’s democracy,” The Japan Times, December 13, 
2014. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/12/13/commentary/japan-commentary/abes-secrets-
law-undermines-japans-democracy/. 
553 John Hofilena, “LDP’s Ishiba apologizes for ‘terrorism’ comment over protests to secrecy bill,” 




Despite facing an enormous domestic opposition coming from various 
segments of society, the LDP did not hold any public consultation and instead 
rammed through the bill without any significant debate in both Diet chambers. The 
law, designating 55 categories of state secrets and creating up to 460,000 state 
secrets between the 19 government offices,554 took effect a year later, in December 
2014. Kōichi Nakano, professor of political science at Sophia University, said that 
the Abe administration’s aim was to seek greater influence over the Japanese media, 
and Kaori Hayashi, a professor at Tokyo University, criticised the bill, saying that 
“[t]he definition of secret is very vague, and people, including myself, are wary of 
misuse.”555 
Many major media and law organizations, including the Japan Newspapers & 
Editors Association, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, the Japan Magazine 
Publishers Association, The Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, and the Japan 
P.E.N. Club, had also declared their opposition to the law, saying that it went against 
fundamental democratic values and principles. The June 2000 declaration of the 
Japan Newspapers & Editors Association says that 
“The public’s right to know is a universal principle 
that sustains a democratic society. That right cannot 
be ensured without the existence of media, operating 
with the guarantee of freedom of speech and 
expression, while being totally committed to a high 
moral standard and fully independent. […] Freedom 
of expression is a fundamental human right, and 
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newspapers have that absolute freedom in both their 
news coverage and editorial commentary.”556 
 
The new law would infringe upon these basic principles and values that all news 
organizations should be founded on. Similarly, Yasuhiko Tajima, media law expert 
at Sophia University, argues that the SSL allows for almost unlimited power for 
government agencies to exercise information control (jōhō tōsei). He points out that 
people’s right to know, as guaranteed by the current constitution, will only apply in 
the context of government agencies and bureaucrats, and the general public’s free 
access to information will no longer hold. He is concerned that Japan’s news 
organizations and journalists will be turned into government public relations 
agencies as their role could be reduced to simple “press release journalism” (happyō 
hōdō). Ultimately, the state secrets law will “root out and destroy” the very basic 
values of democracy, says Tajima. 557  Jeffrey Kingston, a professor at Temple 
University, adds that the lack of any independent oversight body means that 
government officials will  
“have a carte blanche to cover their tracks, and that 
state bureaucrats will designate too much 
information as “special secrets” so that their 
decisions won’t be scrutinized or second-guessed 
(…) bureaucrats have often decided against the 
public interest and now have a way to hide their 
misdeeds.”558 
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International organizations such as the Human Rights Watch, the International PEN 
Club, Reporters Without Borders, and the Open Society Justice Initiative also came 
forward criticising the SSL.559 Even the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, a position regarded as the top human rights job in the world, made a 
statement voicing her concern that the law was rushed through Japan’s Diet, that 
there was not enough clarity as to what constituted a secret, and that the bill allowed 
the Japanese government to “designate any inconvenient information as secret.”560 
Consequently, in the year the bill was accepted, Japan experienced a record 
drop of 31 places and ranked 53rd in the 2013 World Press Freedom Index. The next 
year, when the law came into effect, Japan fell a further 6 places to 59th in the same 
index, and its freefall continued with the latest index ranking Japan the 72nd nation 
out of 180, putting  it behind countries such as Namibia, Botswana, Mongolia, Niger, 
or Papua New Guinea.561 In its 2014 country analysis the Reporters Without Borders 
said that as a consequence of the SSL, “[i]nvestigative journalism, public interest 
and the confidentiality of journalists’ sources are all being sacrificed by legislators 
bent on ensuring that their country’s image is spared embarrassing revelations.”562 
Ironically, the same year the bill was accepted, the Open Society Justice 
Initiative released its Global Principles on National Security and the Right to 
Information, what became generally known as the Tshwane Principles. According to 
the Society’s statement, these principles were  
“based on international (including regional) and 
national law, standards, good practices, and the 
writings of experts...[T]hese Principles were drafted 
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by 22 organizations and academic centres in 
consultation with more than 500 experts from more 
than 70 countries at 14 meetings held around the 
world.”563 
 
The Tshwane Principles is therefore widely considered to be the most 
comprehensive document made to date that provides guidelines for setting the 
balance between the state’s national security interests and the public’s right to know. 
Sadly, Japan not only did not participate at any stage of the two-year-long discussion 
leading to the issuing of the Tshwane Principles, but its state secrets law clearly goes 
against the spirit, values and principles of the document. 
 
Rule of law versus rule by law: Japan’s post-war values in danger 
With the exception of a few brief intervals, the Liberal Democratic Party has ruled 
Japan for most of its post-war period, with changing the 1946 Constitution that was 
imposed on Japan by foreign powers being one of its founding goals. Since its 
creation in 1955, the party has also acted as a “hub for history revisionists,”564 who 
denied that events such as the Nanjing Massacre ever took place and who have been 
attempting to whitewash Japan’s wartime history. The likes of Nippon Kaigi and its 
closely affiliated organizations and groups appear to serve as indirect ideological 
think-tanks that provide a right-wing conservative ideology for the LDP. These 
groups have been growingly active since the 1990s and early 2000s, pushing the 
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LDP towards constitutional revision and reintroducing more traditional values into 
Japanese society. 
A political blueblood, Prime Minister Abe has built his entire career 
supporting this political agenda, being closely associated with, or even serving as a 
high-ranking member in, a number of these right-wing conservative groups. A Diet 
member with only a few years experience in the 1990s, Abe was already at the 
forefront of the politics of denial as the Secretary General of the Young Diet 
Member Group for Considering Japan’s Future History Textbooks (Nihon no Zentō 
to Rekishi Kyōkasho wo Kangaeru Wakategiin no Kai), a group aiming to revise 
Japan’s masochistic (jigyakuteki) history education and whitewash the country’s 
wartime history.565 
His career has developed parallel to the creation of such groups that one way 
or another advocated for Japan-specific values and the reversal of the post-war 
liberal democratic order established by the 1946 Constitution. Accordingly, Abe and 
other leaders of the LDP have long sought to establish greater government powers,566 
and their moment finally arrived with the LDP securing a comfortable majority in 
both houses of the Diet after the December 2012 elections. 
Soon after PM Abe announced his new cabinet in January 2013, Children and 
Textbook Japan Network 21, a non-governmental organization formed to resist 
historical revisionism and fight the removal of material critical of Japan’s war record 
from textbooks, published a comprehensive list of the Abe administration’s ministers’ 
affiliations with various right-wing and conservative groups, as well as indicating 
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their positions in those groups. The list is a staggering account of how deeply 
Japan’s top leaders are involved in activities of such groups as the Diet 
Representative ‘Japan Conference’ Roundtable (Nippon Kaigi Kokkai Giin Kōdankai, 
the influential political wing of the Nippon Kaigi), the Diet Member Group for 
Considering Japan’s Future and History Textbooks (Nippon no Zentō to Rekishi 
Kyōkasho wo Kangaeru Giin no Kai), the Shinto Political Alliance Diet Member’s 
Roundtable (Shintō Seiji Renmei Kokkai Giin Kōdankai), the Association of Diet 
Members for Worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine Together (Minna de Yasukuni Jinja ni 
Sanpai suru Giin no Kai), the Diet Member Alliance for Promoting the Assessment 
of a New Constitution (Kenpō Chōsa Suishin Giin Renmei), the Japan Rebirth (Sōsei 
Nippon), the Committee for Promoting Reform of the Fundamental Education Law 
(Kyōiku Kihonhō Kaisei Sokushin Iinkai), the Association for Building a Proper 
Japan (Tadashii Nippon wo Tsukurukai), and the Association of Diet Members for 
Demanding that China Remove Defamatory Photographs from the War of 
Resistance Against Japan Memorial Hall (Chūgoku no Kōnichi Kinenkan kara Futō 
na Shashin no Tekkyo wo Motomeru Kokkai Giin no Kai).567 Many of the Japanese 
government’s top officials, including PM Abe himself, the Deputy Prime Minister, 
the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Minister of Justice, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology, the Minister of Defence, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary held high-
ranking positions in these influential groups that both implicitly and explicitly claim 
that Japan has “gone wrong” during the post-war period and therefore advocate for a 
social order similar to the prewar status quo, including the removal of content 
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critical of Japan’s wartime actions from school history textbooks and assert that 
Japan’s aim was to free Asia from Euro-American imperialism, implement a moral 
and patriotic education based on Japan’s traditional values, reinstate the centrality of 
the Imperial Family and promote Shinto values, advocate for official political visits 
of the Yasukuni Shrine, push for a constitutional revision, and to rethink Japan’s 
post-war order.568 
Japan’s first constitution, the Meiji Constitution, can be regarded as a means 
for the government to have control over society, in which the value of the people 
was defined in such terms as obedience, filial piety and loyalty to the Emperor, and 
being subservient to a government that acted in the name of that Emperor. Japan’s 
post-war Constitution radically changed this view of law by placing constraints on 
the power of the government instead, following the principles of constitutionalism 
developed in Western liberal democracies. This new understanding of the law was 
founded on popular sovereignty and on the principles of fundamental human rights, 
representative democracy, and individualism. Although these were at odds with 
Japan’s traditional values, the Japanese people have since come to embrace them. 
Elevating the status of the Emperor, or even restoring his formal powers, has 
been a part of a simmering, but decades-long revisionist agenda in Japan, in which 
right-wing conservative groups such as Nippon Kaigi have played a central role. 
Parallel to issuing the LDP’s draft constitution in 2012, Abe proposed a new public 
commemorative event called the Restoration of Sovereignty Day (Shūken Kaifuku no 
Hi) to be celebrated on 28th of April each year. This is the day when Japan’s Allied 
Occupation ended in 1952 and the day when the LDP announced its draft 
constitution 70 years later. It became a formal event of the state soon after Abe 
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assumed his position as prime minister and was first celebrated with the attendance 
of the Emperor and the Empress in 2013.569 On the grounds of Japan’s current 
constitution it is highly questionable that the emperor, being merely a symbol of the 
state, should attend such an event, his presence could have reinforced the right-wing 
consevative agenda which claims that full sovereignty can only be restored with the 
Emperor becoming the head of the state again, and Article 1 of the LDP’s draft 
points in this direction. 
Abe is also at the front of a campaign that aims to call for a revision of Article 
96, lowering the current two-thirds supermajority requirement for constitutional 
amendments to a simple majority in the Diet. The initiative appears to have support 
not only among LDP members, but also with Nippon Ishin no Kai, a major 
opposition party, and some smaller ones like Your Party.570 Watering down the 
supermajority requirement would essentially open the road to all other constitutional 
changes in the future. As Yōichi Higuchi points out, by amending Article 96, the 
LDP would effectively “change the rules of the game first,” which goes “completely 
against the spirit of constitutionalism.”571 
In Japan, there has always been a tendency for the government to destroy 
evidence, or in certain cases, to not produce any evidence at all, and there is no law 
for governments agencies and bureaucrats to keep records or disclose information 
after a certain time has lapsed. A recent example would be that when the Japanese 
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government reinterpreted the Constitution to allow for the exercise of collective self-
defense in 2014, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau did not keep any records of its 
internal discussions.572 
The 2012 draft constitution and the state secrets law point right into the heart 
of an issue that has long and deeply been embedded in the Japanese political system: 
a right-wing conservative revisionist agenda that aims to remove the liberal-
democratic foundations of post-war Japan, of which the LDP itself appears to be the 
most significant enemy. Japan’s current constitution has greatly contributed to the 
nation’s quick post-war recovery, serving as a basis for the nation’s peaceful 
prosperity and keeping government power at bay. Abe and his right-wing followers 
have embarked on a mission to turn Japan’s current constitution that is based on 
upholding universal values such as human rights, democracy and freedom into a 
Japan-specific “autonomous constitution” (jishū kenpō) that draws on historical 
traditions and focuses on Japan’s perceived uniqueness, significantly changing the 
balance of power between government and civil society, to the detriment of the latter. 
So far both public and academic debate about the LDP’s proposal to amend 
Japan’s post-war constitution has largely been in the context of reinterpreting and 
changing Article 9, which guarantees peace. As this chapter showed, however, there 
are many more fundamental values that are in danger by the 2012 draft constitution. 
With the State Secrets Law now in place, some of Japan’s democratic values, 
including the general public’s right to know, are in grave danger. With its checks and 
balances in place, however, Japan’s current constitution is still able to put a powerful 
restraint on Japan’s political elite. But Abe and his followers envision an 
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autonomous constitution that would significantly adjust the balance of power 
between the government and individual rights: instead of using the constitution to 
keep the power of the state in check, the LDP wants to remove restraints from 
government power and impose duties on the people instead, which goes against the 
values of modern constitutionalism. In other words, the LDP wants to revise the 
fundamental values and principles in Japan’s constitution, based on which Japan’s 
post-war regime was founded, and on which a new Japanese society was built. By 
attempting to revoke those values and principles, the LDP clearly believes that those 
‘universal’ values and principles are wrong, or at least do not apply to Japanese 
society. With its proposed new constitution and the already implemented State 
Secrets Law, the LDP clearly seems to value state power and authority above 
universal values and principles. If the proposal to change the post-war constitution is 
successful, the Japanese government would simply become the judge, the jury and 
the enforcer and the state would become accountable ultimately only to itself. 
The LDP’s constitution was first drafted and published in 2005. Remarkably, 
this year was also when Japan started to develop its so-called values-oriented 
diplomacy (during Abe’s first term as prime minister), with which it aimed to clearly 
distinguish itself from the Chinese government and reinforce its image as a liberal-
democratic and progressive country to other members of international society. With 
the proposed changes, however, the LDP is effectively saying that liberal democracy 
is incompatible with Japan’s culture and traditions. Indeed, the values and principles 
that the LDP’s draft constitution advocate, and the powers that the already-
implemented state secrets law give to the government, push Japan closer to the way 
in which the Chinese government, the object of its criticism, operates. At the same 
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time, the LDP clearly seems to want to distance itself from certain values on which 






In this thesis I have argued that values play a significant role in the views of the 
Japanese toward contemporary Japan-China relations. Both in its academic and 
political narrative as presented to an international audience, Japan views itself as a 
country that puts great emphasis on advancing universal values such as democracy, 
freedom, the rule of law, and human rights. At the same time, Japan characterises 
China in quite the opposite terms, presenting it as a country that lacks these shared 
values. 
My research examined the shortcomings of Japan’s views of its relations with 
China in the context of the same values the Japanese elite considers important, and 
concluded that, while its references to universal values are frequent, those values are 
not applied consistently and critically when it comes to reflecting on Japan’s own 
roles and responsibilities, whether in regard to persistent and deep-running historical 
issues between the two countries, or in regard to Japan’s strategies in cooperating 
with other countries, or in reflecting on its recent domestic politics. Advancing 
arguments based on the relevance of any values is misleading when those values are 
applied only in a particular context. Values must be consistently applied to all parties 
involved, in any context and without exception. The Japanese political and academic 
elite’s lack of consistency in applying the same values based on which it criticizes 
China to itself – and to some other countries – is therefore what this dissertation 
takes issue with. 
More specifically, my research revealed shortcomings in Japan’s values 
approach in the following three different areas: 
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Credibility of Japan’s foreign policy strategies 
Firstly, Japan’s concept of universal values was vaguely defined. Apart from 
repeatedly emphasizing the importance of democracy, freedom, human rights, and 
the rule of law in its foreign policy statements and international agreements, Tokyo 
did not make clear what exactly it meant by these values and never formulated actual 
policies based on which these values could be further advanced with its partner 
countries. 
Secondly, there was also a lack of consistency in Japan’s pursuit of universal 
values in its diplomacy. Frequent changes in Japanese government resulted in 
inconsistent foreign policy strategies: While some administrations placed universal 
values in the centre of their diplomacy, others appeared to consider promoting 
universal values less important. Some governments were even openly against 
incorporating any kind of values into their diplomacy. The emergence and 
subsequent decline of Tokyo’s Arc of Freedom and Prosperity initiative also showed 
that Japan itself has difficulties with how central universal values should be in its 
own diplomatic principles. Tokyo’s oscillations between pragmatism and universal 
values appear to have been motivated less by a deeper commitment to those values 
than by its more narrowly understood national interests. 
Thirdly, there was a significant problem with credibility. Japan’s values-
oriented diplomacy, and its Arc of Freedom and Prosperity initiative in particular, 
outlined cooperation based on strengthening universal values with a number of 
countries that did not find those values important. It would be hard to argue that 
some Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan greatly value 
democracy, the rule of law, or human rights in both their domestic and foreign 
policies, and this was also the case with some ASEAN countries such as Myanmar 
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and Cambodia. This was arguably the reason why Tokyo expressed its commitment 
to universal values in principle and never put the strengthening of those values into 
well-defined policies and practical action. 
It is clear that frequent references to universal values were meant 
predominantly to advance Tokyo’s own political interests: It is hard to think it was a 
sheer coincidence that Japan emphasized exactly those values that it thought China 
rejected. Japan’s values-oriented foreign policy therefore had relevance 
predominantly on a rhetorical and strategic level. In this way Tokyo aimed to 
mitigate China’s influence in Asia by expanding the scope of its own cooperation 
with supposedly like-minded countries in Asia and beyond. Japan therefore appears 
to have used the concept of universal values with the aim of elevating its 
international image and appeal to certain countries in a larger geopolitical game of 
competing for power and influence vis-à-vis China. 
 
Consistency of Japanese academic views 
I argued that not only are Japan-China relations fraught, but so are some of the 
approaches with which a number of leading Japanese academics attempt to explain 
them to an international audience. Firstly, Japanese scholars tend to view China and 
Japan, and even Japan’s major ally, the United States, in monolithic terms. While 
they adopt a critical approach towards China and describe it in mostly negative terms 
– some even going as far as to claim China is Japan’s enemy – they tend to avoid 
criticising the Japanese government with the same vehemence. Also significantly, 
the presented scholars’ views lack any substantial criticism toward the role the 
United States plays. In normative terms, the power of the US-Japan alliance, as well 
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as the power of the current global and regional status quo, should be valued by Japan 
to the extent they consistently uphold universal values in the country’s international 
relations. From a values perspective, the power of any status quo is only credible and 
acceptable as long as it is based on the genuine advancing of universal values and 
not narrowly defined self-interests. Drawing on John Mearsheimer, who asks why 
China would not act out of self-interest, Chapter Three also questions whether the 
current status quo, both in Asia and globally, was based on the realization of 
universal values. Even the lack of equality in the US-Japan alliance, in which the US 
is evidently the leading power whose actions are never questioned, indicates that 
perceptions of power play a more significant role than universal values not only in 
the bilateral relation itself, but also in Japanese scholarly writing on it. Status quo 
always serves the interests of those in power and affects negatively those who are 
not. Status quo itself is the result of the age-old struggle for power and it therefore 
represents power relations and hierarchy and not a state of affairs based on the 
realisation of universal values. The term itself in international relations presupposes 
interests and efforts to maintain existing power structures and a resistance to any 
change that might challenge the power of those in charge. As such, status quo itself 
is part of the problem and not the solution. While scholars rightly point out that 
China is challenging the current regional, and perhaps global, order, their arguments 
remain in the context of power, and not values, if they are not critical towards the 
current status quo itself. 
As argued earlier, China is much more than merely a research object to satisfy 
Japanese scholars’ intellectual curiosity, but, as Noriko Kamachi points out, a proper 
attitude towards China is also important for their moral integrity. This needs to be 
extended to critical scholarly reflections on the roles of Japan and the United States, 
 228 
including holding them to account when it comes to holes in their advancement of 
universal values. This leads to the problem of normativity in Japanese scholarship. 
As Chapter Three showed, while earlier Japanese research on Japan-China 
relations included significant normative elements, more recent publications tend to 
be descriptive. The advantage of normative research, particularly on the present state 
of Japan-China relations, is that it can make a strong case for how things ought to be, 
rather than just explaining how things in reality are. From a normative and values-
based perspective, scholars must contribute proactively towards establishing better 
visions for future bilateral relations, be it through criticism or through concrete 
policy recommendations that help facilitate cooperation and the realization of a more 
values-based future status quo.573 Japanese scholars need to work on formulating 
more positive visions for future Japan-China relations that are inclusive, holistic, 
long term-based, and universal values-oriented. 
 
The Japanese political elite’s proposed domestic values 
As discussed earlier, one of the central tenets of Japan’s values-oriented diplomacy 
is a general respect for universal values such as “human dignity, rule of law, and 
democracy.”574 These values can also be understood as values of civil society and are 
therefore applicable to Japan’s own domestic society as well. However, as the case 
study in Chapter Four reveals, it is highly questionable whether universal values are 
really important to the Japanese political elite when it comes to its own civil society. 
                                               
573 The term “future status quo” is somewhat an oxymoron as status quo literally means the state of 
affairs that existed before. The point is of course to constantly move forward towards a better state 
of affairs. 
574 Kanehara, “Japan’s Grand Strategy and Universal Values.” 
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Indeed, neither the spirit of the LDP’s draft constitution and its proposed new 
stipulations, nor the State Secrets Law and issues around its implementation  such as 
the lack of both public discussion and consultation with experts  indicate that the 
Japanese government has much respect towards universal values. On the contrary, 
the case study showed that the existence of those very values is put in danger by both 
documents: the values and principles that the LDP’s draft constitution advocate, and 
the powers that the State Secrets Law give to the government, push Japan closer to 
the way in which the Chinese government, the object of its strongest criticism, 
operates. At the same time, the LDP’s draft constitution clearly distances Japan from 
the very values that Western liberal democracies uphold and on which Japan’s own 
post-war order was founded. As argued in the Introduction, values represent an ideal 
state of affairs and are therefore only approximative in reality. In this context, it can 
be argued that Japan’s moving away from those values is even more alarming than 
China’s perceived lack of universal values, as Beijing is at least consistent in that 
regard. 
 
‘What can Japan do better?’575 
In my thesis I do not aim to discredit Japan’s genuine concern about China’s rise and 
its future course. Nor does it argue that values are not important to Japan. On the 
contrary, I strongly agree with those cited in this research who point out that values 
                                               
575 One of the most prominent contemporary Japanese international relations scholars, Takashi 
Inoguchi, maintains that post-war Japanese international relations research mostly sought to answer 
the question, “what went wrong?”, i.e. how Japan ended up in the position it found itself at the end 
of the Pacific War. See Takashi Inoguchi, “Why are there no non-Western theories of International 
Relations? The Case of Japan,” in Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and 
Beyond Asia, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (London, New York: Routledge, 2010), 56. 
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are important and they do matter to Japan.576 I also agree with one of Japan’s 
significant dilemmas about China: namely, whether the latter will take a more open 
and commonly shared values-based approach, or on the contrary continue to pursue a 
rather self-centred and self-interest-based approach in dealing with other countries. 
This is indeed a very important dilemma and is of concern to the rest of the world as 
well. What this thesis takes issue with is whether values always matter to Japan, and 
whether Tokyo always appreciates values for what they are. How much does Japan 
really understand the value of personal freedom and human rights when it comes to 
issues of history with China, and, indeed, how much does it really comprehend the 
significance of the rule of law and democratic decision-making when it comes to its 
own civil society? Can Japan use these arguably universal values merely as a foreign 
policy strategy and exempt itself whenever it sees fit from having those values 
applied to itself? 
Shin`ichi Kitaoka makes a strong case that the international order of the 21st 
century must be based on achievements made by societies in the last 150 years. With 
this in mind, it is particularly concerning what Tarō Asō, Japan’s former foreign 
minister and present deputy prime minister – who happens to be one of the strongest 
advocates of Japan’s Arc of Freedom and Prosperity diplomacy – said regarding 
trilateral relations between China, Japan, and India: namely, that “China and India 
have hated each other for a thousand years. Why should things be different now?”577 
He later added that there was never a time for the past more than 1,500 years 
of history when India’s and Japan’s relations with China “went extremely 
                                               
576 Hosoya, “The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Grand Strategy: The ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ and 
the Future Asian Order,” 15. 
577 Malcolm Moore, “China: the new rulers of the world,” The Telegraph, April 19, 2018. Accessed 
May 1, 2018. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/non_fictionreviews/3672728/China-the-
new-rulers-of-the-world.html.  
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smoothly.”578 Asō’s argument indicates that he simply dismisses the possibility, and 
even the necessity, of making progress with China. He views China as a menacing 
force and a remnant of the past. As already argued, however, something has 
universal value when everyone finds it valuable or at least has reason to believe it 
has value. It would be difficult to argue that China has no reason to value human 
rights or the rule of law, even though it may not emphasize these as much as some 
other countries.  
The real issue, however, and quite controversially, is that universal values, 
such as human freedom, are not wanted with a universal validity (e.g. not everyone 
wants equal freedom for everyone else), and those values do not carry the same 
meaning for all. In fact, those values are vaguely defined and are understood quite 
differently in various cultural contexts. As argued in the Introduction, values are 
approximative in reality. Thus it is therefore unfair to deny universal values to any 
country, even if their path to realize these values is paved with contradictions and 
universal values are therefore often violated. Different countries take different paths, 
face different obstacles, and evolve at a different tempo. It would therefore result in 
the Japanese elite’s sudden and inevitable self-criticism if, instead of questioning 
China’s respect for values for its own benefit, it focused on how to better realize 
values in general. 
By the internal logic of Japan’s value-oriented diplomacy, it would be 
contradictory to say that Japan does not value the human rights of the Chinese. In 
other words, the problem with Japanese elite views – which can be rather extreme 
and self-righteous at times – is that they appear to try to convince others that China 
                                               
578 “Japan never had smooth ties with China, says deputy PM Taro Aso,” South China Morning Post, 
last updated February 23, 2017. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1230661/japan-never-
had-smooth-ties-china-says-deputy-pm-taro-aso. 
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rejects universal values, instead of assuming China’s own pursuit of universal values 
once and for all and focusing on how to assist and work together towards the 
convergence of the two countries’ different paths of realising universal values. 
Interests tend to focus on differences while values emphasize similarities. If 
Japan really considers universal values important, it must also seek for cooperation 
based on these values consistently, and without exception. The nature of universal 
values dictates that, regardless of how cooperative or uncooperative China seems, 
Japan should always be open towards it and constantly make efforts towards 
cooperation. In addition to that, and similarly importantly, the nature of universal 
values also dictates that even competition should be based on these values. But what 
is the best way to realize these values through competition? How can international 
competition be arranged so that it benefits everyone? In other words, how is it 
possible that, instead of narrowly defined self or national interest, international 
competition is based on values? Japan’s values-oriented diplomacy completely fails 
to address these important questions. 
 
‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ universal values in Japan’s international relations 
It may be no exaggeration to say that the history of post-Meiji Restoration Japan has 
been a history of the struggle with the notions of Westernization and 
modernization.579  
It would well exceed the limits of this thesis to go into the complexities of the 
- otherwise unavoidable – terminological issue of what is meant by "East” and 
                                               
579 Yōko Arisaka, “Beyond "East and West": Nishida's Universalism and Postcolonial Critique,” The 
Review of Politics 59, no. 3, Non-Western Political Thought (Summer, 1997): 541-542. 
 Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1408551. 
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"West,” and the relation between these two terms has changed over history. 
Nevertheless, even by using these terms we already assume and attempt to 
summarize what influences we attribute to certain cultural patterns. It was the 
Western tradition that defined itself and found its "special otherness” vis-á-vis 
Eastern traditions, starting from ancient Greek philosophy, through Roman law, the 
declaration of human and civil rights, the birth of free market capitalism, and the 
economic and cultural expansion of military-industrial imperialism. The West and 
the East shared many important views for centuries, but with time the utilitarian- and 
capitalist-turned West departed from holistic approaches and, with a few exceptions, 
generally stopped the scientific inquiry into universal values. The focus on sensual 
reality (over the supersensual) and individuality became the dominant characteristic 
of the soon-to-become-dominant West as well as the basis of the kind of empirism, 
positivism and political realism that Japan had to face relatively late and quite 
violently. In summary, the Japanese elite encountered, interacted with, and 
ultimately "tuned in to” not simply any kind of "West” – or "East" for that matter – 
at the end of its self-imposed isolation in the 19th century: It was strongly influenced 
by, and became susceptible to, dominant powers that strictly furthered their own 
interests. 
These are the contexts in which Japan’s values-oriented diplomacy becomes 
really interesting, and this is where Asia’s traditional cultural values and holistic 
sensitivity – something that, for instance, Okakura Kakuzō emphasized in the 19th 
century - can help further Japan’s genuine pursuit for universal values. As pointed 
out in the Introduction, traditional international relations in East Asia were defined 
by a China-centered system of tributary and vassal states, or, as John Fairbank calls 
 234 
it, the “Chinese World Order.”580 Early Japan was also a part of this ancient and 
relatively loose East Asian regional order, which not only contributed to its cultural 
development, but also stabilised the power of the Japanese archipelago’s competing 
warlords through assigning social ranks and authority to its members for many 
centuries.581 As opposed to the growingly individualistic Western cultures, East 
Asian relations were dominated by a more rigid and more collectivist social order 
and hierarchy until Western colonization. Even at times of anarchy, traditional order 
in East Asian societies remained largely unchanged. This unchallenged and mostly 
unchanging system brought peace and a sense of predictability on the one hand, but, 
on the other hand, it was essentially based on power and inequality, where social 
change and individuality played very little, if any, role. Confucianism found social 
harmony in a well-defined hierarchy, while Buddhism and Taoism did not have 
much to say about society. The only soft theory about international relations in East 
Asia, if one really stretches it, was perhaps offered in Sun Tzu’s famous book, the 
Art of War, from some 2,600 years ago. Interestingly, his book would likely be 
considered a Chinese realist theory today and would be compared to the works of 
Thucydides and Machiavelli, who are often considered to be forerunners of Western 
realist IR theories. 
It would be interesting to see, for instance,  a genuine attempt to create a 
Japanese theory of international relations based on the concepts of dàtóng (大同), 
perhaps Confucianism’s highest principle, which refers to a Great Harmony or a 
                                               
580 John K. Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 2. 
581 See Zhenping Wang, Ambassadors from the Islands of Immortals: China-Japan Relations in the 
Han-Tang Period (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 17-19. 
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Grand Union within society,582 and tiānxià (天下 –"all under heaven") – a concept 
understanding the world as an integrated whole in which a natural way of life is to 
seek harmony between differences, and where there is no such thing as an 
“outsider.” 583  This holistic worldview emphasizes inclusiveness rather than 
exclusiveness, an inclusiveness in which well-defined boundaries of nation-states 
and national interests are difficult to imagine. As opposed to Western theories, where 
the balance of power is perhaps what can be achieved at best, and in which power 
often comes from possessing, and often exploiting, human and natural resources, the 
holistic ideas of dàtóng and tiānxià suggest not only a possibility, but the moral 
necessity of establishing harmony within and between societies as well as in human-
nature relations. In the light of the current state of international relations, let alone 
Japan-China relations, this is a rather naïve, if not laughable, proposition. Yet it also 
indicates how far those current international relations are from such high ideals, and 
not only in the case of Japan. 
Despite an abundance of East Asian religions and philosophies (i.e. 
Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, Zen Buddhism), it is striking to see how little 
these have been utilized to create East Asian theories of international relations. 
Perhaps the answer lies in the traditionally hierarchic and fundamentally cyclic 
worldviews of East Asian cultures and in their simple struggle to catch up with the 
West in the past 170 or so years. 
                                               
582 Xiufen Lu, “The Confucian Ideal of Great Harmony (Datong ), the Daoist Account of Change, and 
the Theory of Socialism in the Work of Li Dazhao,” Asian Philosophy 21, no. 2 (May 2011): 171–192. 
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583 Lelise Gobena, “The Implications Of "Tianxia" As A New World System,” USC US-China Institute, 
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While some thinkers, such as Yūkichi Fukuzawa, fully embraced Western 
notions of liberalism and democracy, others rejected them and tried to preserve the 
“spirit of the samurai.”584 The Meiji modernization is also generally considered to be 
the time when the notion of “Western philosophy” – as opposed to Confucianism 
and Buddhism – was introduced to Japan,585 and during this period notions such as 
truth, universality and modernity became closely linked to the West in the eyes of 
many, and things as well as ideas ‘non-Western’ were often associated with being 
false or regarded as lagging behind.586 Nevertheless, some Japanese thinkers sought 
to establish a balance between Eastern and Western thought and to find a better 
understanding of the universal by attempting to combine what they considered to be 
the best of both cultures. One of the most prominent intellectuals in this regard was 
Kitarō Nishida, the founder of modern Japanese philosophy and the leading figure of 
the Kyoto School, who argued that Eastern traditional thought must be used to shed a 
new light on Western thought with the aim to create a new world culture. He noted 
that the East and the West “must complement each other and (…) achieve the 
eventual realization of a complete humanity. It is the task of Japanese culture to find 
such a principle.”587 
                                               
584 For instance, Saigō Takamori, one of the central figures bringing about the Meiji Restoration, 
even led an unsuccessful uprising against the modernizing state with the aim of returning to 
traditional Japanese values. 
585 Funayama Shin`ichi dates the introduction of Western philosophy to Japan in 1862, when August 
Comte and John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism were introduced from Europe. See footnote 4 in Arisaka, 
“Beyond "East and West," 543. 
586 Arisaka, “Beyond "East and West",” 542-543. 
587 Cited in Arisaka, “Beyond "East and West," 545.  See also Nishida Kitarō Zenshu [Collected works 
of Kitarō Nishida], vol. 14 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 404-407. To Nishida, the synthesis of 
‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ thinking meant a combination of the language of Western philosophy with 
Buddhist metaphysics.  For a more detailed analysis see Andrew Feenberg and Yōko Arisaka, 
“Experiential Ontology: The Origins of the Nishida Philosophy in the Doctrine of Pure Experience,” 
International Philosophical Quarterly 30, no. 2, issue 118 (June 1990): 173-205. DOI: 
10.5840/ipq19903023. Emphasis added. 
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While some attempts were made to combine the best of both philosophies, 
this was not the case when it came to ideas about international relations, which, as 
opposed to soft philosophies, were driven predominantly by hard power at the time. 
It is therefore not surprising, but rather unfortunate, that Japanese thought on 
international relations was based on hard power, on a fight for survival. In other 
words, Japan’s major concern was whether it would end up another colony of the 
Western powers or whether, on the contrary, it could resist colonization and even 
become a colonizing power itself. Accordingly, Japan went on to become a 
military-industrial power in its own right, something like a "best disciple of the 
West", by most successfully adapting to the dominating context of struggle for 
power in Asia. The history of international relations (IR) research in Japan was also 
dominated by Western ideas and IR theories, thus defining Japan’s success by 
Western, more specifically American, terms. One of the leading contemporary 
Japanese IR scholars, Takashi Inoguchi, argues that Japan, “being a failed 
challenger to American hegemony in the past and having been embedded in the 
global governance system dominated by the US today,”588 has not been in a 
position to develop new theories of international relations. 
Nevertheless, some recent developments, such as the 2001 launching of the 
journal, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (IRAP), Japan’s most important 
English-language international relations journal, suggest a growing need for 
Japanese IR scholars to introduce their views to a global audience and therefore be 
able to provide Japanese perspectives and play a more proactive role in the 
international community of IR research. Remarkably, the first topic taken up by the 
IRAP was the Asian values debate. On the other hand, however, Japan-China 
                                               
588 Inoguchi, “Why are there no non-Western theories of International Relations? The case of Japan,” 
51. 
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relations appear to be of interest for the journal’s editors only in the context of the 
China-Japan-US triangle, and even this topic is listed after “Japan’s ‘special 
relationship’ with the UK and the US.”589 
As an interesting coincidence with the time of the submission of this thesis, 
IRAP published an article rethinking Japan in mainstream international relations, 
arguing that all the usual theories provide “poor foundations for both academic and 
policy analysis of Japan’s important world role.”590 
Another important change has been a growing cooperation among various 
research institutions, as marked by the foundation of The Association of Japanese 
Institutes of Strategic Studies (AJISS), which incorporates the Institute for 
International Policy Studies (IIPS), The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), 
and the Research Institute of Peace and Security (RIPS). The research that has been 
carried out under the auspices of AJISS is available in English on its website and 
amounts to well over 200 articles to date, the majority of which focus on 
contemporary international issues and Japan’s international relations.591All these 
recent initiatives show the importance that Japan puts on its international relations, 
but there still appears much work to be done when it comes to incorporating values, 
let alone developing coherent value-oriented theories, into Japanese research. In 
addition, most publications are still strongly embedded in Western theories and the 
majority of them are still descriptive.592 
                                               
589 See the journal’s description and topics of interest here: 
https://academic.oup.com/irap/pages/About.  
590 Hitomi Koyama and and Barry Buzan, “Rethinking Japan in mainstream international relations,” 
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problems, a normative style that offers solutions is just as important, particularly when arguing from 
a values-based approach. When adopting a normative perspective, scholars can contribute 
 239 
The academic study of international relations dates back to not much longer 
than a century ago593 and has, up to now, been an overwhelmingly Western and 
predominantly male-dominated field of science. This has significant implications for 
the way its research concepts are defined and therefore for the way international 
relations are generally understood. The mainstream view of Western IR research is 
that all nation states have to compete for power and control based on self-interest in 
an anarchic set of international relations.594 In addition, one of the major works on 
which IR theories are founded is Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, in 
which he argues that “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of 
states.”595 Another scholar of the field, Edward Carr, also states that “no ethical 
standards are applicable to relations between states.”596 Their arguments suggest that 
the priority of being in control marginalizes all other objectives, and therefore the 
pursuit of power itself becomes the ultimate purpose of states, and the end justifies 
the means. However, the pursuit of power and control above all generally 
presupposes a world that does not change in its fundamental character. No wonder 
these ideas have very little, if anything, to say about qualitative change, such as 
moral progress or the pursuit of values, in international relations.597 In fact, many IR 
theories were unable to provide explanations for the sweeping political changes at 
                                                                                                                                    
proactively towards establishing better visions for future bilateral relations, be it through criticism or 
through concrete policy recommendations that help facilitate cooperation and the realization of a 
better ’future status quo’.  
593 William C. Wohlforth, “Realism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian 
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594 Ibid. 
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596 Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
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597 For instance, John Ruggie argues that realism, the most predominant IR theory, is unable to 
explain vital changes in the international system because the theory is missing both a dimension of 
change and a determinant of change. See John G. Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the 
World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” World Politics 35, no. 2 (January, 1983): 261-85. DOI: 
10.2307/2010273. 
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the end of the twentieth century, such as the end of the Cold War, accelerated 
globalization and the notion of a ‘global society’, as well as the growing number of 
international and non-governmental organizations, the growing importance of 
international law, and the strengthening of international civil societies and their 
networks. The problem lies in how power and interest are used and understood in 
international relations. As prominent IR scholar Janice Mattern points out, “if the 
way power is used shapes world politics, the way it is conceived shapes international 
relations.”598 
The earliest conceptions of power in international relations scholarship 
described it as an entity, intrinsic to physically tangible things such as the military, 
wealth and geography, and therefore the discipline focused exclusively on physical 
resources and on those states that had control over them, equating power literally 
with materialistic wealth and military force. It was not until late in the second half of 
the twentieth century that scholars started exploring and theorizing intangible 
features of power and made a distinction between actual and potential power, the 
former meaning the capacity of actor A to get actor B to do what it would otherwise 
not do, and the latter describing power as a relationship of influence.599 From this 
distinction, new theoretical aspects of power were born, and scholarship focused on 
defining various forms and aspects of power; however, it still failed to create more 
comprehensive and more positive definitions of the concept.600 Therefore, it is still 
common among scholars of international relations to conceive power in negative 
                                               
598 Janice B. Mattern, “The Concept of Power and the (Un)discipline of International Relations,” in 
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599 See David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in the Handbook of International 
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Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13-23. 
 241 
terms: they generally regard it as some form of control and influence over others, as 
an ability to impose one’s will upon another, whether directly or indirectly. 
Even though Joseph Nye, a leading theorist of the field, has pointed to the 
growing role of less direct forms of power, such as soft and smart power,601 scholarly 
interpretations, including those of Nye, still tend to understand the concept from a 
narrowly-defined interest-based perspective. In other words, power is still 
understood as imposing one’s self-interest upon others, albeit in more 
sophisticated/less coercive ways.  
Some scholars have challenged these essentially negative definitions of 
power by pointing to consequences of the abuse of power. Some international 
relations scholars point out that it was the Frankfurt School’s and feminist theory 
that contributed perhaps the most to a more positive understanding of power. They 
focused on the ethical foundations of power, criticizing oppression and envisioning 
emancipation, and they introduced concepts such as caring power.602  
As I argued earlier, Japan attempted to form a new East Asian regional order 
during its first period of modernization that culminated in the Pacific War, although 
its attempt was not more than merely adjusting itself to the international 
circumstances of the time based on colonizing and hard power. After its defeat by 
the Allies, Japan has never challenged the U.S.-centered international order and 
theories of international relations. China’s re-emergence may well only reinforce a 
traditionally non-theorizing and China-centered East Asian regionalism and a 
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worldview that is based on both social and regional hierarchy and therefore may 
provide little space for critical theories that are necessary to bring about change and 
progress in international relations. 
Nevertheless, it may seem a bit naïve but I believe that one of the most 
important and yet-to-be-answered questions about power in international relations, 
from both a practical and a theoretical perspective, is: what should be the common 
goals and strategies based on which opposing interests in a conflict can be 
resolved?603 If there is no clear understanding of, and a strong focus on, common 
goals and strategies, conflicts tend to be ‘resolved’ in favour of the more powerful 
party. But can conflicts truly be resolved based on power? It seems that as long as 
power determines who – or what – is right, solutions are not real and can even 
deepen any existing conflicts. Without being based on common goals and strategies, 
solutions are impossible. Without being based on universal values, common goals 
and strategies are difficult to establish.  
Overall, Japan appears to show little intention to challenge dominant Western 
theories and perceptions of international relations, and, considering its weight, 
contributes very little to IR theories. In fact, some of the attempts at creating more 
comprehensive non-Western theories of international relations were done by 
Western intellectuals, such Ralph Pettman and Ernst Schumacher. The former writes 
about such theories as Taoist strategies, Buddhist economics, Confucian Marxism, 
                                               
603 Whatever the meaning of ‘conflict resolution’ might be, e.g.  a complete elimination or a partial 
solution, or even a transformation of a problem. 
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and Hindu constructivism, while the latter developed an alternative economic model 
based on one of Buddhism’s central ideas, the Middle Way.604 
Without contradicting the concept of universal values, Japan’s pursuit of values in its 
international relations could certainly draw from Zen’s practice of self-discipline, 
Buddhism’s emphasis on compassion and responsibility towards others, or Taoism’s 
concept of a holistic harmony. 
It must be noted that a larger, ultimately philosophical, problem lies behind 
the Japanese elite’s controversial use of values: it is clear that any external influence, 
be it Eastern or Western, is filtered through the selective receptivity and 
susceptibility of the Japanese elite, and will be adapted accordingly. Therefore, even 
within the context of ‘Eastern’ and Western influence, the Japanese elite is 
ultimately struggling with itself, with its very own syntheses. As Friedrich Nietzsche 
pointed out, if one fights with demons too long, one might become a demon 
oneself.605 To paraphrase him, it is the Japanese elite that created its own demons. 
Power struggle is always more receptive to relative power relations than to absolute 
values, and is therefore more apt to create demons rather than to genuinely struggle 
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How does Japan’s values-oriented diplomacy matter? 
Recent Japan-China relations appear to have reached a critical point. Based on 
lingering issues from the past and newly emerged conflicts, the two countries harbor 
so much negative sentiment towards one another that, to make significant progress in 
their bilateral relations, yet another normalization between them seems necessary. 
This thesis argues that Japan seems to be concerned less about values as about power 
and influence when it comes to its relations with China. It also attempts to show why 
this is problematic from a values-oriented perspective and argues that liberal 
democratic values that were embraced by the majority of the Japanese in the post-
war period are threatened less by China than, in fact, by the very political party that 
has ruled Japan for most of the same period and which, remarkably, calls itself 
liberal and democratic. 
The Japanese elite can only expect qualitative change when it better 
understands the importance of values and consequently can genuinely strive to 
realize them internally as well as externally. Hitoshi Tanaka argues that Japan 
matters even more as China rises. What is left unclarified in Tanaka’s argument is 
how Japan matters in this context. In this thesis I have indicated that Japan should 
matter from a values perspective: it needs to overcome a growing chasm between the 
values it advocates to an international audience and the values on which the Japanese 
political elite attempts to strengthen power over its own society.  
Tamotsu Aoki, a well-known anthropologist at the University of Tokyo, 
maintains that Japan has faced an identity crisis three times. The first came with its 
rapid modernization and Westernization in the Meiji period, and the second with its 
devastating defeat at the end of the Pacific War, which propelled the country towards 
Americanization. The third crisis started in the mid-1980s (1984-present), which 
 245 
Aoki calls the period “from unique to universal,”606 with Japan struggling to open 
itself more and become a more integral part of international society. 
How the Japanese elite sees China reflects also on them. What course China 
takes in the future therefore can also be influenced by Japan’s more consistent 
approach to values, whether it be through self-criticism or through criticising others, 
such as its major ally, the United States. 
To paraphrase Japanese international relations scholar, Takashi Inoguchi, who 
argued that post-war Japanese international relations research predominantly sought 
to answer the question, “what went wrong?”,607 current Japanese research must try 
harder to address the question, “what is going wrong?” When practical solutions do 
not seem to work well enough, questioning ourselves and our own approaches is just 
as important as questioning others. This is all the more essential when adopting a 
values-oriented approach. The status quo will not change significantly without a 
substantial shift in perspective based on the understanding of universal values. 
What really should matter is not who leads, but what values lead and where we 
are all heading. This is how values should really matter, and not only to Japan. 
  
                                               
606 Tamotsu Aoki, Nihon Bunkaron no Henyō [Evolution of the “studies on Japanese culture”] (Tokyo, 
Chūō Kōronsha, 1990), 11-28. Emphasis added. 
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